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1. Introduction 
 
In the introduction to Out of her Mind: Women Writing on Madness, 
Rebecca Shannonhouse poses the question “So what is “madness”? 
When is it mental illness? Or when is it the circumstances of a woman’s 
life driving her “out of her mind”?” (Shannonhouse 2003: xii).  This is 
precisely the question, which is fundamental to my question. In this thesis, 
I want to highlight the influence of patriarchal society on women’s mental 
condition and how women are driven “out of their minds”, as represented 
in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper”, Sylvia Plath’s The 
Bell Jar and Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing.  
 
In order to analyze “The Yellow Wallpaper”, The Bell Jar and 
Surfacing, some key terms must be established before turning to the 
individual literary works. My analysis is based on the following terms: 
femininity, madness and psychiatry. None of these concepts have one 
single meaning but, rather, are subjects to changing meanings. As a 
consequence, one stable, unchanging definition cannot be given, but the 
discourse evolving around each term should be elaborated. The first 
chapter functions as a theoretical introduction to the aforementioned key 
terms. First of all, the term “madness”, which is fundamental to all three 
literary works discussed in this thesis, will be clarified and the relation to 
psychiatry will be identified. Secondly, “femininity” will be introduced as a 
parallel construction to “madness”. Feminist attempts of challenging and 
deconstructing “femininity” and of creating a new female language will be 
elaborated.  
 
In the second chapter, I will turn to “The Yellow Wallpaper”, a text in 
which madness is employed as a liberating tool to escape the construction 
of “traditional femininity” of Victorian society. The plot evolving around a 
depressed mother and wife, who flees her unsatisfying reality, provides 
the opportunity to analyze the doctor-patient relationship as well as the 
husband-wife relationship. Additionally, the distribution of space will be 
highlighted and a relation between the limiting physical space available to 
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the narrator and the mental space she claims will be established. In 
addition, the narrator’s altering use of language as the origin of a new 
feminine language will be discussed.  
 
The third chapter is devoted to The Bell Jar, which is set during 
McCarthyism. The Cold War and the parallels between the Communist 
enemy and the mad protagonist are central in this chapter. Because the 
novel is partly set at a psychiatric hospital, the doctor-patient relationship 
will be elaborated, but also the limiting effects of the “cure” of the 
protagonist from her madness. Furthermore, I will show how the traditional 
roles available to women in 1950s America are challenged and the 
possible careers, which are presented to the protagonist, are questioned.  
 
In the fourth chapter, Surfacing, which is set in 1970s Canada, will be 
analyzed. As I will show, space plays a major role in the novel and the 
concept of wilderness is presented as a sign for the return to and the 
redefinition of one’s self.  
 
This thesis will prove that madness can be used by patriarchal society 
as an instrument to suppress women, but that it can also be a device for 
women to escape this very society.  
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1.1. Madness/Woman – the Other 
 
Three literary works will be discussed in this thesis, which address the 
notion of madness and femininity. Patriarchal society captures the female 
body and inscribes its norms onto it. Women cannot break free from this 
system with their bodies; however, they can flee patriarchal norms with 
their minds—by going mad.  
Neither femininity nor madness can have one single definition, but they 
are subjects to continuous change. It is essential to note the parallels and 
interweavements of femininity, madness and language. All three concepts 
can be found in the works discussed in this thesis and can be understood 
as instrument working either for or against women. 
Madness can be understood as the tool of patriarchal society to 
suppress women. However, it can also be regarded as women’s device to 
gain freedom and independence from a society, which does not allow 
women to leave prescribed norms. Madness is the only option for women 
who do not want to conform to these societal rules. As a consequence, 
madness can be a tool either for suppression or liberation.  
Additionally, madness is represented in the notion of space: women 
who leave the allowed patterns of thinking and broaden their mind by 
recourse to madness, are in return restricted to a certain—limited—space. 
This space can be a room, a psychiatric institution or the wilderness, as 
will be shown later in this thesis. As soon as women’s minds cannot be 
limited to a certain way of thinking anymore, their bodies must be 
restricted within space by patriarchal society. Despite the spatial 
restriction, some women manage to break free in their minds and conquer 
patriarchal norms1. 
 
The question arises as to what function madness serves in some texts. 
In his book “Gender Identity and Madness in the Nineteenth-Century 
Novel,” Robert Lange shares his belief that  
                                            
1 “The Yellow Wallpaper” and Surfacing give examples of women breaking free from 
limiting societies, while The Bell Jar presents a protagonist who becomes both physically 
and mentally restricted by patriarchal society. The narrator of “The Yellow Wallpaper” is 
able to reject patriarchal rules in spite of physical restriction and thus make space for her 
new self. The protagonist of Surfacing, on the other hand, uses wilderness as her own 
space to recreate herself.  
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the language used by many nineteenth-century novelists to discuss 
and demonstrate gender issues was couched in a vocabulary of 
insanity, since no other vocabulary seemed adequate to reflect the 
conflict and turmoil manifest in theses personal issues (Lange 1998:1) 
 
This leads to the conclusion that gender and mental issues have 
something in common. Femininity is always marginalized and constructed 
as the Other—just like madness. Madness is seen as a passive term that 
mirrors the normal or sane. In this regard, madness is as necessary to 
society as femininity is. It is essential in playing the counterpart to the 
socially accepted behavior. In the essay “Women and Madness: The 
Critical Phallacy,” Shoshana Felman asks the crucial question which can 
be applied to both women and madness: 
 
How can the woman be thought about outside of the 
Masculine/Feminine framework, other than as opposed to man, without 
being subordinated to a primordial masculine model? How can 
madness, in a similar way, be conceived outside of its dichotomous 
opposition to sanity, without being subjugated to reason? How can 
difference as such be thought out as non-subordinate to identity? In 
other words, how can thought break away from the logic of polar 
oppositions? (Felman in Belsey and Moore 1995:138) 
 
Felman’s answer is “to examine the ideological effects of the very 
production of meaning in the language of literature and in its critical 
exegesis” (Felman in Belsey and Moore 1995:138).  
 
Madness is not only a parallel construction to femininity, but it has 
always also been linked to women more so than to men and is thus 
constructed as a natural female trait. This can already be seen by the 
word “hysteria”, which is derived from the Greek word for ‘uterus’ (Felman 
in Belsey and Moore 1995:133). This connection between madness and 
femininity reinforces existing stereotypes of the emotional woman who 
cannot control herself, mainly because of biological reasons, i.e. her 
hormones. However, Barta also sees moodiness as something positive. 
According to her,  
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the moody woman gains power through her unpredictability. When 
people do not know what to expect from her, she can manipulate them 
and keep them in suspense; she can even scare them (Barta 2004:10) 
 
As long as this madness does not interfere with patriarchal society, it 
can be tolerated and even used as a tool to put women into their 
seemingly natural place. However, if this madness diverges too much from 
the norm, women are considered mad. The only consequence then is to 
overtly exclude them from society and to treat them in patriarchal 
institutions, such as the psychiatric ward, or by representatives of 
patriarchal society. However, psychiatrists represent the norms of values 
of patriarchal society and fulfill the role of the paternal suppressor. 
Accordingly, psychiatric asylums work with the means of silencing 
patients. Just like women are spoken for in patriarchal society, the mad 
are spoken for as well. Felman calls this an “oppressive gesture of 
representation, by means of which, throughout the history of logos, man 
has reduced the woman [or the mad] to the status of a silent and 
subordinate object, to something inherently spoken for” (Felman in Belsey 
and Moore 1995:137). Phyllis Chesler makes women speak for 
themselves in her book Women and Madness. She shows that more 
women than men are treated in psychiatric institutions and she claims the 
reason is the uselessness and valueless of women in society. Chesler 
states that presently women are needed less in their “natural” sphere, 
namely at home and in their families. However, they are not wanted 
outside of their homes, either, which makes them “go mad” more overtly 
than ever before (Chesler 1972:33). According to Chesler, the patients in a 
psychiatric institution are forced into the role of children. Their sexuality is 
repressed, which might prove to be disastrous (especially for women) 
because, often, they have been sexually repressed all of their lives 
(Chesler 1972:36). 
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1.2.1. Hysteria – a “typical” and “natural” form of feminine 
madness? 
 
One particular form of madness should be discussed at this point, 
namely hysteria, with which most (mad) women were diagnosed in the 
middle and late nineteenth century. Joy Allison Barta states in her 
dissertation that  
 
[f]rom its Greek root, we learn why hysteria has always been 
associated with women. “Hysteria” comes from the word husterikos, 
which means suffering in the womb. This term itself was coined from 
the root hustera, meaning womb. […] Regardless of the gender of the 
sufferer, this illness has always been associated with the female, and 
thus with women. Perhaps the long-held belief that women are 
somehow “crazier” than men comes from the associations that have 
followed the word “hysteria” through time (Barta 2004:5) 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that doctors, such as Silas Weir Mitchell 
in the late nineteenth century, have diagnosed women suffering from 
different symptoms with one and the same mental illness and, as a result, 
condemning them to rest cures. Hysteria cannot be used to explain a 
specific set of symptoms that are the same for every patient. On the 
contrary, women with opposing symptoms were diagnosed with the same 
illness, making the only common feature of this illness the biological sex of 
its patients. The same symptoms might not have been cause for concern 
when they occurred in a man.  Barta discovers that  
 
[a] woman’s violation of society’s traditional role for her was much 
more troubling than a man’s, mainly because there were so many 
more ways that a woman could defy her role. If a woman did not stay 
home, marry, have children, obey her husband, she was considered 
abnormal (Barta 2004:8). 
 
One can draw the conclusion that women, who did not conform to the 
patriarchal norms and rules or did not fulfill the expected set of 
stereotypes, had to be treated or institutionalized.  
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Madness, on one hand, leads to an exclusion from patriarchal society 
and thus can be seen as a liberating step for women because they no 
longer have to carry out their duties and can break free from suppression. 
Madness could potentially provide space for women to be themselves. On 
the other hand, one must not forget that due to the denial of their 
traditional role women were locked up or treated by representatives of the 
society from which they were fleeing. These representatives again made 
sure to provide a substitute for what the women’s families or surroundings 
had done before, that is suppress them and incorporate them into the 
existing system. Barta even describes “the madhouse” as “dirty, 
repressive, and abusive,” and continues saying that “a woman’s madness 
could be a powerful expression, but it could also place her in a dangerous 
position” (Barta 2004:4).  
Excluding mad women from society leads back to the notion of 
marginalization, which can be seen in two different ways: Marginalized 
women can still just be part of the very society which has marginalized 
them. As a consequence, women at the brink of society are weakened by 
society. The other option is to regard the women as being part of 
another—alternative—society already, where they are not weakened 
anymore. These two different concepts of marginalization lead to different 
subject positions. Femininity and madness can be marginalized by a 
society to its outer limits. However, it does not liberate them, but only 
weakens them. Thus, becoming part of another society might actually 
provide space for them and proof to be liberating.  
 
Madness does not only share marginalization with femininity, but also 
faces the same problem when it comes to binary oppositions2. Jane M. 
Ussher sums this problem up with the term “material-discursive divide,” 
where material refers to action and the flesh, while discursive means 
discourse, signs and signifiers (Ussher 1997:1). She states that sexuality, 
madness, and reproduction are usually regarded as material, where the 
                                            
2 The following chapter on femininity will show that “woman” forms a binary opposition 
with “man”, where “woman” is always the weak part, which “man” needs to constitute 
itself. Similarly, “mad” is needed in order to define “sane”. “Mad” is turned into the passive 
term—into the Other—which has to be avoided in order to be a functioning part of 
patriarchal society.  
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body stands at the center of the scene (Ussher 1997:2). This makes the 
body subject to scientific or medical research, which is primarily based on 
physical examinations. 
Similarly, Michel Foucault regards “social structures as determined by 
dominant ‘discursive practices’”(Barry 2002: 179). “Discourse” includes 
“the whole ‘mental set’ and ideology which encloses the thinking of all 
members of a given society” (Barry 2002: 176).  Chris Barker sums up that 
Foucault 
 
explores the genealogy of the body as a site of disciplinary practices 
which  bring subjects in to being. Such practices are the 
consequences of specific  historical discourses of crime, 
punishment, medicine, science and sexuality. Thus, Foucault (1973) 
analyses statements about madness which give us knowledge about it, 
the rules which prescribe what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’  about 
madness, subjects who personify madness and the practices within 
institutions which deal with madness […]. (Barker 2000: 20) 
 
Consequently, every person is a product of history and of historical 
discourses. “Discursive formation” takes place “[w]here discourses provide 
ways of talking about a particular topic in similar ways with repeated motifs 
or clusters of ideas, practices and forms of knowledge across a range of 
sites of activity” (Barker 2000: 78). In reference to the study of discourses 
of madness, Foucault’s 1973 study Madness and Civilization is useful. 
Barker enumerates what Foucault included in his research:  
 
 statements about madness which give us knowledge 
concerning madness; 
 the rules which prescribe what is ‘sayable’ or ‘thinkable’ 
about madness; 
 subjects who personify the discourses of madness, i.e. the 
‘madman’; 
 the processes by which discourses of madness acquire 
authority and truth at a given historical moment; 
 the practices within institutions which deal with madness; 
 the idea that different discourses about madness will appear 
at later historical moments, producing new knowledge and a new 
discursive formation. (Barker 2000: 78-79) 
 
Consequently, “[d]iscourse constructs, defines and produces the 
objects of knowledge in an intelligible way while excluding other forms of 
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reasoning as unintelligible” (Barker 2000: 78). Therefore, madness is a 
construct of discourse which does not only determine what can be said 
about this topic, but also “who can speak, when and where” (Barker 2000: 
79). Hence, discourse is related to disciplinary power which includes “the 
‘sciences,’ which constitute the subject as an object of inquiry,” “‘dividing 
practices,’ which separate the mad from the sane” and “technologies of 
the self, whereby individuals turn themselves into subjects” (Barker 2000: 
79). Consequently, a “classification of what is sane and mad” has taken 
place and the “degrees of ‘mental illness’” have been categorized (Barker 
2000: 79).3 Thus, the body has functioned “as object and target of power” 
and has been dominated by disciplinary power since the classical age 
(Foucault 1979: 136).  
 
1.2.2. Psychiatry – a historical overview 
 
Treatment, which takes into account the patient’s opinion, is desirable; 
however, oftentimes, especially at the time when the discourse on 
madness first came up, the patient was merely the subject of experiments 
designed to test various theories. 
All three literary works discussed in this thesis are in one way or 
another connected to psychiatry. In “The Yellow Wallpaper,” psychiatry is 
represented by the protagonist’s husband, her brother and the absent, yet 
powerful, S. Weir Mitchell. In The Bell Jar, the protagonist sees and 
encounters several psychiatrists, is placed in a psychiatric ward of a public 
hospital and later in a private insane asylum. Surfacing relies on 
psychiatry on a more subtle level and does not overtly display 
representatives or institutions of psychiatry. However, psychiatry is an 
institutionalized part of the society the protagonist lives in and she—as 
well as other characters of the novel—must have knowledge of psychiatry, 
which makes the protagonist an object to psychiatry as well. For these 
reasons, a quick overview of the technologies of psychiatry should be 
                                            
3 The ‘Panopticon,’ Foucault’s “metaphor of disciplinary power,” will be introduced in the 
chapter 2.5. in this thesis (Barker 2000: 79). For further information, please check chapter 
3 “Panopticism” in Foucault’s Discipline&Punish. 
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given. I rely on Foucault’s Madness and Civilization, some works 
discussing Madness and Civilization and a book on medical history by Roy 
Porter, who does not criticize psychiatric developments in the same way 
as Foucault, but offers important steps in medical science. 
 
In order to understand how psychiatry works, one should bear in mind 
that the treatment of mentally ill people had not been a branch of its own 
until the nineteenth century. Instead, general practitioners had to take care 
of the insane. Jane Louis-Wood explains that Foucault regarded the 
concept of madness in the Middle Ages as a chaotic natural force outside 
man, which was derived from Biblical concepts (cf. Louis-Wood n.p.). This 
perception of madness was followed by two different concepts in the 
Renaissance. Madness was either regarded as a portal to the terrifying 
natural powers of night, thus representing a cosmic viewpoint, or as an 
ironic counterpart to reason, representing human weakness. In the 
Renaissance, the madmen were kept on the so-called “Ship of Fools,” the 
ultimate symbol for exile and marginalization; however, no strict exclusion 
of the mad from society existed, which was to come later. Only the second 
approach, namely madness as unreason or madness as the negative to 
reason, survived. Madness appeared to be in dialogue with reason, for 
example in the person of the court jester in the seventeenth century (cf. 
Protevi n.p.).  
 
The Classical Age represented the age of The Great Confinement. At 
the end of the eighteenth century, the first private mental asylums were 
opened in England. However, these asylums did not always involve 
doctors. At this time, it was still society that would declare people insane 
and would have them placed under custody with their own families, 
caretakers, prisons, reformatories, such as the Hôpital Général in France, 
or possibly (catholic) monasteries, where exorcisms were practiced upon 
the mad (cf. Porter 2000: 495). People who did not conform to the given 
social rules, were likely to be stigmatized as insane. One can assume that 
a society’s most powerful figures would decide whether or not someone 
was mad. Generally speaking, men were more powerful than women, 
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which turned women into powerless victims of madness accusations, if 
they did not conform to their preassigned role, for example that of a 
housewife and mother. 
 
In the nineteenth century, psychiatry was finally developed and 
institutionalized. Institutions such as madhouses, asylums, and psychiatric 
wards in hospitals were installed (Porter 2000:496). The Frenchman 
Philippe Pinel (1745-1826) played a major role in the development of 
psychiatric institutions, as he was in charge of the Hôpital Bicêtre, the 
psychiatric ward for men in the Hôpital Général.  
The Hôpital Général was founded in 1656 and, according to Michel 
Foucault, was “not a medical establishment” originally, but “an 
administrative entity which, along with the already constituted powers, and 
outside of the courts, decides, judges, and executes” (Foucault in Rabinow 
1991:125). Thus, the Hôpital Général was a powerful institution and an 
instrument of order, which provided confinement and prevented 
“mendiacancy and idleness as the source of all disorders” (Foucault in 
Rabinow 1991:128-129). Unemployed people were taken in who had to 
trade their individual freedom for food and had to “accept the physical and 
moral constraint of confinement” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:130). It 
should be noted that the Hôpital Général served as an institution for the 
homeless, unemployed, vagabonds and finally the mad. Also, it played a 
double role by giving work to the confined, thus providing cheap 
manpower to the state (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:132). The “madmen 
were included in the proscription of idleness” and were beginning to be 
confined in the seventeenth century because the madman “crosses the 
frontiers of bourgeois order of his own accord, and alienates himself 
outside the sacred limits of its ethic” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:136). 
Thus, the Great Confinement might be seen as an answer to an economic 
crisis, which demanded cheap labor, and as “a reaction to transgression of 
the basic structure of Classical thought” (Protevi n.p.). 
Philippe Pinel made the psychiatric ward more humane by handling 
the patients by means of an “ethical treatment,” which meant foregoing the 
use of chains. In addition, Pinel considered psychological reasons for 
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madness rather than physical reasons and introduced a more gentle way 
of treating the insane (Porter 2000: 497). He installed the authority of the 
alienist and tried to distract the insane by providing them with work (Porter 
2000:498). Thus “[t]he values of family and work, all the acknowledged 
virtues, now reign in the asylum” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:148), which 
was not unlike the confinement of a marriage for women. Pinel 
“guarantee[d] bourgeois morality a universality of fact and permit[ted] it to 
be imposed as a law upon all forms of insanity” (Foucault in Rabinow 
1991:150). He treated his patients by three principal means—silence, 
recognition by mirror and perpetual judgment. Silence was installed 
because 
 
there was no longer any common language between madness and 
reason; the language of delirium can be answered only by an absence 
of language, for delirium is not a fragment of dialogue with reason, it is 
not language at all; it refers, in an ultimately silent awareness, only to 
transgression (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:152) 
 
Silence was only broken by Freud in the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when he made “the insane” talk again.  
Finally, perpetual judgment regards the asylum as a juridical instance 
with instruments of punishment, where the madman is watched, judged, 
and condemned, which should lead to “the birth of remorse in the inmate’s 
mind” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:156).  
The three methods applied in Pinel’s asylum lead to an “apotheosis of 
the medical personage” and thus “mental disease […] is made possible” 
(Foucault in Rabinow 1991:158). This new position of the psychiatrist 
meant that  
 
[the] physician could exercise his absolute authority in the world of the 
asylum only insofar as, from the beginning, he was Father and Judge, 
Family and Law – his medical practice being for a long time no more 
than a complement to the old rites of Order, Authority, and Punishment 
(Foucault in Rabinow 1991:160-161) 
 
The paternal authority, which determines patriarchal society, also 
appropriates the asylum and incorporates exactly the same virtues and 
norms in the asylum. The psychiatrist becomes the exclusive holder of 
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power, who incorporates “the authority he has borrowed from order, 
morality, and the family” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:163). 
 
Samuel Tuke (1784-1857) accomplished something similar to Pinel’s 
asylum in an English Quaker community in York. His charitable institution 
was called “The Retreat,” which was governed by calmness, 
encouragement and a supporting familial atmosphere. The insane were 
treated like undisciplined children and, like Pinel, Tuke used neither chains 
nor corporal punishment (Porter 2000:499). The standard for “the Retreat” 
was family life, where the principles of praise/dispraise and 
punishment/reward were used. Foucault states that “[t]he Retreat would 
serve as an instrument of segregation: a moral and religious segregation 
which sought to reconstruct around madness a milieu as much as possible 
like that of the Community of Quakers.” Religion took over the function of 
balancing the “violence of madness” because “religion constitutes the 
concrete form of what cannot go mad” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:143). 
Tuke aimed at rebuilding self-control and restraint, which did not consider 
the reasons for madness. Foucault discovered that fear was  
 
addressed to the invalid directly, not by instruments but in speech; 
there is no question of limiting a liberty that rages beyond its bounds, 
but of marking out and glorifying a region of simple responsibility 
where any manifestation of madness will be linked to punishment 
(Foucault in Rabinow 1991:145) 
 
Therefore, “the madman” is no longer responsible for his/her madness, 
but he/she is in charge of “everything within him that may disturb morality 
and society, and must hold no one but himself responsible for the 
punishment he receives” (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:145). The asylum 
“organized that guilt” and 
 
by this guilt the madman became an object of punishment always 
vulnerable to himself and to the other; and, from the acknowledgement 
of his status as object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman 
was to return to his awareness of himself as a free and responsible 
subject, and consequently to reason. (Foucault in Rabinow 1991:146) 
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Tuke institutionalized the insane, but he did not believe that medicine 
had reached anything concerning madness and claimed that madness 
was not a medical illness. Medical doctors, on the other hand, believed to 
find the reason for insanity in the brain (cf. Porter 2000:500). Tuke’s 
distrust in medicine is understandable if one considers that medical 
doctors, such as Thomas Monro, who was in charge of Bethlehem 
Hospital in London, still chained the insane (cf. Porter 2000:499). Madness 
was still linked to animality, which triggered the lack of medical treatments 
(cf. Protevi n.p.). Still, continuously more alienists emerged and from 1845 
onwards, every county in Great Britain as forced by law to have one public 
asylum for the insane.  
 
Modern psychiatry is often regarded as ideal; however, it still reflects 
bourgeois values and holds the psychiatrist as the higher power. Never 
before has the psychiatrist had as much power as after Freud. This led to 
a revaluation of the position of the psychiatrist, who was almost turned into 
an omnipotent and beloved savior of the insane.  
Modernity was accompanied by various new findings and treatments. 
John Connolly (1794-1866) linked psychological and social factors and 
developed the non restraint method, which included socializing the insane 
and making them work (cf. Porter 2000:501). Other methods of that time 
were cold baths and gushes, isolation, electroshocks, swivel chairs, 
laxatives, and bleeding the patient.  
 
Several retreats were opened in the USA, which were modeled after 
Tuke’s “Retreat” in York, for example the Friend’s Asylum in Philadelphia 
(1817), the McClean Hospital in Boston (1818), the Bloomingdale Asylum 
in New York (1821), or the Retreat in Hartford, Connecticut (1824). In 
1812, Benjamin Rush, the founder of U.S. American medicine, wrote a 
book on madness that offered ethical therapy, physical restraint, fear, and 
bleeding as solutions to madness. Samuel B. Woodward (1787-1850) and 
Pliny Earle (1809-1892), both followers of the ethical therapy, founded the 
Association of American Institutions for the Insane (AMSAII) in 1844. In 
the same year, the American Journal of Insanity, later called the American 
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Journal of Psychiatry, was established by Amariah Brigham (cf. Porter 
2000:502). 
With the development of forensic psychiatry, insane people who had 
committed a crime were no longer punished. This development took place 
in England in 1799. It also triggered the fact that from this time on, only 
psychiatrists were allowed to judge whether or not someone was insane. 
Therefore, society had to give up its power of deciding who was insane 
and allow psychiatrists to be their representatives (cf. Porter 2000:504). 
Only the institution had changed, but the result remained the same. The 
psychiatrists conformed to the same norms as patriarchal society 
demands; therefore, they also condemned the people for the same failure 
to follow the norms.  
 
After 1850, several people, including John Perceval or Dorothea Lix, 
took action against deficiencies in mental clinics (cf. Porter 2000:505). Roy 
Porter describes one shocking scandal in his historical review of 
psychiatry—the case of Louisa Lowe. After having left her husband in 
1870, Louisa Lowe was kidnapped by him and brought into a madhouse, 
where she was held hostage despite her repeated insistence on her sanity 
and innocence. Despite the discovery that falsified documents brought her 
into the madhouse, she was not released. She was kept at the madhouse 
for eighteen months, which led her to found the Lunacy Law Reform 
Association, a means for protection of victims against their own family 
members (cf. Porter 2000:506). This scandal depicts how easily 
psychiatric institutions could have been used as instruments against 
women who did not follow socially accepted norms.  
Psychiatric institutions became instruments to lock and isolate patients 
as well as to observe their symptoms and behavior. In medicine, this led to 
new descriptions and classifications of illnesses; however, the morality of 
this kind of treatment must be strongly criticized and challenged (cf. Porter 
2000:508).  
 
 Around 1900, several developments took place, some of which were 
dangerous. The psychiatrist George Miller Beard (1839-1883) developed 
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the concept of neurasthenia—a weakness of the nerves because of the 
pressure of civilization. Silas Weir Mitchell (1829-1914) from Philadelphia 
enhanced this model and treated it with the famous rest cure, which 
consisted of bed rest and isolation. Increasing lobbies demanded 
compulsory measures, sterilization and the deployment of psychiatry at 
immigration controls (cf. Porter 2000:514). At the end of nineteenth 
century psychiatry, particularly mesmerism and hypnotism, people 
became interested in freedom of will, unconscious thinking and the unity of 
the self (cf. Porter 2000:515). Hypnosis was applied as a diagnostic 
means to discover hysteria, for example by Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-
1893). His findings proved to be wrong because he triggered hysteric 
seizures by his own expectations (cf. Porter 2000:516).  
Freud regarded hysteric symptoms as symbolic equivalences of 
unsolved subconscious conflicts (cf. Porter 2000:518). His psychoanalysis 
laid stress on other forms of therapy than medication. Ugo Cerletti (1877-
1963) first used electroshocks in 1938 in order to lessen symptoms of 
severe depression. Egas Moniz (1874-1955) developed the leucotomy, 
which had the side effect of altering the personality of some of his patients. 
Despite his experimentations, he received the Nobel price in 1949 (cf. 
Porter 2000:522). 
 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the prescription and use of 
psychotropic drugs has spread widely. Instead of putting “madmen” and 
“madwomen” into asylums, insanity is regarded as a societal phenomenon 
that is omnipresent (cf. Porter 2000:523). Thus a certain kind of 
deinstitutionalizing of the insane occurred in the 1980s, which was 
supported by movies, such as One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975), 
and by researchers such as Thomas Szaz or Michel Foucault (1926-1984) 
(cf. Porter 2000:524).  
 
Historically speaking, madness became mental illness, which was and 
is treated and controlled by medical and psychiatric practices. Madness is 
not, however, natural and unchanging, it depends on the society in which it 
exists, meaning that it depends on cultural, intellectual and economic 
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structures. Madness has always been assigned a certain cultural space 
within society—this could be the Ship of Fools, The Great Confinement, or 
hopefully a place within society, which does not marginalize, isolate and 
exclude. Psychiatry incorporates major resources of power. This power 
has often been abused in the past as an instrument to further careers or 
medical research and has especially been turned against women, who are 
marginalized even more. Foucault discovered that the living world of 
mentally ill people consists of terrifying images, while the healthy people 
realize their imaginary world artistically. The mentally ill are incapable of 
such interpretation because their expression is blocked “by a warped 
social system that prevents some people from acting on their projects” 
(Protevi n.p.). Therapy should start by conceding enough space to 
mentally ill people in order that they realize their imaginary world as well. 
Linda McDowell states that “speaking from the margins provides an 
alternative, more grounded position form which to challenge conventional 
assumptions” (McDowell in Eagleton 2003:13). A marginalized position is 
therefore supposed to procure women or the mad a platform to express 
themselves. Changes will ultimately only be effective if people also follow 
them. The works discussed in the following parts of this thesis are one 
means of expression and of challenging conventional assumptions.  
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1.2. Femininity 
 
Femininity is one of the key terms of feminism and a constant topic of 
an ongoing debate. Initially, I want to discuss femininity by giving attention 
to three major French feminist theorists in particular, namely Hélène 
Cixous, Luce Irigaray, and Julia Kristeva, whose theoretical definitions of 
“femininity” will be considered the course of this paper.  
 
In the essay “Feminist, Female, Feminine,” Toril Moi takes over 
Simone de Beauvoir’s notion of femininity by stating that “’[f]emininity’ is a 
cultural construct: one isn’t born a woman, one becomes one” (Moi in 
Belsey and Moore 1989:122). This is probably the key argument that 
underlies most consecutive attempts to define “femininity” or “woman”. 
Toril Moi proceeds by saying that 
 
patriarchal oppression consists of imposing certain social standards of 
femininity on all biological women, in order precisely to make us 
believe that the chosen standards for “femininity” are natural. Thus a 
woman who refuses to conform can be labeled both unfeminine and 
unnatural. It is in the patriarchal interest that these two terms 
(femininity and femaleness) stay thoroughly confused. (Belsey and 
Moore 1989:122-123) 
 
Consequently, the terms femaleness as the term for biological sex and 
femininity as cultural construct have to remain separated. Women do not 
share certain traits just because they have a similar biological 
precondition. However, in patriarchal society women are often reduced to 
their bodies and to their shared bodily experiences, such as menstruating 
or giving birth. As a result, women are subjects to medical and natural 
scientific doctrines based on bodily processes. These ostensibly medical 
facts are used to subordinate women when it comes to work, family, and 
language (Martin 1987:19). According to Emily Martin, a woman has to 
become solely her physical body in order to be sexually attractive in 
patriarchal society. Thus, the body becomes an object, not only for 
patriarchal society, but also for the woman herself. This leads to a split of 
the self, where various personae of the woman watch and various 
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personae are watched (Martin 1987:38-39). Therefore, women fulfill a role 
that is imposed on them by their bodies, or more precisely by what is 
inscribed on their bodies. Hence patriarchal society connects feminism to 
a set of psychological traits, such as naturalness, sweetness, helping, 
nurturing, etc., which lack biological reasons and are simply stereotypes.  
In Sexual/Textual Politics, Toril Moi lists the following eleven major 
stereotypes of femininity by Mary Ellmann, which were connected to 
women throughout history: formlessness, passivity, instability, 
confinement, piety, materiality, spirituality, irrationality, compliancy, the 
Witch, and the Shrew (Moi 1985:34). These traits do not apply to each and 
every woman and, therefore, cannot be regarded as natural. However, a 
relationship between the aforementioned stereotypes and femininity has 
been established by patriarchal society. As a consequence, stereotypes 
concerning femininity often are not questioned anymore, but regarded as 
biologically given and natural. 
Furthermore, a specific place is ascribed to women by patriarchal 
society. Men are supposed to work within the public arena, whereas 
women must construct “a place of leisured and domestic calm” (McDowell 
in Eagleton 2003:12). Home, meaning both the house and the homeland, 
has always been linked to the feminine and to female virtues; despite this 
fact, the behavior of women at home must still conform to societal norms. 
Therefore, home only appears to be the sphere of the woman, but it is 
merely an extension of patriarchal society (McDowell in Eagleton 
2003:14). The “domestic ideology of women as angels of the hearth” in the 
nineteenth century was only another image to suppress women (McDowell 
in Eagleton 2003:15). The same phenomenon occurs in the function of 
psychiatric asylums, which will be discussed later.  
Women are also suppressed in their sexuality. Since the eighteenth 
century, the population has been controlled by means of “strategic unities” 
in enforcing “normal” sexualities: “hystericization of women’s bodies, 
pedagogization of children’s sex, socialization of procreative behavior, and 
psychiatrization of perverse pleasure” (Chow in Eagleton 2003:102). 
 
According to the feminine traits mentioned above, Judith Butler calls 
femininity a “stylized repetition of acts” and sees gender as “a constituted 
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social temporality,” because gender norms can never be fully internalized 
and embodied (Butler 1990:140&141). Gender is not a fact, rather an idea 
of it is created by various acts of gender (Butler 1990:139). Thus, an 
illusion of a “natural sex” or a “real woman” is given and is sought to 
perpetuate within patriarchal society (Butler 1990:140). Similarly to Butler, 
Samantha Holland regards feminine behavior as a “task” of imitation which 
does not incorporate inherent skills or traits, but learnt behavior, and thus 
makes gender into “something which people ‘do’ rather than what they 
are” (Holland 2004:35-36). Femininity is performed and differs from 
performance to performance and from woman to woman. In addition, 
traditional practices of femininity and actual practices do not necessarily 
conform. As a consequence, there cannot be one definition of the term 
femininity but there must be a continuous discourse.  
 
The term “femininity” is always connected to passivity opposed to 
activity or to lacking opposed to possessing something. Hence, “femininity” 
is manifested by hierarchical oppositions and is always included in the 
term which is lacking and over which the other term is defined, thus, 
always making it the seemingly weaker term, for example active/passive, 
man/woman. “Man” needs the term “woman”, simultaneously, in order to 
have a term against which it can be defined. Without “woman”, “man” 
cannot exist, or as Irigaray puts it, man needs woman as “a mirror to catch 
his reflection” (Irigaray 1985:11). Woman is “the negative required by the 
male subject’s ‘specularization’,” which is actually a “reflecting on [one’s] 
own being” and hence “fundamentally narcissistic” (Moi 1985:132).  
However, binary oppositions turn femininity into the other and women 
become marginalized by this system. Woman is made invisible because 
woman is solely the “other” of man. Audre Geraldine Lorde even turns the 
opposition “man/woman” into “man/not man” (Cranny-Frances and Waring 
2003:60). As a consequence “woman” disappears as an entity of her own 
and is only defined as a negative of man. “Woman” therefore “is ignored; 
we refuse to recognise it” (Cranny-Francis and Waring 2003: 60). 
Similarly, there is no such opposition as “penis/clitoris,” but only “penis/no 
penis.” Woman and female sexuality are only regarded as a void and are 
dominated by the male term (Cranny-Francis and Waring 2003:59). This 
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can already be found in Freud’s writings, in which woman is outside of 
representation. Thus, Luce Irigaray sees the feminine as “deciphered as 
forbidden, in between signs, between the realized meanings, between the 
lines” (Irigaray quoted by Moi 1985:13). Woman is only allowed to be a 
mirror for man and, therefore, “[t]he pleasure of self-representation, of her 
desire for the same, is denied woman: she is cut off from any kind of 
pleasure that might be specific to her” (Moi 1985:135). The loss of 
eroticism and the woman’s submission to male sexuality offers only one 
remedy to women – namely to renew their ties to their mothers and other 
woman. According to Irigaray, “[o]ne of the lost crossroads of our 
becoming women lies in the blurring and erasure of our relationships to 
our mothers and in our obligation to submit to the laws of the world of 
men-amongst-themselves,” which destroys female ancestry (Irigaray 
1989:13). In order to make an ethics of sexual difference possible, women 
must renew the land of female ancestries (Irigaray 1989:18).  
Irigaray states that women have two different choices: the first is to 
“remain silent, producing incomprehensible babble (any utterance that falls 
outside the logic of the same will by definition be incomprehensible to the 
male master discourse),” and the second is to “enact the specular 
representation of herself as a lesser male,” which would make woman into 
a mimic, which for Irigaray is a form of hysteria, because “[t]he hysteric 
mimes her own sexuality in a masculine mode, which is the only way to 
rescue something of her own desire. The hysteric’s dramatization […] of 
herself is thus a result of her exclusion from patriarchal discourse” (Moi 
1985:135). 
The questions “What is woman?” or “What is feminine?” also lead to 
the question of subjectivity. The issue of subjectivity bears various 
problems as well, as Irigaray points out when she states that  
 
[w]e can assume that any theory of the subject has always been 
appropriated by the “masculine”. When she submits to (such a) theory, 
woman fails to realize that she is renouncing the specificity of her own 
relationship to the imaginary. Subjecting herself to objectivization in 
discourse – by being “female”. Re-objectivizing her own self whenever 
she claims to identify herself “as” a masculine subject. A “subject” that 
would re-search itself as lost (maternal-feminine) “object”? (Irigaray 
1985:11) 
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Irigaray comes to the conclusion that it is impossible for women to 
obtain subjectivity, and offers two ways to escape for women in history – 
to be part of mysticism or become a hysteric. Both ways to escape offer 
women “a real if limited possibility of discovering some aspects of a 
pleasure that might be specific to their libidinal drives” (Moi 1985:138).  
According to Irigaray, femininity so far has only been produced in 
relation to the logic of the Same, which leads to essentializing women. 
Therefore, one must not ask “What is woman?,” but instead, the logic of 
the economy of the logos must be exceeded and disturbed, for example, 
by means of mimicry of the male discourse (Moi 1985:139). The only 
existing language is the male discourse. One must read the feminine “in 
the blank spaces left between the signs and lines of her own mimicry” (Moi 
1985:140). 
However, Irigaray wants to detect a specific woman’s language 
connected to a plural femininity, which resembles the female sexual 
organs in their multiplicity. She calls this language “le parler femme” or 
“womanspeak.” This language is only used when no man is present and 
its style is fluid and it has a sense of touch in it (Moi 1985:144-145).  
Irigaray finally defines woman in “This sex which is not one”: 
 
‘She’ is indefinitely other in herself. That is undoubtedly the reason 
she is called temperamental, incomprehensible, perturbed, capricious 
– not to mention her language in which ‘she’ goes off in all direction 
and in which ‘he’ is unable to discern the coherence of any meaning. 
Contradictory words seem a little crazy to the logic of reason, and 
inaudible for him who listens with ready-made grids, a code prepared 
in advance. In her statements – at least when she dares to speak out – 
woman retouches herself constantly. She just barely separates from 
herself some chatter, an exclamation, a half-secret, a sentence left in 
suspense – when she returns to it, it is only to set out again from 
another point of pleasure or pain. One must listen to her differently in 
order to hear an ‘other meaning’ which is constantly in the process of 
weaving itself, at the same time ceaselessly embracing words and yet 
casting them off to avoid becoming fixed, immobilized. For when ‘she’ 
says something, it is already no longer identical to what she means. 
Moreover, her statements are never identical to anything. Their 
distinguishing feature is one of contiguity. They touch (upon). And 
when they wander too far from this nearness, she stops and begins 
again from ‘zero’: her body-sex organ. 
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It is therefore useless to trap women into giving an exact definition 
of what they mean, to make them repeat (themselves) so that the 
meaning will be clear. They are already elsewhere than in the 
discursive machinery where you claim to take them by surprise. They 
have turned back within themselves, which does not mean the same 
thing as ‘within yourself’. They do not experience the same interiority 
that you do and which perhaps you mistakenly presume they share. 
‘Within themselves’ means in the privacy of this silent, multiple, diffuse 
tact. If you ask them insistently what they are thinking about, they can 
only reply: nothing. Everything. (Irigaray: This sex which is not one 
1985:28-29) 
 
Like Irigaray, Hélène Cixous opposes hierarchical oppositions. In her 
point of view, all oppositions in the binary system are ultimately 
representations of the hierarchical opposition “man/woman;” this 
“[o]rganization by hierarchy makes all conceptual organization subject to 
man” because man is always the privileged term (Cixous in Belsey and 
Moore 1995:102). Hence, male writing is manifested as the marked term, 
which follows the phallocentric tradition. However, Cixous believes that 
hierarchical oppositions can be broken down by woman constituting 
herself as “’impossible’ subject” and thus by “breaking the codes that 
negate her” (Cixous in Marks and Courtivron 1981:249). This can be 
achieved by speaking up or writing: 
 
If woman has always functioned ‘within’ man’s discourse, a signifier 
referring always to the opposing signifier that annihilates its particular 
energy, puts down or stifles its very different sounds, now it is time for 
her to displace this ‘within’, explode it, overturn it, grab it, make it hers, 
take it in, take it into her woman’s mouth, bite its tongue with her 
woman’s teeth, make up her own tongue to get inside of it. And you 
will see how easily she will well up, from this ‘within’ where she was 
hidden and dormant, to the lips where her foams will overflow (Cixous 
in Belsey and Moore 1995:114) 
 
Writing comprises women’s freedom from patriarchal suppression and, 
for Cixous, it represents escaping the binary system:  
 
To write – the act that will ‘realize’ the un-censored relationship of 
woman to her sexuality, to her woman-being giving her back access to 
her own forces; […] that will tear her out of the superegoed, over-
Mosesed structure where the same position of guilt is always reserved 
for her. […] Write yourself: your body must make itself heard. Then the 
huge resources of the unconscious will burst out. Finally the 
inexhaustible feminine imaginary is going to be deployed. Without gold 
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or black dollars, our naphtha will spread values over the world, un-
quoted values that will change the rules of the old game (Cixous in 
Belsey and Moore 1995:116) 
 
In “The Laugh of the Medusa,” Cixous follows up this argument by 
stating 
 
that sexual opposition, which has always worked for man’s profit to the 
point of reducing writing, too, to his laws, is only a historico-cultural 
limit. There is, there will be more and more rapidly pervasive now, a 
fiction that produces irreducible effects of femininity (Cixous in Marks 
and Courtivron 1981: 253) 
 
Cixous claims that writing is “working (in) the in-between” and calls it 
the “other bisexuality” which she defines as “each one’s location in self 
(répérage en soi) of the presence” and which “doesn’t annul differences, 
but stirs them up, pursues them, increases their number” (Cixous in Marks 
and Courtivron 1980:254). According to Cixous, while a woman embraces 
this bisexuality and opens up to it, man sticks to phallic monosexuality 
because of Freud’s proposed fear of being a woman.  
 For Cixous, a new femininity arises through writing and “[e]verything 
is yet to be written by women” about this kind of femininity (Cixous in 
Marks and Courtivron 1981: 256). She proposes to turn towards the 
female body, which is seen as lacking by patriarchal society, because  
 
[w]omen must write through their bodies, they must invent the 
impregnable language that will wreck partitions, classes, and rhetorics, 
regulations, and codes, they must submerge, cut through, get beyond 
the ultimate reserve-discourse, including the one that laughs at the 
very idea of pronouncing the word “silence”, the one that, aiming for 
the impossible, stops short before the word “impossible” and writes it 
as “the end” (Cixous in Marks and Courtivron 1981: 256) 
 
By doing so, women “[sweep] away syntax” (Marks and Courtivron 
1980:257). Cixous conjures up a new woman, who will change 
“intersubjective relation” (Marks and Courtivron 1981:257). For this new 
woman, body means writing; therefore, Cixous does not regard the female 
body as lacking, but as a source of power. Whereas other feminists reject 
a common female experience, Cixous embraces it and wants women to 
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turn it into their subversive weapon against the patriarchal power symbol 
of the phallus. The female body must be used to break down the discourse 
of man because it is “the language of men and their grammar”, which has 
to be made into woman’s language (Cixous in Marks and Courtivron 1981: 
257). This “écriture feminine” is characterized by its link to the imaginary 
world; it is “the voice of the Mother, that omnipotent figure that dominates 
the fantasies of the pre-Oedipal baby” (Moi 1985:114). Therefore, the 
writing woman “is never far from “mother” […]. There is always within her 
at least a little of that good mother’s milk. She writes in white ink” (Cixous 
in Marks and Courtivron 1981:251). 
 
Julia Kristeva uses a similar starting point as Cixous when it comes to 
femininity – namely language – which is central to defining subjects. 
Kristeva develops a theory of language and focuses on “speaking beings” 
that use language and are in return constituted through their use of 
language. Thus, Kristeva’s theory is strongly connected to a theory of 
subjectivity (Mcafee 2004:14). Kristeva regards language as a dynamic 
signifying process which shapes our subjectivity and experience; 
therefore, “linguistic changes constitute changes in the status of the 
subject” (Kristeva cited by Mcafee 2004:14 -15). Kristeva divides this 
process into a symbolic and a semiotic pole, where symbolic stands for 
“an expression of clear and orderly meaning” and semiotic refers to “an 
evocation of feeling or […] a discharge of the subject’s energy and drives” 
(Mcafee 2004:15 – 16). The semiotic is similar to Lacan’s Imaginary and is 
part of the chora, which is not present anymore in the Symbolic order 
aside from appearing as 
 
pulsional pressure on symbolic language: as contradictions, 
meaninglessness, disruption, silences and absences in the symbolic 
language. The chora is a rhythmic pulsion rather than a new language. 
It constitutes, in other words, the heterogeneous, disruptive dimension 
of language, that which can never be caught up in the closure of 
traditional linguistic theory (Moi 1985:162) 
 
The semiotic might vaguely correspond to Cixous’ écriture feminine – 
Cixous’ means of breaking down hierarchical oppositions. However, the 
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semiotic is part of the pre-Oedipal phase, where “the opposition between 
feminine and masculine does not exist” (Moi 1985:165). Kristeva opposes 
a specific female language, as well as a single definition of “woman” as 
such. For Kristeva, it is still “necessary to campaign in the name of 
women, [however] it is important to recognize that in this struggle a 
woman cannot be: she can only exist negatively, as it were, through her 
refusal of that which is given” (Moi 1985:163). “Woman,” therefore, is “that 
which cannot be represented, that which is not spoken, that which remains 
outside naming and ideologies” (Kristeva quoted by Moi 1985:163). 
Without a definition of femininity or woman, Kristeva’s theory turns into a 
“theory of marginality, subversion and dissidence” (Moi 1985:163).  
The feminists mentioned so far share the notion of femininity as 
something that is marginalized. Language can be a means of pointing out 
this marginalization or even a means to break it down; on the other hand, 
it can also be regarded as an instrument that works for patriarchal society 
because it assumes that “masculinity” and “femininity” are stable terms 
(Moi 1964:154). In this thesis, I will show that language functions as an 
instrument, which can operate as a tool for either suppression or liberation 
for women.  
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2. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” 
  
The first literary work to be discussed in this thesis is the short story 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” by Charlotte Perkins Gilman. I will consider “The 
Yellow Wallpaper” as a forerunner or prototype of the other two works 
analyzed in this paper. Parallels and differences will be pointed out in the 
final chapter. Meanwhile, the main concerns of this part will be the 
question of madness in the short story and the main motifs, such as 
language, space and the quest for identity.  
 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, who underwent Silas Weir Mitchell’s famous 
rest cure during her first marriage to Walter Stetson, came to reject the 
rest cure and instead sought independence from both her doctor and her 
husband by leaving for California, where she wrote “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” in 1890 (cf. Lane 1990:123-124). Although Gilman never 
completely conquered her depressions, she saw work – the opposite of 
Mitchell’s advice – as her only option to keep herself sane. 
 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” was first published in the New England 
Magazine in 1892 and later reappeared in various magazines and books, 
for example in the Golden Book in 1933, in the Feminist Press edition from 
1973, in The Charlotte Perkins Gilman Reader from 1980 or in Catherine 
Golden’s The Captive Imagination: A Casebook on “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” in 1992. However, these different editions go back to various 
versions of “The Yellow Wallpaper” and little interest has been shown in 
the accuracy of the various versions of the used texts.4 
 
                                            
4 I do not want to go into greater detail regarding the different text editions, but I want to 
refer to Julie Bates Docks’ But One Expects That: Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” and the Shifting Light of Scholarship, which points out the various 
misidentifications of the different versions of Gilman’s text. In my thesis I only rely on the 
Bantam Classic edition.  
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2.1. Historicizing “The Yellow Wallpaper”: History – 
Herstory – Hystory 
 
2.1.1. Victorian society and the place of women 
 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” was written by Charlotte Perkins Gilman in 
1890 at a time when men and women were subjects of a set of limited 
roles. Women were supposed to be the angels of the house: stay-at-home 
wives, whose only objective was to take good care of their husbands and 
children. No other role was socially acceptable, and consequently women 
who did not follow their prescribed role as happy housewives, were most 
often than not at the edge of society.  
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg notes that bourgeois matrons had undergone 
role changes between the 1840s and the 1890s. By the 1890s, they were 
expected to be “True Woman” and “Ideal Mother” at the same time, 
although the concepts were practically contradictory: the “True Woman” 
was expected to be emotional, dependent and gentle, whereas the “Ideal 
Mother” had to be strong, self-reliant, protective and an efficient caretaker 
(Smith-Rosenberg 1985:198-199). Barbara Welter calls middle-class and 
upper-class women of Gilman’s time “hostages to their homes”, to whom 
no alternative lifestyle was presented (Welter in Lane 1990:109). Ongoing 
changes within society, such as getting married later in life or spending 
less time on food and clothing, gave women more time for themselves; 
however gender roles did not adjust to this new situation (cf. Smith-
Rosenberg 1985:199-200). The notion of femininity was still strongly 
connected to a woman’s activities and her behavior (cf. Lane 1990:109).  
 
Internal tensions between the expectancies of patriarchal society and 
women’s own wishes, the tensions between the ideals of the “True 
Woman” and the “Ideal Mother” as well as isolation and loneliness within 
women’s own families often triggered a range of psychological diseases. 
Ann J. Lane regards depression as a rebellion which “damaged the rebel 
most seriously” (Lane 1990:110). However, Smith-Rosenberg claims that 
psychological illnesses like hysteria also helped to redefine and 
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restructure a woman’s place within her family (cf. Smith-Rosenberg 
1985:200). Mentally ill women were sent away to undergo various cures 
and even after their return, they were treated with care, which left some of 
a woman’s duties to her husband or to other family members in her home. 
Ann J. Lane therefore remarks positively on the water cure, which was a 
common treatment in the mid-1840s.  
The water cure was carried out at sanatoriums, which provided a place 
of rest and removal and additionally a “female supportive community” to 
exhausted women (Lane 1990:111). The water cure was replaced by 
several other treatments, such as the “Swedish movements” (a kind of 
massage), the theory of “galvanism,” which is the application of electric 
currents through the body, and finally the rest cure (cf. Lane 1990:112). 
The choice of treatment was mainly dependent on social class and on the 
funds available; all treatments served the same cause: “preparing the 
patient to return to her place” (Lane 1990:112). The various treatments 
therefore did not intend to change women’s role in society, they simply 
gave women a break from their daily routines. Smith-Rosenberg states 
that hysteria5 presented a “relief of day-to-day responsibility”, because 
hysterical women ceased to function within the family; instead they 
dominated their families passive-aggressively (Smith-Rosenberg 
1985:208). Thus hysteria provided women with power over their usual 
suppressors. However, this power was only granted as long as the illness 
proceeded and a return to the “normal” order was inevitable.  
 
 
2.1.2. Gilman’s encounter with Silas Weir Mitchell and her 
objective to writing “The Yellow Wallpaper” 
 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman worked her entire life against the stereotype 
of the woman as the angel of the house. Instead, she wanted to create a 
picture of (economically) independent women, who did not have to rely on 
                                            
5 In the course of discussing “The Yellow Wallpaper”, the term “hysteria” and the term 
“madness” are used practically exchangeably. Smith-Rosenberg enumerates the varied 
illnesses, which used to be regarded as mere symptoms of hysteria: “neurasthenia, 
hypochondriasis, depression, conversion reaction, ambulatory schizophrenia” (Smith-
Rosenberg 1985:197). Hence hysteria is actually made up by a variety of different mental 
illnesses. In this thesis, the actual medical diagnosis of a mental illness is secondary to its 
function. Therefore no further differentiation between hysteria and madness will be made.  
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men in order to make a living. According to Gilman, motherhood should 
therefore not be regarded as absolutely necessary for a woman, but she 
admitted that it could present bliss to a woman if she really wanted a 
child.6  
In spite of the relative success of “The Yellow Wallpaper” and her other 
fiction, Gilman did not only write short stories and novels, but focused 
more on her theoretical work with topics such as “autonomy, marriage, 
work, the struggle of enlightenment against restriction” (“Wallpaper” 
2006:XV). Gilman did not regard “The Yellow Wallpaper” as a regular 
fictional text wither, which to her presented “reading for escape” “through 
projection and identification” with the protagonist, but as “fiction with a 
purpose” (Hochman 129-130). “The Yellow Wallpaper” was supposed to 
make a significant change in the treatment of mentally ill women.  
 
During one of her own depressions, Gilman herself had encountered 
Silas Weir Mitchell, who intended to help her with his famous rest cure, 
which had been developed to cure hysteria. The rest cure meant extended 
and total bed rest, isolation from the family and from familiar surroundings, 
overfeeding, massage and the use of electricity for “muscular excitation” 
(Lane 1990:116). It is interesting to note that even Sigmund Freud was a 
staunch supporter of Mitchell’s rest cure.  
Hysteria included “virtually every known human ill” and manifested a 
“hysterical personality” (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:202). Although men could 
suffer from hysteria as well, it was soon turned into a particularly female 
illness in practice. Hysteria was ultimately used as a weapon against 
women who “didn’t function as women were expected to function”, 
because “the physician who treated them felt threatened both as a 
professional and as a rejected male” (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:202). 
Mitchell might have felt similarly, but despite Gilman’s obvious dislike of 
this very physician, it should be stated that following Smith-Rosenberg, 
Mitchell actually “sympathize[d] with his [female] patients” and that he 
believed that they really did suffer and did not only make up their illness 
(Smith-Rosenberg 1985:204). Lane agrees with Smith-Rosenberg and 
                                            
6 Gilman’s vision of a society, in which women do not have to follow patriarchal norms, is 
expressed in her utopian novel Herland. 
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grants Mitchell the “major strength of acknowledging the legitimacy and 
seriousness of his patient’s illness“(Lane 1990:125). However, “hysterics 
[were] often thought to be idle” and their emotional state of being was 
believed to be “rooted in woman’s very nature”, turning hysteria into 
something “peculiarly female and peculiarly sexual” (Smith-Rosenberg 
1985:205-206). Smith-Rosenberg calls hysteria a “stark caricature of 
femininity” when she refers to dependency, fragility, emotionality and 
narcissism as qualities which the hysteric and the feminine woman share 
(Smith-Rosenberg 1985:207).  
The physician had to act as a judge of a woman’s mental state and “by 
diagnosing her as ill,” the physician sided with the woman – something a 
male physician, who was a representative of Victorian values, would 
otherwise not have done (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:209). As a 
consequence, “physicians felt that they must dominate the hysteric’s will” 
in order to reestablish both the female patient and themselves within 
Victorian society (Smith-Rosenberg 1985:210).  
 
Gilman believed that physicians were not able to help women by 
prescribing rest cures or “moral medication”, which referred to the return to 
the work of women: the care of home, husband and child (Lane 1990:117). 
Gilman criticized the infantilization of women and the enforced acceptance 
of male authority, which accompanied the rest cure. Lane refers to 
Mitchell’s rest cure as  
 
an extreme version of the cultural norms that operated outside his 
sanatorium, just as, ironically, the incapacity of these women patients 
took the form of an exaggeration of the very qualities they had been 
taught to value (Lane 1990:117). 
 
Thus, women, who became hysterics, could be characterized by their 
display of exaggerated stereotypes of femininity. Hysteric women were put 
into sanatoriums, which, in return, exaggerated the patriarchal norms and 
values. The more women raged against social constraints, the more they 
were constrained. Within patriarchal society and within sanatoriums 
accordingly, women had to succumb to what Jacques Lacan calls the 
“Law of the Father”. Hence, women had to submit to the rules of 
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(patriarchic) language in order to enter the Symbolic order and to become 
a speaking subject and to be accepted in society7.  
 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman broke out of the vicious circle presented to 
her by her own husband and Mitchell and sought independence in 
California, where she wrote “The Yellow Wallpaper” in 1890 as a protest to 
the rest cure. In her autobiography The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 
Gilman claims that her short story actually changed Mitchell’s rest cure, 
which therefore made her life meaningful.  
 
 
2.1.3. The father of hysteria – Jean-Martin Charcot  
 
For the sake of completeness, another important physician of the 
nineteenth century and the father of hysteria, Jean-Martin Charcot, ought 
to be included here. Jean-Martin Charcot determined the picture of the 
hysterical woman even more so than Silas Weir Mitchell ever did, and 
unlike Mitchell, he treated his patients more as subjects for display than as 
human beings. Charcot’s objective was to discover and observe the 
various symptoms of his patients—their cure was secondary and even 
neglected. As Showalter observes, he dominated the discourse of hysteria 
from the end of the 1870s until his death in 1893 (Showalter 1997:49).  
Jean-Martin Charcot was “a specialist in the observation and treatment 
of madness in women” in nineteenth-century Paris (Borgstrom 1998:1-2). 
He became famous especially because of his open lectures on female 
hysteria, in which he displayed his patients to “a room full of students, 
medical colleagues, and various non-medical dignitaries of Paris, including 
artists, writers, and journalists” (Borgstrom 1998:2). His hand-chosen 
group of patients, who were often hypnotized, only served the function of 
medical display, of objects showing the very symptoms, which Charcot 
wanted to demonstrate in his lectures. For this purpose, “Charcot often 
used gongs, sound forks, or other percussive instruments during his 
presentations to reproduce the various states of the hysterical seizure in 
                                            
7 In all three literary works in this thesis, the female protagonists are trying to abandon 
patriarchal society and simultaneously patriarchal language. Instead, they want to 
establish their own, feminine language and identity. 
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his patients” (Borgstrom 1998:6). Charcot regarded hysteria as a physical 
illness, which was caused by genetic defects or traumatic injuries of the 
central nervous system and which triggered hysteric seizures (cf. 
Showalter 1997:49).  
 Charcot had some favorite patients, who reached some fame on their 
own, for example Blanche Wittman, Augustine and Geneviève8, whose 
hysterical seizures became notorious.9 Henrik Carl Borgstrom notes that 
these female patients “provided visual representations of the Other, the 
“Mad,” and thus valorized the established moral codes and ethics which 
governed “normal” society of his day”. Borgstrom goes on to explain the 
roles played by Blanche Wittman, Augustine and Geneviève as the 
following: 
 
By pushing the envelope of what was considered acceptable female 
propriety in the nineteenth century, Augustine, Geneviève, and 
Blanche Wittman, however genuine their afflictions were, played a very 
specific role—as seductresses and titillating objects of desire—for their 
male spectators. (Borgstrom 1998:34) 
 
Thus, a picture of the mad woman as a monster that should be locked 
up, was created and everything which opposed the moral codes of society 
was condemned.  
It is not surprising that the number of Charcot’s patients rose to ten 
hysteric women a day. Hysteria turned into a practically epidemic illness 
under Charcot. (Showalter 1997:49).  Charcot blamed the ovaries for 
causing the hysteric seizures, thus manifesting hysteria as a female illness 
and hystericizing the female body (Showalter 1997:33&53).  
 Hysterics were supposed to be idle and prone to showmanship—a 
“typical” variety of the female character (Showalter 1997:55). Hysterics 
therefore were regarded as more feminine than regular women, but were 
as much ostracized by society as were women who lacked feminine traits.  
 Charcot’s lectures were accompanied by a “[p]recise documentation in 
the form of detailed drawings or photographs” and turned Charcot into “the 
                                            
8 Only Augustine and Geneviève’s first names occur in secondary sources, while Blanche 
Wittman’s full name was conveyed.  
9 A more detailed account on Charcot’s patients is given in Borgstrom’s Performing 
Madness. 
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premier analyst of madness in Europe in the nineteenth century” 
(Borgstrom 1998:3). His lectures resembled plays, in which the patients 
functioned as actors. Because of Charcot, “madness became a condition 
which could be clearly identified, classified, and recorded” (Borgstrom 
1998:8).  
Charcot’s classification of madness was connected to visual traits in 
his patients. Phrenology became widespread in the nineteenth century 
with representatives like the Swiss theologian Johann Kasper Lavater, the 
Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso or George Combe from Boston. 
Ultimately, phrenology became one “scientific” practice the Nazis relied on 
“in their effort to prove the racial superiority of the Germanic people” 
(Borgstrom 1998:12). In the nineteenth century, “[a]sylums all over Europe 
and the United States began to compile catalogues of photographs of 
criminals and the insane in an effort to identify common physical signs of 
mental illness and physical anomalies” (Borgstrom 1998:15). This 
dangerous development cannot solely be blamed on Charcot; however, 
his medical lectures definitely contributed to this common trend. 
In the course of his studies, numerous photographs of “[t]he four main 
“periods” of the hysterical seizure: epileptic fit, clownism, emotional 
attitudes, and delirium” were taken (Borgstrom 1998:21). It is proven that 
these photographs were not taken in the midst of a naturally occurring 
seizure, but that “in the most cases the seizures were artificially induced 
by having the patient inhale significant quantities of ether or amyl nitrate” 
(Borgstrom 1998:26). Hence, both the public display and the photographs 
documenting cases of hysteria are more part of a theatrical performance 
than an objective observation.  
Charcot’s main objective was to collect medical evidence and to 
provide a fully explored picture of madness and hysteria and its various 
symptoms. Unfortunately, instead of trying to provide help for his patients, 
Charcot seems to have forgotten that he was treating actual human beings 
and instead pursued his career as “the father of hysteria”.  
 
Both Charcot and Mitchell are representatives of patriarchal society of 
the nineteenth century. Charcot seems to have created an illness and to 
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have provided one name to different kinds of mental problems which 
women suffered in patriarchal society: hysteria. Mitchell, on the other 
hand, tried to heal these women by means provided by patriarchal society. 
Neither “creator” nor “healer” really helped women. The solution of the first 
was to lock up the “mad woman” in La Salpêtrière and to record her 
symptoms; the solution of the latter was to make the hysteric “function” 
again and send her back into her prison-like home within patriarchal 
society. Neither one of the two doctors realized that their ways did not help 
or cure anyone. The only ones to realize this were the female patients sent 
to La Salpêtrière or back to their unhappy homes.  
 
Elaine Showalter claims that hysteria is a form of expression for those 
people, who cannot express their feelings any other way anymore; hence, 
hysteria is a protolanguage or a code for suppressed feelings (cf. 
Showalter 1997:17). The epidemic of hysteria symbolizes the deep 
structures of our society. That hysteria turned into a mass phenomenon 
proves the disregarded problems within patriarchal society (cf. Showalter 
1997:18). Hence, hysteria symbolizes how women are reduced to silence 
within an institutionalized language and culture (cf. Showalter 1997:86).  
 
 
2.1.4. Different readings of “The Yellow Wallpaper” 
 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” has not always been regarded as a feminist 
literary work. In fact, there are various different ways of reading “The 
Yellow Wallpaper”. As a consequence, many scholars claim that “The 
Yellow Wallpaper” was solely read as a horror story by Gilman’s 
contemporaries. This was definitely not intended by Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, who preferred “fiction ‘with a purpose’”, partly because of 
“culturally typical anxieties about certain kinds of fiction-reading [, such as] 
reading for escape, through projection and identification” (Hochman 
2005:130,129). Instead, Barbara Hochman claims that “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” was intended to be a “cautionary tale” about women’s reading 
(Hochman 2005:131). She sees the relationship between the narrator and 
 36 
the wallpaper as a parallel construction to the relationship between the 
nineteenth century reader and fictional texts; thus, reading could lead to 
the loss of borders and to the reader’s sense of reality (Hochman 
2005:132). According to Hochman, Gilman’s message could be to read 
critically and to differentiate from one’s own experience (Hochman 
2005:139).  
 
Jean E. Kennard points out that the interpretations of a text rely heavily 
on literary conventions – the reading strategies and the associative 
clusters – of a time (cf. Kennard 1981:72). Kennard claims that Elaine 
Hedges was the first to read “The Yellow Wallpaper” as a feminist work in 
1973. Only at this point in time were a series of conventions available to 
the readers which were not available to the readers of 1892 (cf. Kennard 
1981:74-75). Consequently, it is assumed by Kennard that Hedges was 
the first scholar to make the connection between insanity and gender 
instead of reading the short story as “a Poesque tale of chilling horror” 
(Hedges quoted by Kennard 1981:74).  
However, Jonathan Crewe ironically remarks that “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” has been read “as a work of virtually revolutionary feminism” 
from 1973 onwards, and scholars like Conrad Shumaker or Julie Bates 
Dock even contradict the previously mentioned feminist theorists and 
claim that “The Yellow Wallpaper” was not exclusively misunderstood and 
isolated (cf. Crewe 1995:276, Shumaker 1985:589, Dock 1996:59). Dock 
even goes so far to point out that  
 
the story’s first readers did recognize its indictments of marriage and 
the treatment of women, although theses discussions do not use 
modern terminology. Three reviews of the 1899 Small, Maynard edition 
identify the cause of the narrator’s insanity as her husband (Dock 
1996:59-60).  
 
Consequently, Dock accuses feminist theorists of victimizing “The 
Yellow Wallpaper”, because  
 
scholars engaged in enlarging knowledge privilege new interpretations, 
new facts, new documents. There would be scant pleasure in 
unearthing a nineteenth-century story if the original audience read it 
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exactly as twentieth-century readers do. The thrill comes in finding the 
gem that others have overlooked. Critics must differentiate themselves 
from earlier readers, not just for self-gratification but also to validate 
the importance of the find (Dock 1996:60). 
 
Dock’s judgment appears to be rather harsh, especially when one 
considers the rise in popularity “The Yellow Wallpaper” has undergone 
within the academic community because of feminist theory.10 
 However, it is clear that Charlotte Perkins Gilman herself intended 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” to be critical of the ongoing suppression of women 
in general, and of the medical treatment of women with psychological 
problems in particular.  
 
 
2.2. The story 
 
Showalter claims that “The Yellow Wallpaper” reads like one of Freud’s 
medical histories (Showalter 1997:135): A woman—the narrator of the 
story—and her husband John, a physician, spend the summer in “[a] 
colonial mansion, a hereditary estate” because of the woman’s mental 
condition (“Wallpaper” 1). The house is supposed to provide the narrator 
with some rest from her day-to-day activities: the household and her 
motherly duties towards her newborn child. In addition, John’s sister 
Jennie is present to take over the narrator’s responsibilities. Even though 
the narrator wishes for a room downstairs, she must occupy the nursery 
upstairs, a room with barred windows and a wallpaper with “[o]ne of those 
sprawling flamboyant patterns committing every artistic sin” (“Wallpaper” 
3). The narrator’s mental condition does not improve despite John’s 
insistence. Instead she gets caught up with the wallpaper and starts to see 
women behind the strange, bar-like patterns of the wallpaper, with whom 
she identifies. The narrator rips off the wallpaper and believes that she 
                                            
10 Dock’s work should not be diminished, especially because in the course of my research 
I hardly came across any theoretical work which actually questions or criticizes the 
research carried out in the 1970s and after. Reading similar streams of thought over and 
over again definitely helps to manifest “The Yellow Wallpaper” as a seminal feminist 
literary work, however it does not necessarily further academic research in other 
directions than the ones already given. 
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frees the women behind the pattern of the wallpaper and herself by doing 
so. The story ends when John breaks into the locked room, and faints at 
the sight of his wife, who creeps over him pronouncing that she “got out at 
last” (“Wallpaper” 18).  
 
 
2.3. The characters 
 
Not many characters are found in “The Yellow Wallpaper” – after all, 
the narrator is separated from society and kept far away from the next city, 
far away from excitement and far away from other people. Thus, only the 
narrator, her husband John and his sister Jennie actively appear in the 
story. However, many other characters influence the narrator’s life, but are 
absent in the story: Dr. Silas Weir Mitchell and the narrator’s physician 
brother determine the narrator’s life despite their absence, just like the 
narrator’s newly born baby, who is one of the possible reasons for the 
narrator’s condition. The narrator also reports on the visit of some close 
relatives on the fourth of July and mentions others, whom she would like to 
meet again.  
The story evolves around the female narrator and her progressing 
mental illness. The narrator is a prototypical woman of Victorian society, 
who does not or cannot follow the expected patriarchal rules anymore. In 
order to signify the universality of the short story, the narrator does not 
have a name11; anybody, or more precisely, any woman within Victorian 
society could easily be in the narrator’s place. Although Gilman describes 
the case of one single woman, this woman is exchangeable with so many 
other women who suffer from the same suppression everyday. A 
characterization of the narrator therefore seems to be impossible, 
especially because of her madness, which determines her character: she 
is unreliable, emotional, deceiving, but at the same time sincere. The 
narrator does not only deceive the reader, but also herself, which points at 
an utmost confusion and discomposure. In comparison to John’s sister 
                                            
11 Some critics call the narrator “Jane”, the name she either gives herself, John’s sister, or 
the woman in the wallpaper at the very end of the story. “Jane” is a generic name, c.f. 
“Jane Doe”, which again points out the interchangeability of the characters.  
 39 
Jennie, the narrator seems to be a bad mother, a bad wife, and a bad 
housekeeper. The afore mentioned roles are exactly the ones, which she 
escapes and conquers by means of her madness.  
John’s sister Jennie contrasts the narrator; she gladly or helplessly 
follows the rules of Victorian society and becomes the Angel of the House. 
Jennie seemingly effortlessly handles the household, the baby, and even 
her mentally ill sister-in-law. However, Jennie is not only a stark contrast to 
the narrator, but possibly also her mirror image of the past. Most likely, the 
narrator was just like Jennie, before turning into a madwoman. By 
including Jennie in the short story, Gilman, on the one hand, gives the 
reader a counter-image, against which one can contrast the narrator, and 
on the other hand, she shows the dangers connected to the role of the 
apparently perfect Victorian woman.12 
John is the prototypical Victorian patriarch, who represents reason as 
a contrast to his wife’s or to women’s unreason. John combines the 
function of husband and doctor and therefore has much more power than 
his subordinated wife and his sister. John is the only representative of 
patriarchy and is absent for the most part. During John’s presence, reason 
dominates over the narrator’s life and she tries to present herself as 
reasonable and sane; John’s absence signifies the takeover of unreason 
and madness within the short story. Although patriarchal rules still apply in 
John’s absence, the narrator does not need to deceive anyone anymore 
and can give in to her “unreason”, which could be a new form of 
“femininity”. While John is a dominant counterpart to the narrator, he is not 
unloving; indeed, he tries to help his wife. However, his help solely 
consists of trying to make her function within his society again, instead of 
seeking a real solution for his wife, for example, by helping her to break 
down the rules of patriarchal society.  
 
 
                                            
12 Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote another short story entitled “Through This”, whose 
narrator Jane is the perfect Angel of the House and might be the “forerunner” of the 
narrator of “The Yellow Wallpaper”. The reader encounters a regular day of the make-
believe happy wife and mother and the unsaid, implicit emptiness of her life. Denise D. 
Night’s analysis of “Through This” highlights the issues of a “functioning” Victorian 
woman.  
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2.4. Narrative technique and language 
 
2.4.1. How to deal with an unreliable narrator 
 
Gilman’s short story would probably never have become so famous if it 
had not been for her splendid use of narrative technique. “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” is a first-person-narration, which gives the reader insight into 
the mad woman’s perspective. The story consists of a number of journal 
entries, which are disrupted because the narrator writes secretly.  
At the first encounter with the short story, the reader does not 
immediately recognize the mental state of the narrator, who repeatedly 
claims to be sane or simply misunderstood. At the same time, she 
contradicts herself by acknowledging that she is actually sicker than her 
husband believes her to be: “You see he does not believe I am sick!” 
(“Wallpaper” 1). Therefore, Barbara A. Suess calls “The Yellow Wallpaper” 
a “psychologically realistic and impossible text” (Suess 2003:79). Gilman’s 
story is full of traces of the narrator’s insanity, which can be easily 
overlooked at the first reading of the story. The bites in the bedpost or the 
“funny mark […] [, a] streak that runs round the room” for example, which 
the narrator assumes someone else has caused, actually come from the 
narrator herself (“Wallpaper” 14). Therefore, the reader has to function as 
a detective, who must question everything the narrator tells him/her and 
look at everything from a different perspective and fill in blanks presented 
within the story.  
Narratologist Monika Fludernik describes an unreliable narrator as 
someone whose “behavior deviates from the reader’s expected standards 
of normalcy, objectivity or factual accuracy” and names four different types 
of unreliable narrators: “picaros, clowns, madmen and naifs” (Fludernik 
1999:76). These standards of normalcy are determined by social and 
moral conditions. Hence, social conformity is supposed to be the basis of 
a reliable narrator.  
Fludernik provides further evidence of the narrator’s insanity, which 
turns her into an unreliable narrator: She keeps on “doing baffling things”, 
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but admits to her unreason and that way tries to reestablish herself as 
sane; she states that she is “crying all the time”—a sign for depression—; 
she points at her “inability to argue her case with John” and her “failure of 
communication”; she watches the wallpaper and believes that the other 
people in the house do so too, thus transferring an “insane projection of 
her obsessions on her keepers”; she sees women in the wallpaper and at 
the end of the story she even creeps around the room and over her 
husband (cf. Fludernik 1999:80, 81). The narrator’s insistence on her own 
sanity provides a stark contrast to her actual increasingly non-normative 
behavior—that is, she is not normal anymore according to the standards of 
Victorian society. However, because of the narrator’s behavior the reader 
might also start to question the oppressive standards of patriarchal society 
itself, instead of immediately blaming the narrator for her condition—as it 
is done by the people surrounding her in the short story.  
Fludernik poses the question of whether or not the narrator has been 
insane throughout the story, from the beginning on, and whether John has 
been correct in his diagnosis of his wife’s mental state (cf. Fludernik 
1999:84). Clues are given within the story that the narrator has been 
“creeping around [the room] for some time”, that “she has been tearing at 
the wallpaper” and “gnawing at the feet of the iron bedstead” – actions for 
which she blames others (Fludernik 1999:83). It is possible to come to the 
conclusion that the narrator’s insanity proceeds within the story, because 
she cannot even hide her insanity from the reader anymore at the end of 
the story, something she was able to do at the beginning of the story, no 
matter how insane she had already been. Therefore, the discovery of the 
narrator’s insanity refers to the actual proceeding of her insanity, which is 
only detected because of her inability to continuously hide it and because 
of her failure to appear to be following Victorian norms.  
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2.4.2. Patriarchal language of suppression and the finding of 
identity through the use of a new feminine language  
 
Janice Haney-Peritz discovers that by entering the “hereditary estate” 
(“Wallpaper” 1), the narrator becomes subject to Lacan’s symbolic order 
and the order of language (cf. Haney-Peritz 1986:117). Language plays an 
essential role, because it can act as a device to suppress someone, for 
example by “sentencing” or “diagnosing” a person; on the other hand, 
language is also a means to break free from standardized codes of 
patriarchal society, if one creates a new language, such as Hélène Cixous’ 
concept of écriture féminine. This new language is significant in the 
process of finding and manifesting one’s identity.  
 
At the beginning of “The Yellow Wallpaper,” language is used to 
diagnose and hence suppress the narrator, while at the same time 
forbidding her to use language in a genuine, creative or productive way 
herself. Instead, she is limited to the usage of the “language authorized by 
patriarchy” and to reading the wallpaper (Treichler 1984: 74). However, at 
the end of the short story the narrator subverts language and breaks free 
from her husband’s diagnosis by creating a language of her own. This new 
language breaks with all existing patriarchal codes and is connected to the 
narrator’s new identity. Only by changing who she is, is she able to create 
a language of her own. And only by using a new language, does she have 
the power to leave patriarchal standards and her inscribed role behind. 
Language and identity are interlinked and hence cannot be kept apart. 
Even within this short story it is impossible to point out whether the change 
in the narrator’s story preceded her changed use of language or vice 
versa. The two processes go hand in hand with one another, and what is 
important is mainly the outcome—the newly gained freedom of the 
narrator.  
 
Almost at the beginning of the short story, more precisely at the end of 
the narrator’s first journal entry, the reader comes to understand that the 
narrator writes secretly: “There comes John, and I must put this away,—he 
hates to have me write a word” (“Wallpaper” 4). The reason for this ban 
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from writing is the narrator’s “temporary nervous depression—a slight 
hysterical tendency” (“Wallpaper” 1). At least this is what John “assures 
friends and relatives”; in fact, he might suspect a more severe illness in his 
wife, or else why should he try to keep her away from her friends and 
family and prohibit her from all kinds of work and writing, if he were not 
afraid that she might make a fool out of him and herself (“Wallpaper” 1). 
Consequently, he might not prohibit her from writing for her sake, but for 
his own sake. John, after all, is a doctor and it might not prove useful for 
his career if people discovered that his wife is a madwoman.  
On the other hand, it was common practice to impose the rest cure on 
insane women, which was accompanied by practically constraining 
women to silence and forbidding them to work, write and read. Similarly, 
the narrator is “absolutely forbidden to “work” until [she is] well again” and 
must not see “stimulating people”, who might engage her into an 
exhausting conversation (“Wallpaper” 2, 5). Suess claims that women 
have been “socially, historically and medically constructed as weak and 
sick,” hence John’s treatment of the narrator is not surprising (Suess 
2003:80). The narrator admits that writing “does exhaust [her] a good 
deal—having to be so sly about it, or else meet with heavy opposition” 
(“Wallpaper” 2). Writing does not itself exhaust the narrator, but the fact 
that people around her oppose it and want to keep her from continuing to 
write. The narrator herself believes writing could improve her condition: 
 
I think sometimes that if I were only well enough to write a little it 
would relieve the press of ideas and rest me. 
But I find I get pretty tired when I try. 
It is so discouraging not to have any advice and companionship 
about my work. (“Wallpaper” 5)  
 
However, the narrator is not the one in charge of the choice of cure 
she must undergo. Her husband’s “selfish desire to maintain the 
order/Order [(Lacan’s symbolic Order)] of his own life” forces him to 
suppress anything, which he is not in control of—including the narrator’s 
writing (Suess 2003:88). John, a physician, provides the narrator with a 
diagnosis, which “names reality” and “has power” over her (Treichler 
1984:65). A diagnosis translates the body into signs or symptoms; these 
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signs in return trigger a treatment of the body. Therefore, a medical 
diagnosis is an “authorized linguistic process”, which “translate[s] realities 
of the human body into human language and back again” (Treichler 
1984:69).  
 
In “The Yellow Wallpaper”, John plays a double-function of husband 
and physician and doubly represents the Law of the Father; Karen Ford 
calls John an “epitome of male discourse” (Ford 1985:310). The 
“diagnostic language of physician” and the “paternalistic language of 
husband” are combined within John (Treichler 1984:65). Paula Treichler 
discovers that the “diagnostic process [is] plac[ed] within an 
institutionalized frame: medicine, marriage, patriarchy”, which all define 
and prescribe (Treichler 1984:66).  
John’s diagnosis serves various functions: it is a “metaphor for the 
voice of medicine or science”, it is “powerful and public”, it “represent[s] 
institutional authority” and it is the “male voice that privileges the rational, 
the practical, and the observable” (Treichler 1984:65). As a consequence, 
the narrator finds herself in a situation determined by patriarchal norms. 
Her situation has actually deteriorated, because in her present condition 
she is not even allowed to write anymore.  
John’s unreasonable treatment is unlikely to help the protagonist 
because it incorporates even stricter norms than the norms of the society 
she tries to escape. While Victorian society formerly has not restricted the 
protagonist from her last means of escape, John deprives his wife of the 
only refuge left to his wife—writing. 
John’s diagnosis serves as a sentence and the narrator must “escape 
the sentence passed by medicine and patriarchy” (Treichler 1984:70). The 
“sentence” refers to a linguistic entity and to a judgment and therefore is 
sign and signified, word and act, declaration and discursive consequence 
at the same time and is defined by its dual character (Treichler 1984:70). 
Treichler suggests that “escap[ing] the sentence” means to “move beyond 
the boundaries of formal syntax” and that this way, the narrator can obtain 
freedom from the suppressive mechanisms of patriarchal society 
(Treichler 1984:70). Following Luce Irigaray, Treichler suggests a “female 
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language”, which the narrator must discover to replace women’s language 
prescribed by patriarchy (Treichler 1984:72).  
 
Treichler detects an underground narrative, which develops in spite of 
John’s ban on writing and conversation; this narrative consists of “safe 
language”, language on “dead paper” (Treichler 1984:61). Although the 
narrator hides her writing from John and Jennie (“I must not let her find me 
writing”), the discursive parts of the journal consist of “safe” topics, such as 
the house, her room or the wallpaper (“Wallpaper” 6, Treichler 1984:62). 
However, Treichler notes that the language grows intense despite the 
“safe topics” (Treichler 1984:62): 
 
On a pattern like this, by daylight, there is a lack of sequence, a 
defiance of law, that is a constant irritant to a normal mind.  
The color is hideous enough, and unreliable enough, and 
infuriating enough, but the pattern is torturing. 
You think you have mastered it, but just as you get well underway 
in following, it turns a back-somersault and there you are. It slaps you 
in the face, knocks you down, and tramples upon you. It is like a bad 
dream. (Wallpaper 11) 
 
Thus, Treichler sees the wallpaper as a metaphor for women’s 
language and discourse; the pattern of the wallpaper accords to a 
“‘pattern’ which underlies sexual inequalities” (Treichler 1984:62). The 
narrator’s forced alienation from work and from writing complies with the 
relationship between women and language in general: patriarchal 
language counters female discourse, which is suppressed.  
 
According to Treichler, the wallpaper can be read as a metaphor for 
the narrator’s mind, the narrator’s unconscious or the pattern of 
sociological and economic dependency, whereas the woman in the 
wallpaper refers to the narrator going mad, the narrator’s unconscious or 
to all women within patriarchal society (Treichler 1984:64). Although I do 
not want to exclude any possible way of reading, I advocate Sandra 
Gilbert’s and Susan Gubar’s reading of the wallpaper as a metaphor for 
the “oppressive structures of the society” and thus, for patriarchal society, 
which entraps women in general (Gilbert&Gubar 1979:90). The use of 
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common names, such as John, Jennie, Mary and Jane, in the short story 
alludes to the universality of the story. Therefore, I suspect that Gilman’s 
objective was to write a universally valid short story instead of only giving 
one particular case study. Consequently, the woman behind the wallpaper 
refers to all women in general and to the narrator of the story in particular. 
Similarly, the wallpaper itself stands for patriarchal society and hegemonic 
discourse in general and for John’s diagnosis and the rest cure in 
particular.  
 
In the beginning, the narrator simply questions John’s diagnosis and 
rules on dead paper, which is “not truly subversive” (Treichler 1984:66): 
 
[…] I am absolutely forbidden to “work” until I am well again. 
Personally, I disagree with their ideas. 
Personally, I believe that congenial work, with excitement and 
change, would do me good. 
But what is one to do? 
I did write for a while in spite of them; (“Wallpaper” 2) 
 
The wallpaper makes the narrator bolder and parallel actions between 
the woman behind the wallpaper and the narrator occur: “The faint figure 
behind seemed to shake the pattern, just as if she wanted to get out” 
(“Wallpaper” 10). Similarly, the narrator wants to get out of the house and 
asks John to take her away from the house: 
 
“[…] I am a doctor, dear, and I know. You are gaining flesh and color, 
your appetite is better, I feel really much easier about you.” 
“I don’t weigh a bit more,“ said I, “nor as much; and my appetite 
may be better in the evening when you are here, but it is worse in the 
morning when you are away!” 
“Bless her little heart!” said he with a big hug, “she shall be as sick 
as she pleases” But now let’s improve the shining hours by going to 
sleep, and talk about it in the morning!” (“Wallpaper” 10) 
  
The narrator wants an ally in John, who refuses to and does not take 
the narrator seriously. He classifies her talk as children’s talk and answers 
her request with a hug, thus infantilizing the narrator. Because John does 
not take her seriously, the narrator needs another ally—the woman behind 
the wallpaper.  
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Barbara A. Suess claims that the narrator has never constituted herself 
by entering the Symbolic Order; instead she makes “attempts to create a 
new order in which she can find social similitude and personal identity” 
(Suess 2003:84). Because of her madness and because of her gender 
she is “twice-removed from an understanding of the Symbolic Order” 
(Suess 2003:89). Suess states that 
 
Because proponents of the patriarchal social order thwart Jane’s [(- 
the narrator’s)] attempts to create her own Symbolic order through 
writing, they force her to turn elsewhere to find her own Order. And 
because, over time, the wallpaper gains more and more authority over 
her, it becomes the recourse to which Jane turns. (Suess 2003:92). 
 
Haney-Peritz follows this argument by stating that the vision of the 
woman in the wallpaper symbolizes the shift from the symbolic to the 
imaginary, which for Haney-Peritz signifies the splitting of the narrator’s 
subject (cf. Haney-Peritz 1986:118). 
As the narrator enters this different reality and deals with “‘living 
paper’, aggressively alive”, the story and the narrator become more 
subversive (Treichler 1984:67). The narrator’s journal entries falter, but her 
language becomes bolder. The narrator commits herself to an “alternative 
reality beneath the repellent surface pattern”, where she finds a woman 
with whom she completely and irreversibly identifies, thus finally obtaining 
her own identity, apart from being John’s wife. The wallpaper reflects 
Lacan’s mirror stage, which “manufactures for the subject […] the 
succession of fantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a 
form of its totality” (Suess 2003:92). Within the realm of the wallpaper, the 
narrator gains a new self-identity and sense of communality “through her 
connection with and ultimately her transformation into the women/woman 
in the wallpaper” (Suess 2003:92). 
Upon finding her identity, the narrator makes John believe that her 
condition is actually improving. The narrator is convinced of her “clarity of 
perception” and starts to “distinguish ‘me’ from them” (Haney-Peritz 
1986:119). She even starts to like the wallpaper and does not want to part 
from it or share it with the people surrounding her: 
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John is so pleased to see me improve! He laughed a little the other 
day, and said I seemed to be flourishing in spite of my wallpaper. 
I turned it off with a laugh. I had no intention of telling him it was 
because of the wallpaper—he would make fun of me. He might even 
want to take me away. 
I don’t want to leave now until I have found it out. (Wallpaper 13) 
 
Jennie looked at the wall in amazement, but I told her merrily that I 
did it out of pure spite at the vicious thing.  
She laughed and said she wouldn’t mind doing it herself, but I must 
not get tired.  
How she betrayed herself that time! 
But I am here, and no person touches this paper but me,—not 
alive! (“Wallpaper” 16) 
 
The wallpaper comes to have a positive connotation, because the 
narrator subverts the meaning of the wallpaper. At first, the wallpaper is a 
sign for the narrator’s oppression, but now it provides the narrator with an 
ally—the woman behind the pattern—an identity of her own and a more 
aggressive language than the one in her journal. Unlike patriarchal 
society, the narrator believes she can at least “find out” or conquer the 
wallpaper, the symbol for patriarchal society. The narrator becomes 
independent of John and frees herself, which is symbolized by ripping off 
the wallpaper: 
 
I pulled and she shook, I shook and she pulled, and before 
morning we had peeled off yards of that paper.  
And then when the sun came and that awful pattern began to laugh 
at me, I declared I would finish it to-day! (“Wallpaper” 16) 
 
Parallels can be drawn between the wallpaper as a representative of 
patriarchal discourse and John. Both John and the Wallpaper lock in and 
oppress women; both laugh at women: “John laughs at me, of course, but 
one expects that in marriage.”, “that awful pattern began to laugh at me” 
(“Wallpaper” 1, 16). 
The ending of the story shows a triumphant narrator: 
 
“I’ve got out at last,” said I, “in spite of you and Jennie. And I’ve 
pulled off most of the paper, so you can’t put me back!” 
Now why should that man have fainted? But he did, and right 
across my path by the wall, so that I had to creep over him every time! 
(“Wallpaper” 18) 
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However, the ending is ambiguous. On the one hand, it shows the 
“dramatic power of her new freedom”, a “transcendent sanity” and a “new 
mode of speaking”, which “escapes the sentence imposed by patriarchy” 
(Treichler 1984:67). On the other hand, the narrator believes to have 
simultaneously conquered the wallpaper and patriarchal society, but she 
does not realize that her madness, her escape from patriarchal society, 
will ultimately lead to a “more intense medical treatment” and that her 
escape is only temporary and compromised (Treichler 1984:67). Because 
of the wallpaper, the narrator becomes “more and more victim of male 
diagnosis” (Ford 1985:310). Karen Ford and Carol Thomas Neely regard 
the development throughout the story as rather negative and state that 
“the world of the wallpaper is less verbal” (Ford 1985:311) and that the 
wallpaper is a “symbolic accomplice to the husband’s discourse and 
diagnosis […] [,which] elicits [the narrator’s] voluntary compliance with her 
husband’s prescriptions” (Neely 1985:316). Similarly, Janice Haney-Peritz 
sees the “turn to the imaginary not as a model of liberation but as a sign of 
what may happen when a possible operation of the feminine in language 
is repressed” (Haney-Peritz 1986:124). However, Haney-Peritz points out 
the importance of “The Yellow Wallpaper” by stating that literature as “a 
really distinctive body which they [feminist critics] seek to liberate through 
identification […] destroy[s] the very foundations of patriarchal literature’s 
ancestral house”, which for her represents patriarchal society in general 
(Haney-Peritz 1986:123).  
 
The ending of “The Yellow Wallpaper” should be regarded as positive 
though, because the narrator finally finds her own female language and 
authors sentences of her own, to which even her husband has to listen. 
Madness ultimately creates a new discourse and space for women, which 
are not governed by patriarchal laws. Karen Ford describes this new 
space as a “space outside language, outside male influence” and links it to 
Freud’s pre-Oedipal and to Lacan’s Imaginary (Ford 1985:312). Paula 
Treichler regards the ending of “The Yellow Wallpaper” as a “significant 
triumph”, because the narrator finally “acts in conformity to her own 
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diagnosis” and because “her different discourse forces a new diagnosis” 
(Treichler 1985:327). Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar call the ending of 
“The Yellow Wallpaper” a “flight from dis-ease into health” and thus point 
out that madness, which is regarded as “the Other” and as abnormal 
within patriarchal society, is actually healthier than the prescribed norm 
(Gilbert&Gubar 1979:91). Similarly, Jean E. Kennard regards the 
“narrator’s descent into madness as a way to health, as a rejection of and 
escape from an insane society”, thus gaining a “higher form of sanity” 
within madness (Kennard 1981:76,77).  
  
 
2.5. The Panopticon: confinement and space in “The 
Yellow Wallpaper” 
 
Jonathan Crewe points out that the narrator’s imagination is 
“permanently at odds with the socially constructed forms that confine it”, 
which leads to the “‘imaginative’ protagonist’s captivity” (Crewe 1995:273). 
Hence, the narrator’s captivity is both a psychological and a physical one: 
she must act according to her husband John’s will and is restrained to the 
“colonial house”, which includes “a delicious garden” and her upstairs 
bedroom, which the narrator dislikes (“Wallpaper” 1, 2): 
 
I don’t like our room a bit. I wanted one downstairs that opened on 
the piazza and had roses all over the window, and such pretty old-
fashioned chintz hangings! but John would not hear of it.  
[…] So we took the nursery at the top of the house. 
It is a big, airy room, the whole floor nearly, with windows that look 
all ways, and air and sunshine galore. It was a nursery first and then 
playroom and gymnasium, I should judge; for the windows are barred 
for little children, and there are rings and things in the walls. 
The paint and paper look as if a boys’ school had used it. It is 
stripped off—the paper—in great patches all around the head of my 
bed, about as far as I can reach, and in a great place on the other side 
of the room low down. I never saw a worse paper in my life. 
(“Wallpaper” 2,3) 
 
The narrator is not even allowed to choose her own room for dubious 
reasons, while in fact, John wants to prevent giving in to his wife, because 
one change might lead to further changes: 
 51 
 
At first he meant to repaper the room, but afterwards he said that I 
was letting it get the better of me, and that nothing was worse for a 
nervous patient than to give way to such fancies. 
He said that after the wallpaper was changed it would be the heavy 
bedstead, and then the barred windows, and then that gate at the 
head of the stairs, and so on. 
“You know the place is doing you good,” he said, “and really, dear, 
I don’t care to renovate the house just for a three months’ rental.” 
(“Wallpaper” 4) 
 
The wallpaper presents imprisonment to the narrator, which John does 
not want to loosen. Hence, he prohibits changing the other means of 
suppression, such as the barred windows or the gate. Clearly, the 
narrator’s bedroom reminds the reader more of a prison than of a 
playroom or gymnasium. According to Jonathan Crewe, the room is 
“marked by a history she [the narrator] cannot read”; it reminds of a “scene 
of disciplinary schooling” and “functions as a prison cell and/or asylum 
ward” (Crewe 1995:274). The narrator’s comparison of the room to a 
children’s playroom points at a mere infantilization of the narrator by her 
husband; however, at a closer look, the room even seems to imprison the 
narrator and operates as a means of restriction of patriarchal society. The 
narrator’s spatial confinement is opposed by “open country”, a “place of 
freedom” (Kennard 1981:75). Her psychological and social confinement is 
contrasted with John’s latitude to do as he pleases. This contrast 
forebodes John’s role as a prison guard and the narrator’s role as an 
inmate. 
 
John S. Bak even compares the narrator’s room and the wallpaper to 
Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth century Panopticon, which Michel Foucault 
discussed in his 1975 work Discipline and Punish (Bak 1994 n.p.). 
Foucault regards the Panopticon as a “metaphor of disciplinary power”, a 
“continuous, anonymous, all-pervading power and surveillance operating 
at all levels of social organization” (Barker 2000:80). Originally, the 
Panopticon was Jeremy Bentham’s means of controlling prisoners, who 
were subjects to anonymous observers at all times. The main part of the 
Panopticon is a watchtower, from which guards or observers can overlook 
the prisoners everywhere at all times. The observed prisoners, on the 
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other hand, cannot even see the observers and thus do not know when 
and if they are being watched. Irreversible, “authorative power” is being 
exerted on the inmates, because of their “conscious and permanent 
visibility” (Bak 1994 n.p.). The subject’s visibility and the unverifiable 
presence of the observer cause paranoia and “affect the inmate’s 
psychological health” (Bak 1994 n.p.). Foucault claims that the major 
effect of the Panopticon is the following: 
 
To induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange 
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to 
render its actual exercise unnecessary; that its architectural apparatus 
should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation 
independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates 
should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves 
the bearers. (Foucault 1979:201) 
 
Bak claims that the same situation occurs in “The Yellow Wallpaper”. 
The narrator is watched by representatives of patriarchal society, such as 
John and his sister Jennie, who function as her observers; however John’s 
presence is not absolutely necessary as he is multipresent because of the 
narrator’s paranoia: The narrator feels monitored by the wallpaper with its 
“two bulbous eyes”, which “stare at you upside down” (“Wallpaper” 5). 
Thus, the narrator’s paranoia does not only include John and Jennie, but 
also the wallpaper. The narrator even states that “John is away all day, 
and even some nights when his cases are serious” (“Wallpaper” 4); the 
narrator’s wish for John’s presence—“And you won’t go away?” 
(“Wallpaper” 10)—and thus for his personal surveillance can be explained 
with the fact that visible observation does not leave the narrator paranoid. 
Actual surveillance gives the narrator a reason to be sly about her writing 
and her progressive fascination with the wallpaper, whereas mere 
paranoia drives her into madness.  
 
When the narrator identifies with the woman in the wallpaper, who is 
“trapped inside a Panopticon”, she aspires for the woman’s and her own 
freedom from surveillance. John S. Bak explains the narrator’s descent 
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into madness and her obsession with the wallpaper with the statement that 
the narrator “has to climb into it [the wallpaper], into the central tower of 
the Panopticon in order not to be watched” (Bak 1994 n.p.). According to 
Bak, her “breaking free from her internal prison” signifies her release “from 
the external bars that John uses to restrain her” (Bak 1994 n.p.). Only by 
denying the “Panopticon’s reality upon her” is the narrator able to 
“eliminate[..] its control” (Bak 1994 n.p.)  
Upon conquering the control of the Panopticon, the narrator gains a 
new identity: she is the one in charge, she is the observer. The ending of 
the short story therefore shows the reversed limitations of female space. 
Instead of being locked in, as in the beginning of the story, the narrator 
has the power to keep John out of her space. Jean E. Kennard states that 
the narrator replaces a “You keep me in” with an “I keep you out” (Kennard 
1981:81). The ascribed physical space might not have changed for the 
narrator, but the power relations clearly have: Whereas the narrator acted 
according to John’s will in the beginning, John has to listen to his wife and 
do what she orders him to do in the end. Whereas the narrator was 
irrational in the beginning, John adapts to this role, providing his wife with 
his former position of the reasonable person: 
 
Why there’s John at the door! 
It is no use, young man, you can’t open it! 
How he does call and pound! 
Now he’s crying for an axe.  
It would be a shame to break down that beautiful door! 
“John dear!” said I in the gentlest voice, “the key is down by the 
front steps, under a plantain leaf!” 
That silenced him for a few moments. 
Then he said—very quietly indeed, “Open the door, my darling!” 
“I can’t,” said I. “The key is down by the front door under a plantain 
leaf!” 
And then I said it again, several times, very gently and slowly, and 
said it so often that he had to go and see, and he got it of course, and 
came in. (“Wallpaper” 18)  
 
By calling John a “young man”, the narrator infantilizes her husband, 
which reflects the way he treated her before (“Wallpaper” 18). Repeating 
her statements “very gently and slowly” also hints at a role reversal of the 
narrator and John (“Wallpaper” 18). 
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As a consequence, the narrator’s quest for space and for an identity of 
her own is not a quest for physical, horizontal space, but it is a vertical 
quest, which is found by the narrator by extending her mind and ultimately 
her power. The narrator’s madness is not a limitation of her mind, but an 
extension of her space; her madness provides the narrator with an identity 
and “self-fulfillment” (Kennard 1981:82).  
 
 
2.6. So why did she go insane? 
 
Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story “The Yellow Wallpaper” is a 
crucial documentation of women’s lives at the end of the nineteenth 
century. The major themes in this literary work—patriarchy, madness, 
search for a female language, space, and the quest for identity—are 
interlinked and cannot be handled independently. All themes aim at 
breaking down the old patriarchal order, which suppresses women. 
However, self-fulfillment could not be reached easily by women in 
Victorian times. Gilman’s work highlights which paths women were not 
allowed to follow, namely self-determination, an identity independent from 
the one of their husbands’, work and creativity. Instead, women were 
infantilized and disregarded as subordinate to their husbands. Gilman 
managed with her story to show the one and only possibility many women 
had to conquer patriarchy; she showed a way into madness, into freedom.  
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3. Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar 
 
The second work chosen for this thesis is Sylvia Plath’s The Bell 
Jar. The novel is set in 1953 and therefore this work functions as a 
transition between the traditional image of women which can be found 
in “The Yellow Wallpaper” and a more modern view of women, as that 
depicted in Atwood’s Surfacing.  
The young heroine of Plath’s novel, Esther Greenwood, is torn 
between the old-fashioned role and the unattainable new role for 
women. While college education and fancy internships in cities like 
New York were possible for intelligent women like Esther, the 
fulfillment of her dreams outside of a traditional family after college was 
still a “no-go”, which would lead to punishment and exclusion from 
society. Sylvia Plath’s novel depicts a society of progression, which 
solely forgets the advancement of the role of women.  
 
 
3.1. Cold War America and the role of women in the 
1950s 
 
The Bell Jar is set during the time of the Cold War between the 
USA and the USSR, which plays an important role because of the 
protagonist’s obsession with the execution of the Rosenbergs, alleged 
Communist spies. Consequently, The Bell Jar is already set in a 
“binary framework”: not only do binaries between men and women 
exist, but also between the U.S. American and the Soviet ideology and 
culture (Baldwin 2004:24). Kate A. Baldwin calls the U.S. culture “U.S. 
domestic containment” or “U.S. domestic incarceration” and compares 
it to “the asylum” (Baldwin 2004:23).  
Indeed, McCarthyism with its observation mechanisms reminds us 
of the image of the Panopticon and accordingly of the means applied 
at the asylum. J. Edgar Hoover, the leader of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) during this time, mimics the role of the 
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psychotherapist, who observes the patients, or the citizens, and 
assigns the respective treatment to them. The American citizens are 
required to play the standardized roles of working husband and stay-
at-home wife. Consequently, “the links between the sexual and the 
political” roles cannot be overlooked (Baldwin 2004:24). McCarthyism 
promoted an old-fashioned and outdated role allocation, where men 
are the heads of their families and women do anything possible to 
support their husbands.  
It is important to note that the USA and the USSR represent 
completely different attitudes towards women. Communism allowed 
women to go to work and to be equal work forces to men; additionally, 
Soviet women had to keep up with the household (cf. Baldwin 2004: 
27). Thus, Soviet women had to handle both their jobs and their 
families, like many women nowadays. This double burden, on the one 
hand, put additional pressure on women, but, on the other hand, 
allowed them to find self-fulfillment outside their families and outside 
the private sphere as well.  
The concept of women in the work force was practically unknown 
and unestablished in the United States during the 1950s as it was in 
the Soviet Union. Women were still the “angels of the house”, the 
husband’s support and the caretaker of the children. The American 
woman’s purpose was to bring up patriotic citizens, who would 
successfully follow the established norms of McCarthyism, and to be 
the stronghold and the backbone of American society. Thus, the 
American society of the 1950s was still clearly divided into a public and 
a private sphere, whereby access to the public sphere was only 
granted to men and women were strictly banned from it.  
Kate A. Baldwin shows the two different attitudes towards women 
by means of the “Kitchen Debate”, an exchange between Vice 
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the 
American exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow in July 1959 (Baldwin 
2004:26). The exhibition was supposed to leave behind an impression 
of consumerist America and its cultural values; hence, Nixon and 
Khrushchev’s encounter proceeded in the kitchen of the exhibition’s 
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single family home, where Nixon explained the role of the American 
woman as follows: “Americans were interested in making life easier for 
their women”, placing women into a position behind their husbands, 
who were responsible for making their wives’ lives easier; 
Khrushchev’s reply that the Soviet Union “did not have the capitalist 
attitude towards women” was practically ignored by Nixon’s statement 
that “this attitude towards women is universal. […] What we want to do 
is make easier the lives of our housewives” (Baldwin 2004: 27).  
For Nixon, the “housewife” was a synonym of “woman”; he 
disregarded any possibility that women might not be housewives. 
Khrushchev’s notion of women, on the other hand, was a completely 
different one: for him, it was clear that women did not stay at home in 
order to solely do the housework, but that they also went to work and 
made their contribution to Communist society. Baldwin notes that  
 
The kitchen in the Soviet context connotes that place in the 
communalka, or communal apartment, where running water may 
blur conversation so it cannot be overheard; it is the place of the 
faux-private, a space that reinforces who’s cooking as a matter of 
ideology. For Khrushchev it is always a political site, and yet Nixon 
considers this movement to the domestic realm exemplary of 
democratic liberty, where ideas = goods in the interest of female 
autonomy and an exceptional idealization of the home as sacred. 
(Baldwin 2004:27-28) 
 
Nixon’s attempt to show off the progressive treatment of women in 
the USA appears like a backfiring joke because of the Soviet woman’s 
unique position in Soviet society. Instead of liberating American 
women, Nixon clearly locks them in with the help of kitchen aids. The 
kitchen served as the American woman’s hostile imprisonment, not as 
the helpful environment Nixon wanted it to be. Despite Nixon’s attempt 
to be helpful to women and to make their lives in their realm of the 
kitchen easier, his attitude “by making [it] universal, […] also 
compulsorily puts women in a position of captivity” (Baldwin 2004:28). 
The woman’s place in the kitchen became part of the American 
ideology.  
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The two different concepts represent a binary system, where one 
ideology is marked as the Other. From the American standpoint, the 
Other is the USSR. It is the passive, feminine counterpart to the USA, 
which is marginalized and fought against. Because of the Soviet denial 
to adapt American norms and ideology, Communism was prosecuted 
and its followers were punished by representatives of the American 
system. Although the construction of the USSR as the Other was 
generated similarly to the construction of women as the Other, there 
were significant differences: first of all, Soviet-style communism did not 
regard itself as inferior to the USA, but constructed the USA as the 
inferior Other to itself. Additionally, the USSR had not ultimately been 
conquered by the USA and instead presented a real threat to 
American capitalism. Women, on the other hand, had been 
suppressed for too long a time to still be considered as a threatening 
Other instead of a passive Other that could be locked in the kitchens of 
the nation.  
The momentary threat of the Other was the ultimate drive behind 
McCarthyism. The Other was not necessarily an Other, which was 
outside of the USA, but it was mainly the enemy within, which was 
feared. According to Linda Anderson, the question of Plath’s time was 
“where to attribute the threat – is it inside or outside” (Anderson 1997: 
105). Communists did not stand out of the crowd, as women do, which 
explains the McCarthyist means of observation and prosecution.  
One example of McCarthyist prosecution is the case of Ethel and 
Julius Rosenberg, which starts Sylvia Plath’s novel and is a leitmotif 
throughout the text: “It was a queer, sultry summer, the summer they 
electrocuted the Rosenbergs, and I didn’t know what I was doing in 
New York” (TBJ 1). The electrocution of the Rosenbergs is presented 
as a universally known fact, which it undoubtedly was due to 
widespread and intensive media coverage.13 The Rosenbergs 
demonstrate the paranoia of the 1950s against the enemy within, the 
                                            
13 The Jewish couple Ethel and Julius Rosenberg was accused of espionage for the 
Soviet Union and was executed in 1953 despite worldwide media coverage and protests. 
The Rosenberg case stands for the prosecution of Communism in the USA in general 
and exemplifies the ongoing witch-hunt during McCarthyism.  
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invisible danger from the inside. As a consequence, the electrocution 
of the Rosenbergs made an example of what happened to unpatriotic, 
noncompliant citizens, who were Communists, the abhorred Other. 
However, the electrocution of Ethel Rosenberg furthermore threatened 
American women not to follow the example of a woman who was trying 
to overcome the established American gender ideals. Kate A. Baldwin 
refers to “Ethel Rosenberg’s status as a bad mother—an image the 
press went to great pains to construct— […] as a reminder that [the 
American women] must conform to the era’s dictates and be a good 
mother” (Baldwin 2004:25). Additionally, despite their equal “guilt” in 
the case14, Julius Rosenberg—unlike his wife—was not the one to be 
blamed. After all, it was Ethel Rosenberg’s main agenda as a wife and 
mother to make sure that her family was not morally corrupted. Hence, 
Ethel’s electrocution was even more legitimate to American society of 
the 1950s than her husband’s. Although both Ethel and Julius 
Rosenberg were (falsely) convicted for the same crime—Communist 
espionage and revelation of nuclear technology to the USSR—Ethel’s 
betrayal weighed more heavily, because not only was she betraying 
American society as such, but also was she rejecting her normative 
role as a woman by her actions. 
Ethel Rosenberg was transformed into the Russian woman by her 
betrayal and role-rejection; she deliberately chose to be a more 
dreaded Other than the role of a woman within American society would 
let her be. As a communist, Ethel could become less passive and more 
powerful than American women in most other permitted female role. 
Ethel’s execution demonstrated what would happen to women who did 
not want to conform to gender stereotypes and therefore her case 
functioned as a means of deterrence. 
 
 
                                            
14 Nowadays, one can assume that Ethel Rosenberg merely knew about her husband’s 
spying, but did not participate in the espionage herself. As a consequence, “Ethel was 
guilty only ‘of being Julius’s wife’” (Linder: INTERNET). However, this fact does not 
influence my argument, because of Ethel’s lack of performing according to the permitted 
gender roles of the McCarthy era.  
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3.2. Plath’s (lost) battle with depression: Esther as 
Plath’s alter ego 
 
Many literary critics and more so the public are in favor of reading 
The Bell Jar as Sylvia Plath’s unofficial biography. The reasons for this 
undertaking are quite simple:  
First of all, it is a widely known fact that Sylvia Plath herself 
suffered from depression, spent time at a psychiatric hospital and 
ultimately committed suicide. Her life greatly resembles the life of 
Esther Greenwood—with the only exception that Esther is still alive at 
the end of the novel.  
Secondly, Sylvia Plath’s published journals almost read like a first 
manuscript of The Bell Jar15: Not only does Plath report of her 
internship at a women’s magazine, but she also refers to the 
Rosenbergs and repeats a comment a fellow-intern made about them:  
 
The tall beautiful catlike girl who wore an original hat to work 
every day rose to one elbow from where she had been napping on 
the divan in the conference room, yawned and said with beautiful 
bored nastiness: ”I’m so glad they are going to die.” She gazed 
vaguely and very smugly around the room, closed her enormous 
green eyes, and went back to sleep. (Silvia Plath quoted in 
MacPherson 1991:35) 
 
The very same situation is presented in The Bell Jar, and is 
reported in almost the same words as in The Journals of Silvia Plath: 
 
‘I’m so glad they are going to die.’ 
Hilda arched her cat-limbs in a yawn, buried her head in her 
arms on the conference table and went back to sleep. A wisp of 
bilious green straw perched on her brow like a tropical bird. (The 
Bell Jar 95)  
 
Finally, the publishing history of The Bell Jar appears like an 
attempt to prevent her mother and the other people who are written 
about in the novel from damage. Why else should The Bell Jar not 
have been published under Sylvia Plath’s real name, but under the 
                                            
15 Sylvia Plath: The Journals of Sylvia Plath 
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pseudonym Victoria Lucas? Only in 1966, three years after the novel’s 
first publication in England—coincidentally one month before Plath’s 
death—, did the novel appear under Plath’s own name. Aurelia 
Plath’s—Sylvia Plath’s mother’s—struggle against the novel’s 
publication in the USA also conforms to the assumption of many critics 
that The Bell Jar is indeed an autobiography. When the novel was 
published in the U.S. in 1971, many were “reading the novel as if it 
were simply ‘true’” (Anderson 1997:114). 
Despite the many undeniable parallels, The Bell Jar is not 
synonymous with Sylvia Plath’s journals, but remains a piece of literary 
art. Unlike her journals, the novel was written at a much later point in 
time, with more distance to her experiences during her college years. 
A differentiation between Sylvia Plath and Esther Greenwood is 
essential to any study of The Bell Jar. For this paper, it is secondary 
whether or not Sylvia Plath regarded Esther Greenwood as her alter 
ego and whether or not writing about her experiences helped her 
personally.16 
 
 
3.3. The story 
 
The Bell Jar can roughly be divided into three major parts: Esther 
Greenwood’s stay in New York City working for a women’s magazine, 
the protagonist’s return to her hometown including her suicide attempt 
at her mother’s house, and her time at psychiatric institutions, which 
ultimately lead to her apparent recovery.  
 
In the first part, the reader finds out that Esther has won an 
internship at a women’s magazine in New York City and therefore is 
provided with the opportunity to experience the life of a professional 
magazine editor or writer, two of Esther’s longed for occupations. 
                                            
16 Linda Anderson’s Women and Autobiography in the Twentieth Century discloses 
further highly interesting parallels between Sylvia Plath and Esther Greenwood.  
 62 
Additionally, New York is the site where Esther could have 
experiences with men other than her former boyfriend Buddy Willard.  
However, Esther’s life in New York is marked by her aimlessness: 
thus, she wants to copy the bubbly, cheerful lives of the other twelve 
girls, headed by Doreen, who have also “won a fashion magazine 
contest, by writing essays and stories” (The Bell Jar 1963:3). In her 
pursuit to fit in, Esther even adapts her name to Elly Higginbottom and 
invents a whole identity, which makes her feel safer around men. 
Although her friend Doreen tries to set her up with friends of her latest 
boyfriend’s, Esther’s adventures with men end unsuccessfully, either 
with a rejection by a man, or worse, with attempted rape. These 
experiences with men are matched by her unsatisfying experiences 
with Buddy Willard, whom Esther believes to be a “hypocrite”, whom 
she “would never marry […] if he were the last man on earth” (The Bell 
Jar 1963:43).  
Despite her attempts to impress her boss at the magazine, Jay 
Cee, Esther also fails to accomplish this goal and has a breakdown at 
the final photo shoot of the magazine. No matter how hard Esther tries 
to find her role in society, she can neither fulfill her role at the 
magazine and in professional life, nor can she establish her femininity 
in private life. Esther’s only hope remains the summer writing class, 
which she is sure to be accepted to and which would provide her with 
a certain sense of self. 
 
The second part of the novel is set in Esther’s hometown near 
Boston, where Esther finds out that she has not been accepted to the 
summer writing class. Instead of taking other summer classes, Esther 
decides to spend her summer with her mother. Since her professional 
career either as an editor or as a writer has not been launched, Esther 
is searching for another identity, possibly the one she has always 
rejected: an identity like her mother’s or her neighbor Dodo Conway’s 
as a housewife and mother. Suffering from sleeplessness and sinking 
into a state of depression, Esther consults the family doctor, her aunt’s 
sister-in-law Teresa, who sends Esther to Doctor Gordon, a 
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psychiatrist. Esther dislikes him from the beginning on and after a 
shock treatment quits seeing him and ultimately undertakes various 
suicide attempts.  
 
The third part is set in various hospitals and psychiatric institutions: 
first at the hospital of her hometown, where Esther regains 
consciousness after her last suicide attempt, then at the psychiatric 
ward of the city hospital, and upon the help of her benefactress 
Philomena Guinea at a private hospital. This private hospital is 
subdivided into different parts, according to the severity of the case. 
Esther first arrives at a “gloomy brick building called Caplan”, where 
she encounters Doctor Nolan, her new, female psychiatrist (The Bell 
Jar 179). Contrary to her fear of being moved to Wymark, the building 
for more severe cases, Esther is quickly moved “to the front of the 
house [with] lots more sun”, where she reencounters Joan, Buddy 
Willard’s other former girlfriend, who is also a patient (The Bell Jar 
1963:185).  
Esther accepts and respects Doctor Nolan as her psychiatrist and 
even moves to Belsize, where the less severe cases reside. However, 
Esther has to undergo electroshock therapy, but unlike before, she 
actually improves. With Doctor Nolan’s help, Esther has a fitting for a 
diaphragm in order to avoid pregnancy, something she is very scared 
of. Subsequently she has a sexual encounter with an older professor, 
Irwin. Esther loses her virginity, but almost hemorrhages to death. With 
Joan’s help, Esther undergoes medical treatment and survives. Joan 
however commits suicide and Esther attends her funeral. The novel 
ends with the hearing for Esther’s dismissal from the psychiatric clinic.  
 
 
3.4. Identity 
 
Susan Coyle sums up the novel, stating that “[e]ssentially, the 
novel chronicles Esther’s quest for identity, for authenticity, in a world 
that seems hostile to everything she wants” (Coyle 2000:162). Indeed, 
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Esther Greenwood is a young college student, who, according to the 
patterns of American society of the 1950s, should be enjoying her life, 
dating men and finding her own Mr. Perfect to settle down with, have a 
family and fulfill the gender stereotype of the time. Instead, she rejects 
Buddy Willard, the all-American guy she has been dating, for nobody 
or nothing else in particular. Esther wants to exchange a life with 
Buddy for a career and an identity, which are simply unattainable in the 
U.S. of the 1950s, because “she cannot quite fit herself into the 
patterns that she sees as available to her” (Coyle 2000: 162). The only 
respectable role for a woman in the 1950s was “wifehood in terms of 
service as a kitchen mat […], a utilitarian object, easily repaired or 
replaced, […] a metaphor for a woman” (Bonds 1990:54).  
Diane S. Bonds claims that Esther is threatened with “the loss of 
self” and substantiates it with “the pervasive imagery of 
dismemberment [which] suggests Esther’s alienation and 
fragmentation as well as a thwarted longing for relatedness with others 
and for a reconnection of dismembered part to whole” (Bond 1990:50). 
In fact, Esther’s disillusionment with a sought-after identity of her own 
directs her towards the attempt to copy some of the possible roles 
presented to her by the women around her: for example the roles of 
the girls working at the women’s magazine, the identity of the editor of 
the magazine, Jay Cee, her mother’s identity, or later, her 
psychiatrist’s identity.  
Esther’s experiments with the different possible identities at first 
resemble a teenager, who is trying out different clothes to see what 
suits her, especially because Esther picks the least suitable roles first. 
Instead of searching inside herself what is important to her, she prefers 
rejecting every detail of her own self in favor of someone else’s 
identity.  
The first role Esther tries to embrace is her friend Doreen’s: 
Doreen’s main interest lies in men and Esther wants to measure up to 
Doreen’s experiences by discharging her old identity and adopting 
another one, which resembles Doreen’s. Esther’s decision to “kill” the 
old Esther Greenwood leads to the process of “dissociation from 
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herself” and to a rebirth by giving herself a new name and identity — 
Elly Higginbottom (Coyle 2000:169):  
 
‘My name’s Elly Higginbottom,’ I said. ‘I come from Chicago.’ 
After that I felt safer. I didn’t want anything I said or did that night to 
be associated with me and my real name and coming from Boston. 
(The Bell Jar 11) 
 
Esther’s belief that she has to give up everything connected to her 
old self in order to find a new identity even turns her into a liar: not only 
does she lie to the people surrounding her, but also to herself by 
believing that Doreen’s identity could satisfy her. She realizes that her 
former dreams and hopes would never be fulfilled by being Elly 
Higginbottom, but another solution is not presented to her. Doreen and 
the men immediately come to terms with Esther’s new identity, while 
Esther is unsteady: “’Listen, Elly, do me a favour.’ She seemed to think 
Elly was who I really was by now” (The Bell Jar 14). Unlike the others, 
Esther does not recognize or accept herself as Elly. 
Instead, Esther’s abandonment of her former self only produces a 
state of impurity upon Esther’s realizing that adapting one’s name does 
not equal changing one’s identity. Esther has the urge to cleanse 
herself from the identity of Elly Higginbottom and go back to being a 
baby – a clean, pure, empty body, which can still be replenished with a 
completely new identity and does not have to conform to society’s 
pressures: 
 
I never feel so much myself as when I’m in a hot bath. 
I lay in that tub on the seventeenth floor of this hotel for-
women-only, high up over the jazz and push of New York, for near 
on to an hour, and I felt myself growing pure again. I don’t believe 
in baptism or the waters of Jordan or anything like that, but I guess 
I feel about a hot bath the way those religious people feel about 
holy water. 
I said to myself: ‘Doreen is dissolving, Lenny Shepherd is 
dissolving, Frankie is dissolving, New York is dissolving, they are 
all dissolving away and none of them matter any more. I don’t 
know them, I have never known them and I am very pure. All that 
liquor and those sticky kisses I saw and the dirt that settled on my 
skin on the way back is turning into something pure.’ 
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The longer I lay there in the clear hot water the purer I felt, and 
when I stepped out at last and wrapped myself in one of the big, 
soft, white, hotel bath towels I felt as pure and sweet as a new 
baby. (The Bell Jar 19)  
 
In the bathtub, Esther feels clean and unwritten upon; the scene 
reminds the reader of a religious ritual, a rebirth. For Esther, it is not 
necessarily a rebirth, more so the desertion of the used-up and 
blemished identity of Elly Higginbottom. Despite the abandonment of 
Elly Higginbottom, Esther does not gain her own self. She does not 
recognize the name of Elly Higginbottom anymore, but at the same 
time she also disregards her real name: 
 
I didn’t pay any attention at first, because the person knocking 
kept saying ‘Elly, Elly, Elly, let me in’, and I didn’t know any Elly. 
(The Bell Jar 19) 
 
‘Elly, Elly, Elly,’ the first voice mumbled, while the other voice 
went on hissing ‘Miss Greenwood, Miss Greenwood, Miss 
Greenwood’, as if I had a split personality or something. (The Bell 
Jar 20) 
 
Both voices, Doreen’s, which calls Esther “Elly”, and the night 
maid’s, which refers to Esther as “Miss Greenwood”, are hostile voices 
to the sleeping Esther. She does not want to identify with either one, 
which ultimately results in a split self and a refusal of either possible 
self. 
Esther’s indifference to and ignorance of her former identity as Elly 
Higginbottom turns into repulsion when Doreen throws up in front of 
her room: 
 
I made a decision about Doreen that night. I decided I would 
watch her and listen to what she said, but deep down I would have 
nothing at all to do with her. Deep down, I would be loyal to Betsy 
and her innocent friends. It was Betsy I resembled at heart. (The 
Bell Jar 21)  
 
Upon discharging her identity as Elly Higginbottom, Esther 
immediately compares herself to Betsy, making up a new identity. 
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Esther’s immature behavior includes adopting one identity after the 
other until she has found her new, perfect self.  
When she comes to realize that she cannot be one of the girls, she 
even wants to be an editor like her boss Jay Cee:  
 
I sat quietly in my swivel chair for a few minutes and thought 
about Jay Cee. I tried to imagine what it would be like if I were Ee 
Gee, the famous editor, in an office full of pitted rubber plants and 
African violets my secretary had to water each morning. I wished I 
had a mother like Jay Cee. Then I’d know what to do. (The Bell Jar 
36) 
 
The endeavor to be like Jay Cee fails because of Esther’s 
indecision and lack of knowledge of other languages: 
 
[…] ‘What do you have in mind after you graduate?’ 
[…] 
‘I don’t really know.’ 
‘You’ll never get anywhere like that.’ Jay Cee paused. ‘What 
languages do you have?’ 
‘Oh, I can read a bit of French, I guess, and I’ve always wanted 
to learn German.’ I’d been telling people I’d always wanted to learn 
German for about five years. […] What I didn’t say was that each 
time I picked up a German dictionary or a German book, the very 
sight of those dense, black, barbed-wire letters made my mind shut 
like a clam. 
‘I’ve always thought I’d like to go into publishing.’ I tried to 
recover a thread that might lead me back to my old, bright 
salesmanship. ‘I guess what I’ll do is apply at some publishing 
house.’ 
‘You ought to read French and German,’ Jay Cee sad 
mercilessly, ‘and probably several other languages as well, 
Spanish and Italian – better still, Russian. […]’ (The Bell Jar 30-31)  
 
Esther’s former methods of concealing her aimlessness do not 
function any longer and Esther is forced to face reality: American 
society does not provide her with a suitable identity or space. 
Consequently, she has a nervous breakdown at the photo shoot of the 
magazine: 
 
When they asked me what I wanted to be I said I didn’t know. 
‘Oh, sure you know,’ the photographer said. 
‘She wants,’ said Jay Cee wittily, ‘to be everything.’ 
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I said I wanted to be a poet. (The Bell Jar 97) 
 
Esther chooses yet another identity on the spot, but nevertheless 
feels helpless and cannot prevent breaking into tears at the photo 
shoot. Still, she decides to be a writer like her college mentor and 
sponsor Philomena Guinea, starting with a summer writing class she 
applied to: 
 
[…] After my month on the magazine I’d applied for a summer 
school course with a famous writer where you sent in the 
manuscript of a story and he read it and said whether you were 
good enough to be admitted into his class. 
Of course, it was a very small class, and I had sent in my story 
a long time ago and hadn’t heard from the writer yet, but I was sure 
I’d find the letter of acceptance waiting on the mail table at home. 
(The Bell Jar 99) 
 
Esther’s doubtlessness to be admitted to the summer class makes 
her even bolder in her assumptions about her future: 
 
I decided I’d surprise Jay Cee and send in a couple of the 
stories I wrote in this class under a pseudonym. Then one day the 
Fiction Editor would come in to Jay Cee personally and plop the 
stories down on her desk and say, ‘Here’s something a cut above 
the usual,’ and Jay Cee would agree and accept them and ask the 
author to lunch and it would be me. (The Bell Jar 99) 
 
Again, Esther’s newly-sought-after identity vanishes into thin air, 
when she is rejected by the summer writing class of her college. The 
only role left for her is her mother’s, an identity Esther had formerly 
always rejected. Diane S. Bonds explains that Esther “is torn apart by 
the intolerable conflict between her wish to avoid domesticity, marriage 
and motherhood, on the one hand, and her inability to conceive of a 
viable future in which she avoids that fate, on the other” (Bonds 
1990:54). Consequently, Esther’s decision to spend her summer at her 
mother’s house is only a half-hearted attempt to fit into 1950s 
suburbia, while in fact, she justifies her being there with her wish to 
write a novel based on her own life. Kate A. Baldwin explains that 
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Esther’s search for selfhood through the dramatically opposed lives 
of poetry and motherhood offers us a character who throws herself 
against the limited options available to her like a furious pinball, 
aiming for and then bouncing away from discrete targets of female 
identity. (Baldwin 2004: 24-25) 
 
Esther’s attempt to write a novel cannot succeed, because she 
does not have anything to write about. However, Esther’s return does 
not only signify her despair, but also her refusal of society. Esther’s 
isolation has a negative connotation, but it is a wanted one. Isolation 
includes a different perspective to society and to Esther it provides a 
space for refusal.  
Esther cannot use her newly-gained space because she is haunted 
by the images of her neighbor Dodo Conway and her snoring mother, 
the images of two mothers, who—unlike Esther—are willing to give up 
their own identities and lives for their children. The suburb is “Esther’s 
prison”, to which she “is sentenced [...] because she failed her college 
achievement test” (MacPherson 1994: 44). In addition, Esther knows 
that after college she will be “moving ‘back’ into second-class 
citizenship and second-hand achievement”, if she chooses the same 
path as her mother (MacPherson 1994: 45). Pat MacPherson sees 
Esther’s objections to her mother’s life and to marriage as due “to her 
own apparently irrevocable reduction into domestic drudge” and “to 
other women’s apparent willingness to undergo this metamorphosis 
called marriage” (MacPherson 1994: 47). 
Esther, the ungrateful daughter, refuses to follow her mother’s 
path, or to even learn shorthand, which, according to her mother, 
would be a useful tool for Esther on the working market. Society wants 
Esther to follow in her mother’s footsteps and to give herself up for her 
husband and children, just like her mother before, who in return has 
given up her own identity in order to grant her daughter a fulfilled 
future. On the one hand, Esther’s mother feels betrayed by Esther’s 
lack of interest in her life because of society’s expectations of a “good” 
daughter, but, on the other hand, the role of the mother is an 
ungrateful one, which the mother does not want for her daughter. Pat 
MacPherson sums up the mother’s sacrifices by saying that  
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[d]aughterly careerism pays back the mother for her own lost 
career – but it also betrays motherhood, rejecting and devaluing it. 
Daughterly maternalism sacrifices all the mother’s sacrifices but 
passes the culturally approved loyalty test of femininity-as-
motherly-sacrifice – daughters learning martyrdom at their mothers’ 
already bent knees. (MacPherson 1994:53) 
 
Despite Esther’s or her mother’s possible wishes, the only “forms 
of womanhood [are] offered to [Esther] by the very stereotypes she 
has sought to elude” (Bonds 1990:55). Hence, “in the attempt to avoid 
dismemberment, disfiguration or mutilation of the self, the heroine 
undergoes a process of self-dismemberment”, which climaxes in 
Esther’s repeated suicide attempts (Bonds 1990:55). The suicide 
attempts are Esther’s only option out of the suburbs. Hence, “[s]uicidal 
breakdown delivers Esther from ‘mother’s clutch’ into the hands of 
experts, the men in charge” (MacPherson 1994:53).  
 
Esther’s encounter with Doctor Gordon, a prototypical male 
representative of patriarchal society, leaves Esther speechless and 
numb. Doctor Gordon holds high patriarchal values, which include a 
family—a wife who takes care of the children and supports the 
husband, and a husband, who is the head of this family. These values 
are summed up in the photo on Doctor Gordon’s desk, which shows 
his happy family—an immediate threat to Esther’s identity, to all her 
hopes and dreams of escaping from the patriarchal system of 
suppression. Esther inherently knows that Doctor Gordon cannot be of 
any help to her and that his sole purpose is to refer Esther to the 
position she rejects and to punish her in case of a refusal of this role. 
Doctor Gordon leaves Esther speechless; she even loses the ability to 
write or read. The loss of speech and the implied loss of power of 
women is the final aim of patriarchal society. However, Esther only 
loses the ability to use language, a sign of masculinity, which puts her 
into the traditional position of women. But Esther is not able to reinvent 
a female language to regain her power and ultimately slips further and 
further into the space of madness, which becomes the only means for 
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her to resist male power. Esther’s lack of improvement is an attack on 
Doctor Gordon’s values and on the society he represents. Hence, 
Esther has to be punished through electroshock therapy. Marilyn 
Boyer discovers that  
 
Esther’s shock treatments […] debilitate her even further since 
they are administered in a barbaric fashion, akin to electrocution. 
The shocked body is an even deeper representation of the 
minimalization of language in Esther Greenwood. (Boyer 2004: 
214) 
 
Esther’s reaction to this therapy is not the one anticipated: she 
does not get better, but only realizes that her behavior will continuously 
be punished by Doctor Gordon and by society at large, leading to an 
“erasure of language” and leaving her without any power at all (Boyer 
2004: 215). Similarly to “The Yellow Wallpaper”, language is used as a 
tool of power: Doctor Gordon has the power to entirely remove 
language from Esther’s reach by means of continuous shock 
treatments. Esther’s “involuntary institutionalization” signifies the 
“ultimate feminine subjection to male control over knowledge and 
technology”, over language and power (MacPherson 1994:56).  
Esther wants to flee future punishment and slips into the role of 
Elly Higginbottom one last time. However, Elly Higginbottom does not 
really provide an alternative life, because it would only mean to leave 
behind her identity in favor of another traditional female role. Esther 
cannot live in refusal anymore and wants to flee from patriarchal 
society for good. Esther’s last, and almost successful suicide attempt 
shows her complete disillusionment with society. In addition, her 
suicide attempt is an affront to Doctor Gordon and his beliefs. Pat 
MacPherson regards Esther’s suicide attempt “as her critique, as a 
refusal, as Dr. Gordon’s failure to adjust her” (MacPherson 1994: 41). 
A successful suicide attempt would have proven Esther’s final escape 
from the Law of the Father; however, Esther is saved and has to 
readjust to society.  
 
 72 
After her last suicide attempt, Esther’s self is split: she does not 
even recognize herself in the mirror anymore. Esther does not 
recognize her old self, who revolted against society; she wants to 
destroy this old, non-conforming self and the consequences she has to 
bear for her past behavior. Ultimately, Esther destroys the mirror, 
which reflects the old picture of her self.  
Esther is not reborn though, but stands at a new starting point of 
her life. This new starting point is also signified by her destruction of 
the mirror, which indicates that Esther has to undergo the mirror stage 
again and has to learn to recognize and establish her self. The new 
start includes Esther’s stay at several psychiatric institutions, where 
Esther again is subject to psychiatrists, who have been coined by 
patriarchic values. Although Esther’s doctor turns out to be a woman, 
Doctor Nolan, she is no more than a representative of patriarchal 
society. Hence, Esther has to conform to patriarchal society of the 
1950s in order to be declared healthy and “normal”. The refusal to 
participate in her therapy would again be countered by the threat of 
electroshock therapy and the move to an institution for more severe 
cases. Thus, the refusal to participate in therapy signifies the refusal to 
be part of patriarchal society in general, which must be punished in 
1950s society to suppress a possible Other. Only the acceptance of 
the traditional role of femininity and the values of patriarchal society 
prevents Esther from punishment through electroshock therapy or 
exclusion of society as such.  
Unlike before, Esther wants to change. Doctor Nolan, like Jay Cee 
or Philomena Guinea before, gives Esther a new perspective of the 
role of women: apparently it is possible for a woman after all to be part 
of patriarchal society and to have a professional career. Diane S. 
Bonds warns that 
 
Dr. Nolan appears to play a special role in Esther’s “cure,” but 
several reservations about that role ought to be made. Combining 
the attributes of patriarchally-defined femininity and professional 
accomplishment, Dr. Nolan is set forth by some readers as an ideal 
role model for Esther, but the last thirty years have taught us to 
question this sort of image which can merely compound the 
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oppression of women by leading them to assume expectations 
traditionally held of men as well as those held of women: Plath 
herself provides a highly visible example of the tragic 
consequences of uncritically embracing this model which 
encourages the belief that women can “have it all”. (Bonds 1990: 
60-61)  
 
However, Doctor Nolan does not destroy Esther’s dreams of a 
career, as Jay Cee or the rejection from the writing class did, and thus 
provides Esther with an alternative identity to being a wife and mother. 
However deceptive this image might be, Esther accepts it and wants to 
participate in society again. Esther’s attempts to impress Doctor Nolan 
display Esther’s trust in this doctor, which does not even decline when 
electroshock therapy is applied. Instead, Esther trusts Doctor Nolan’s 
promise that electroshock therapy does not hurt when it is applied 
correctly, but that it helps Esther improve.  
 
I curled up in the far corner of the alcove with the blanket over 
my head. It wasn’t the shock treatment that struck me, so much as 
the bare-faced treachery of Doctor Nolan. I liked Doctor Nolan, I 
loved her, I had given her my trust on a platter and told her 
everything, and she had promised, faithfully, to warn me ahead of 
time if ever I had to have another shock treatment.  
[…] 
Doctor Nolan put her arm around me and hugged me like a 
mother. 
‘You said you’d tell me!’ I shouted at her through the 
disheveled blanket. 
‘But I am telling you,’ Doctor Nolan said. ‘I’ve come specially 
early to tell you, and I’m taking you over myself.’  
I peered at her through my swollen lids. ‘Why didn’t you tell me 
last night?’ 
‘I only thought it would keep you awake. If I’d known…’ 
‘You said you’d tell me.’ 
‘Listen, Esther,’ Doctor Nolan said. ‘I’m going over with you, I’ll 
be there the whole time, so everything will happen right, the way I 
promised. I’ll be there when you wake up, and I’ll bring you back 
again.’ 
I looked at her. She seemed very upset. 
I waited a minute. Then I said, ‘Promise you’ll be there.’ 
‘I promise.’ (The Bell Jar 203-204)  
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Feeling numb after the therapy might have frightened the old, 
rebellious Esther, but gives comfort to the new Esther and is even a 
sign of improvement to her: 
 
All the heat and fear had purged itself. I felt surprisingly at 
peace. The bell jar hung, suspended, a few feet above my head. I 
was open to the circulating air. (The Bell Jar 206) 
 
Moving Esther to the part of the psychiatric clinic for less severe 
cases rewards Esther for her improvements, although it also means 
Esther gives up her defense against the patriarchal system. Esther no 
longer fights a system, which only provides opponents with two other 
solutions, namely psychiatry or death, and instead tries to use the 
system and to impress with her impeccable exemplariness—just like 
she used to in her college classes by getting straight As and earning 
scholarships. Esther is the good girl again, who believes that the 
patriarchal system will reward her and find a place and a career for an 
intelligent young woman like her after all. Esther’s industrious behavior 
has one cause—Doctor Nolan, a fellow woman who has a career and 
a place in society. Esther is deceived by this new image of women and 
forgets that even Doctor Nolan—despite being a woman—functions as 
a representative of patriarchal society.  
 
In order to form her new self, Esther needs an Other to define 
herself against and to undergo the mirror stage again. This Other is 
her old friend, Joan, another ex-girlfriend of Buddy Willard’s. Joan 
represents Esther’s double image: at first, she is the one Esther looks 
up to, because Joan seems to be normal and functioning and 
misplaced in the psychiatric institution. After Esther finds out about 
Joan’s homosexual encounter with DeeDee, the image of the good 
twin shifts to an image of a bad double and Esther can look down on 
Joan, make her into a negative Other, in whose reflection she can 
shine. Pat MacPherson states that “homosexuality as disease is the 
necessary Other in the organic medical model of mental health” 
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(MacPherson 1991: 81). This model is reflected in Esther’s behavior 
towards Joan: 
 
As my vision cleared, I saw a shape rise from the bed. Then 
somebody gave a low giggle. The shape adjusted its hair, and two 
pale, pebble eyes regarded me through the gloom. DeeDee lay 
back on the pillows, bare-legged under her green wool dressing-
gown, and watched me with a little mocking smile. A cigarette 
glowed between the fingers of her right hand.  
‘I just wanted …’ I said. 
‘I know,’ said DeeDee. ‘The music.’ 
‘Hello, Esther,’ Joan said then, and her cornhusk voice made 
me want to puke. ‘Wait for me, Esther, I’ll come play the bottom 
part with you.’ 
Now Joan said stoutly, ’I never really liked Buddy Willard. He 
thought he knew everything. He thought he knew everything about 
women …’ 
I looked at Joan. In spite of the creepy feeling, and in spite of 
my old, ingrained dislike, Joan fascinated me. It was like observing 
a Martian, or a particularly warty toad. Her thoughts were not my 
thoughts, nor her feelings my feelings, but we were close enough 
so that her thoughts and feelings seemed a wry, black image of my 
own. 
Sometimes I wondered if I had made Joan up. Other times I 
wondered if she would continue to pop in at every crisis of my life 
to remind me of what I had been, and what I had been through, 
and carry on her own separate but similar crisis under my nose. 
(The Bell Jar 209-210)  
 
 Esther’s turn to the “positive” and Joan’s turn to the “negative” part 
is accompanied by Joan’s decline and Esther’s simultaneous 
improvement.17 However, the exchanged roles do not change Esther 
and Joan’s part in reference to men: in the binary opposition with men, 
both Esther and Joan still fulfill the passive part at all times, no matter 
how hard they try to be good and fulfill the role. The image of women 
in patriarchal society of the 1950s can only be challenged through 
recourse to madness, homosexuality and suicide, the very way Esther 
has given up and Joan is pursuing. According to Pat MacPherson, 
Joan offers a choice to Esther—“the choice of the ‘third sex’”, which 
                                            
17 The terms “positive” and “negative” refer to a binary model accepted by patriarchal 
society. Esther no longer questions the role assigned to her by patriarchal society, 
whereas Joan’s behavior becomes more and more subversive.  
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does not include celibacy or subordination (MacPherson 1994: 84). 
However, Esther fearfully and hatefully rejects this choice. 
With giving up her old self, Esther’s behavior becomes hypocritical 
and even crueler than men’s behavior towards women. Esther rejects 
her old role and at the same time pushes down Joan, who is the 
double of her old self. Esther even finds a new ally, whom she formerly 
rejected as a hypocrite—Buddy Willard. She forgives him and even 
reinforces his belief in his own innocence when she claims that he has 
nothing to do with her condition or Joan’s suicide.  
Esther apparently has the impression that she is an exception in 
society and that she never has to follow into her mother’s or Buddy’s 
mother’s footsteps, because she branded herself through her past 
madness. With this self-deceit, Esther disregards that she turns into 
the very model woman who she never wanted to be, but who is fit for 
patriarchal society. Esther’s final rebirth is marked by Joan’s suicide 
and burial, which signifies Esther’s “burying her own dark side, 
seduced by death in the person of Joan” (Coyle 2000:173). However, 
burying her old rebellious self is not a long-term solution to her 
problems. Diane S. Bonds notes that  
 
Esther’s recovery involves a reinstitution of the problems that led to 
her breakdown. […] The recovery process of this heroine merely 
extends the series of separations from or rejections of others which 
seems to have played an important part in bringing about her 
breakdown. (Bonds 1990: 57) 
 
Consequently, it only seems to be a matter of time until Esther’s 
next breakdown. Still, Esther’s fitness is tested at the end of her stay at 
the psychiatric clinic when she has to appear in front of an assembly of 
representatives of patriarchal society who judge whether or not Esther 
fulfills her role well enough to return to society. Pat MacPherson 
compares the “tribunal evaluating her normalcy” to the tribunals held 
against Communists in the United States such as the tribunal against 
the Rosenbergs (MacPherson 1994:83). Esther feels confident about 
the hearing because she has changed everything about herself and 
has turned herself into the prototypical model of femininity. Although 
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this metamorphosis was a necessity for Esther to grant her survival, it 
represents a step backwards—back into the catch of patriarchy.  
 
 
3.5. Mrs. Greenwood versus Doctor Nolan 
 
The Bell Jar includes a number of opposing female doppelgangers: 
the good girl, Betsy, and the bad girl, Doreen, the experienced and the 
inexperienced, the successful and the unsuccessful, and, of course, 
the sane and the insane. In The Bell Jar, two additional opposing 
female roles are presented: the role of the mother, who is always a 
bad mother to the daughter, and the role of the career woman, who 
has the connotation of the good mother.  
Esther’s mother, Mrs. Greenwood, takes on the part of the bad 
mother: she has given up her life and identity for Esther, whom she 
wants to have a better life, but at the same time she regards Esther as 
ungrateful. Thus, she is ignorant to Esther’s hopes for her future and 
only wants to keep up appearances.  
After Esther’s return to her hometown, her mother seems to be 
oblivious to Esther’s disappointment upon her rejection from the 
summer writing course: “‘I think I should tell you right away,’ she said, 
and I could see bad news in the set of her neck, ‘you didn’t make that 
writing course’” (TBJ 110). To Mrs. Greenwood, the writing course is 
just “that writing course”—one of many writing classes, which are 
interchangeable and unimportant—while Esther’s world falls apart: 
 
The air punched out of my stomach. 
All through June the writing course had stretched before me 
like a bright, safe bridge over the dull gulf of the summer. Now I 
saw it totter and dissolve, and a body in a white blouse and green 
skirt plummet into the gap. (The Bell Jar 110) 
 
Esther’s rejection from the writing class gives Mrs. Greenwood the 
opportunity to convince Esther of learning something useful for life: 
Finally, Esther can learn shorthand, a skill Mrs. Greenwood has 
perfected. 
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By the end of supper my mother had convinced me I should 
study shorthand in the evenings. Then I would be killing two birds 
with one stone, writing a novel and learning something practical as 
well. I would also be saving a whole lot of money.  
That same evening, my mother unearthed an old blackboard 
from the cellar and set it up on the breezeway. Then she stood at 
the blackboard and scribbled little curlicues in white chalk while I 
sat in a chair and watched. 
At first I felt hopeful. 
I thought I might learn shorthand in no time, and when the 
freckled lady in the Scholarships Office asked me why I hadn’t 
worked to earn money in July and August, the way you were 
supposed to if you were a scholarship girl, I could tell her I had 
taken a free shorthand course instead, so I could support myself 
right after college. 
The only thing was, when I tried to picture myself in some job, 
briskly jotting down line after line of shorthand, my mind went 
bland. There wasn’t one job I felt like doing where you used 
shorthand. And, as I sat there and watched, the white chalk 
curlicues blurred into senselessness. (The Bell Jar 117)  
 
 
Mrs. Greenwood’s practicality opposes Esther’s higher hopes for 
her own future. Shorthand becomes the tool of ordinariness, 
homeliness, and artlessness. Esther does not want to gain either 
quality and even loses the ability to see and read the signs of this 
language of patriarchy. By refusing her mother’s skill to provide her 
with a future, Esther also refuses her mother’s identity and does not 
acknowledge her sacrifices. Mrs. Greenwood sacrificed herself and her 
future in order to provide her daughter with a better life at the cost of 
understanding her daughter.  
Mrs. Greenwood and Esther literally speak—and write—a different 
language. Mrs. Greenwood masters shorthand, which for Esther 
symbolizes patriarchy, whereas Esther tries to acquire her own female 
writing, an écriture féminine, in her novel. Esther’s attempt to write a 
novel fails, because she cannot acquire a new language, and 
simultaneously, she loses the ability to use patriarchal language.  
Mrs. Greenwood does not understand or even recognize Esther’s 
severe state of mind, even when Esther cannot sleep anymore: 
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My mother told me I must have slept, it was impossible not to 
sleep in all that time, but if I slept, it was with my eyes wide open, 
for I had followed the green, luminous course of the second hand 
and the minute hand and the hour hand of the bedside clock 
through their circles and semi-circles, every night for seven nights, 
without missing a second, or a minute, or an hour. (The Bell Jar 
122) 
 
In Esther’s view, Mrs. Greenwood becomes the ally of the male 
psychiatrist, Doctor Gordon, and allows for Esther to undergo 
electroshock therapy at Doctor Gordon’s private hospital. Esther 
disregards the fact that her mother has to pay for her therapy—another 
sacrifice she makes for her daughter’s well being.  
Upon Esther’s electroshock treatment, her mother is relieved when 
Esther decides that she does not need any more treatments: 
 
‘I’m through with that Doctor Gordon,’ I said, after we had left 
Dodo and her black wagon behind the pines. ‘You can call him up 
and tell him I’m not coming back next week.’ 
My mother smiled. ‘I knew my baby wasn’t like that.’ 
I looked at her. ‘Like what?’ 
‘Like those awful people. Those awful dead people at that 
hospital.’ She paused. ‘I knew you’d decide to be all right again.’ 
(The Bell Jar 140) 
 
 Esther’s mother regards Esther’s state of mind as a pure 
stubbornness of her daughter’s—something she just has to 
consciously decide against. On the other hand, Mrs. Greenwood’s 
wish for normalcy also shows that she is happy not to be Doctor 
Gordon’s ally anymore, but to regain her daughter, through whom she 
can possibly live out her own dreams. Mrs. Greenwood does not have 
the capacity to understand that fulfillment is not within Esther’s reach in 
patriarchal society—mainly, because Mrs. Greenwood herself is part of 
this very society.  
 
At the psychiatric clinic Esther encounters her newest role model, 
Doctor Nolan. As I have mentioned before, Doctor Nolan is everything 
Esther has always dreamed of: she is a professional woman, who has 
 80 
found space for a career within society, someone, who has not 
mastered shorthand, but her sexuality: 
 
When I enrolled in the main building of the hospital, a slim young 
woman had come up and introduced herself. ‘My name is Doctor 
Nolan. I am to be Esther’s doctor.’ 
I was surprised to have a woman. I didn’t think they had woman 
psychiatrists. This woman was a cross between Myrna Loy and my 
mother. She wore a white blouse and a full skirt gathered at the waist 
by a wide leather belt, and stylish, crescent-shaped spectacles. (The 
Bell Jar 179) 
 
Doctor Nolan promises Esther the same future by providing her 
with a fitting for a diaphragm at a gynecologist. Hence, Doctor Nolan 
turns Esther into a sexual woman, although Esther does not seem to 
be ready for sex—even though she regards almost hemorrhaging to 
death as a suitable first experience with sex. In order to gain her new 
self, Esther turns against her own mother and is backed by Doctor 
Nolan: 
 
‘I hate her,’ I said, and waited for the blow to fall. 
But Doctor Nolan only smiled at me as if something had 
pleased her very, very much, and said, ‘I suppose you do.’ (The 
Bell Jar 195) 
 
Doctor Nolan weakens Esther’s bond with her mother. While her 
mother wants Esther to have a better future than her, Doctor Nolan, as 
the representative of patriarchal society, wants Esther to turn into her 
mother, which includes rejecting her mother and destroying the bond 
of female ancestry at the same time. Doctor Nolan turns into the 
mother figure Esther always wanted to have. According to Pat 
MacPherson, 
 
Esther ‘escapes’ through the enabling therapy provided by the 
good mother, a professional mother, a professional woman who is 
not a mother, not ruled by duty and self-denying service. 
(MacPherson 1994:71) 
 
However, Doctor Nolan also misleads Esther by guiding her back 
into society; Doctor Nolan cannot show Esther an alternative to 
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patriarchal society, because she herself is also a crucial, functioning 
part of it. Although she works at the brink of society, she is the firmest 
member of patriarchal society, because she guards the border of 
society and makes sure that nobody leaves it. Additionally, although 
Doctor Nolan is Esther’s psychiatrist, she is not the one to make 
decisions. Even right in the beginning of Esther’s stay at the 
psychiatric institution, it is not Doctor Nolan who comes to see Esther, 
but “a whole lot of strange men” (The Bell Jar 179). 
Esther’s new mother and another one of her former mother ideals, 
Philomena Guinea, persuade her to return to society. Esther sees the 
possibility of gaining sexual experiences and returning to society if only 
she does not get pregnant. With Philomena Guinea’s money and 
Doctor Nolan’s connections to a gynecologist, Esther can make sure 
that her fear of having a baby will not be fulfilled: 
 
The five dollars was part of what Philomena Guinea had sent 
me as a sort of get well present. I wondered what she would think if 
she knew to what use her money was being put.  
Whether she knew it or not, Philomena Guinea was buying my 
freedom. 
‘What I hate is the thought of being under a man’s thumb,’ I 
had told Doctor Nolan. ‘A man doesn’t have a worry in the world, 
while I’ve got a baby hanging over my head like a big stick, to keep 
me in line.’ 
‘Would you act differently if you didn’t have to worry about a 
baby?’ (The Bell Jar 212)  
 
The baby is the bait Doctor Nolan can offer Esther; however, it is 
only the bait until Esther returns to society. Then she might still 
reconcile with Buddy Willard or find another man to settle down with 
and fulfill her predestined role as wife and mother. Before entering the 
clinic, a baby has always been an immediate threat to Esther and to 
her future, also in her relationship with Buddy Willard: 
 
I also remembered Buddy Willard saying in a sinister, knowing 
way that after I had children I would feel differently, I wouldn’t want 
to write poems any more. So I began to think maybe it was true 
that when you were married and had children it was like being 
brainwashed, and afterwards you went dumb as a slave in some 
private, totalitarian state. (The Bell Jar 81) 
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Instead of being “brainwashed” by a husband and children, Esther 
undergoes this change with Doctor Nolan’s help. No longer does she 
write poetry, but starts turning into the perfect woman. After her first 
sexual encounter with Irwin, Esther is glad that “Irwin’s voice had 
meant nothing” to her when she calls him up (The Bell Jar 231). 
Despite Esther’s belief the reader expects her to find a man, who might 
mean something to her; consequently Esther’s former nightmares 
might turn into her everyday reality: 
 
And I knew that in spite of all the roses and kisses and 
restaurant dinners a man showered on a woman before he married 
her, what he secretly wanted when the wedding service ended was 
for her to flatten out underneath his feet like Mrs Willard’s kitchen 
mat. (The Bell Jar 80) 
 
Although Esther regards her diaphragm as newly gained sexual 
freedom, it actually only leads her back to men, back to patriarchy and 
back to the role she is supposed to fulfill. Instead of freeing Esther, 
Doctor Nolan builds a new prison for her.  
Pat MacPherson perfectly sums up the dilemma and rivalry 
between Esther’s two different role models—between her mother and 
Doctor Nolan: 
 
To find and hear the voice of the woman behind the mother is [...] 
the daughter’s crucial adolescent task. To know the woman before 
and beyond the mother enables the daughter to realize that self is 
not vaporized when Motherhood moves in and seems to Take 
Over in body-snatcher fashion.  
[...] 
Struggling to take on the mother’s point of view is abandoned 
in favour of simple transference in both Esther’s and Sylvia Plath’s 
therapy. They cling to the earlier and easier task of finding the 
therapist a welcome replacement for the mother.  
When the bad mother and the good mother act the parts in 
Esther’s struggle for identity, the one wears the frown of self-denial 
and the other the smile of self-fulfillment. (MacPherson 1994: 72) 
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Both “mothers” only present a façade to Esther, both of them wear 
a mask. Esther recognizes her mother’s mask, but fails to do so with 
Doctor Nolan.  
 
 
3.6. The psychiatric clinic 
 
In The Bell Jar the reader is confronted with Esther’s stereotypes 
concerning psychiatry: Esther expects a doppelganger of Sigmund 
Freud, the “Übervater” of modern psychiatry, who would immediately 
understand and heal her. Instead she encounters Doctor Gordon, who 
“wasn’t like that at all. He was young and good-looking, and […] 
conceited” (The Bell Jar 124). Doctor Gordon’s office is full of icons of 
patriarchy, for example the “certificates from different medical schools, 
with Doctor Gordon’s name in Latin”, in a language of another 
patriarchal society (The Bell Jar 122). Another distracting patriarchal 
icon is the picture of Doctor Gordon’s perfect family with his wife, 
whom Esther will never even come close to matching. The picture is a 
threatening promise to Esther that Doctor Gordon’s attempts are only 
attempts to lead her back into the heart of patriarchal family instead of 
helping her find her own place in society. In addition to the threat of not 
being the perfect housewife, Esther also feels threatened by Doctor 
Gordon’s perfect children: 
 
Doctor Gordon had a photograph on his desk, in a silver frame, 
that half faced him and half faced my leather chair. It was a family 
photograph, and it showed a beautiful dark-haired woman, who 
could have been Doctor Gordon’s sister, smiling out over the 
heads of two blond children. 
I think one child was a boy and one was a girl, but it may have 
been that both children were boys or that both were girls, it is hard 
to tell when children are so small. I think there was also a dog in 
the picture, towards the bottom – a kind of airedale or a golden 
retriever – but it may have only been the pattern in the woman’s 
skirt. 
For some reason the photograph made me furious. 
I didn’t see why it should be turned half towards me unless 
Doctor Gordon was trying to show me right away that he was 
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married to some glamorous woman and I’d better not get any funny 
ideas. (The Bell Jar 124) 
 
Esther enviously acknowledges the fact that at an early age girls 
might be mistaken as boys, thus, they might still belong to the 
favorable sex of society instead of being damned to serving a man.  
Doctor Gordon’s family appears to be even more perfect than the 
Willards, because Doctor Gordon—at least according to Esther’s 
perception—has one son and one daughter, whereas the Willards still 
lack a daughter for their completion. Esther was supposed to fill out the 
position of the daughter, and thus is threatened by the picture’s 
proposal of resurrection of the completed Willard family.  
On the other hand, Esther believes that the picture is turned 
towards her to show her that she cannot get Doctor Gordon or a man 
like Doctor Gordon. In order to deserve someone as perfect as Doctor 
Gordon, one must be a perfect woman like his wife. Thus, Esther 
suggests a competition with Doctor Gordon’s wife, instead of looking at 
her as an ally to bond with. Doctor Gordon’s smiling wife immediately 
turns into the hated enemy, whom Esther never wants to become. 
Esther overlooks the fact that Doctor Gordon’s wife after all is a victim 
of patriarchal society just like her and that the woman might hide her 
own forlorn hopes and dreams behind a smile and a façade of 
perfection—a trap Esther almost fell into herself when Buddy Willard 
proposed to her.  
Interestingly, Esther feels safe at Doctor Gordon’s office, because 
“there were no windows” (The Bell Jar 122). Because of the missing 
windows, Esther feels fully removed from patriarchal society until she 
meets Doctor Gordon and realizes that she is not removed from 
society after all, but is in a microcosm or a miniature model of the 
same society. This miniature model of patriarchal society again has 
measures of punishment, such as electroshock therapy, which Esther 
has to undergo because of her lack of improvement.  
For the shock treatment Esther is sent to Doctor Gordon’s private 
hospital in Walton: 
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Doctor Gordon’s private hospital crowned a grassy rise at the 
end of a long, secluded drive that had been whitened with broken 
quahog shells. The yellow clapboard walls of the large house, with 
its encircling veranda, gleamed in the sun, but no people strolled 
on the green dome of the lawn.  
[…] 
What bothered me was that everything about the house 
seemed normal, although I knew it must be chock-full of crazy 
people. There were no bars at the windows that I could see, and 
no wild or disquieting noises. Sunlight measured itself out in 
regular oblongs on the shabby, but soft red carpets, and a whiff of 
fresh-cut grass sweetened the air.  
I paused in the doorway of the living-room.  
For a minute I thought it was the replica of a lounge in a guest 
house I visited once on an island off the coast of Maine. The 
French doors let in a dazzle of white light, a grand piano filled the 
far corner of the room, and people in summer clothes were sitting 
about at card tables and in the lopsided wicker armchairs one so 
often finds at down-to-heel seaside resorts. 
Then I realized that none of the people were moving. (The Bell 
Jar 135-136) 
 
Doctor Gordon’s private hospital is used for more severe cases, 
which need additional treatments, such as electroshock therapy. While 
his regular office is easy to reach, the private hospital is at a greater 
distance to and further removed from the center of society. The spatial 
removal of the hospital from the center of society stands in stark 
contrast to proximity of norms represented at the hospital: Esther is 
surprised by the “normalcy” of the hospital and by the omnipresent 
silence. Because of its physical distance, Esther expects the hospital 
to be different from patriarchal society and provide an Other space. 
Instead, the hospital follows societal norms even more so than 
patriarchal society itself, enforcing silence and normalcy onto the 
impotent patients, who have been tranquillized by means of shock 
treatments or medication. Despite one’s expectations to find people 
running around wildly and screaming, a powerful silence forbids the 
mad to enact their madness, to express themselves or to speak up 
against patriarchal authority. Hence, language as a tool of power is 
denied to “the mad”. Esther also loses her ability to speak at the 
hospital when she wants to inquire what the shock treatment would be 
like.            
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Spatial removal from patriarchal society does not provide Esther 
with an alternative option as long as a change in norms and values 
does not accompany this removal. She also realizes that the hospital 
restrains mad people from the last option available to them—suicide: 
 
As the woman was dragged by, waving her arms and 
struggling in the grip of the nurse, she was saying, ‘I’m going to 
jump out of the window, I’m going to jump out of the window, I’m 
going to jump out of the window.’ 
Dumpy and muscular in her smudge-fronted uniform, the wall-
eyed nurse worse such thick spectacles that four eyes peered out 
at me from behind the round, twin panes of glass. I was trying to 
tell which eyes were the real eyes and which the false eyes, and 
which of the real eyes was the wall-eye and which the straight eye, 
when she brought her face up to mine with a large, conspiratorial 
grin and hissed, as if to reassure me, ‘She thinks she’s going to 
jump out the window but she can’t jump out the window because 
they’re all barred!’ 
And as Doctor Gordon led me into a bare room at the back of 
the house, I saw that the windows in that part were indeed barred, 
and that the room door and the closet door and the drawers of the 
bureau and everything that opened and shut was fitted with a 
keyhole so it could be locked up. (The Bell Jar 137) 
 
Upon realization that the hospital does not provide solutions or 
cures for mad people, but instead forces them to partake of a system 
they want to flee, Esther decides to flee the system before she does 
not have the power to do so anymore. Esther’s suicide attempts can 
be regarded as a rejection of Doctor Gordon and his cures and of 
patriarchal society at large.  
 
After Esther’s last suicide attempt, she wakes up at a regular 
hospital, where she is looked at like “some exciting new zoo animal” 
(The Bell Jar 167). Her suicide attempt has branded Esther and now 
people can also see in her appearance that she is an outsider of 
society, an Other. Because she is a visible Other now, Esther has to 
be moved to a special ward in another hospital in the city, where her 
roommate insists on a curtain wall between herself and Esther 
because of Esther’s otherness. Before her suicide attempt, Esther 
wanted to detach herself from society, now the members of society do 
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not want to be associated with Esther. As long as Esther appeared to 
be a normal, functioning member of society, society did not want to let 
her exclude herself, but wanted her to fulfill her purpose as a woman. 
After having altered her appearance and after having made her 
otherness visible, Esther cannot function normally anymore and is 
excluded by society.  
At the private hospital, which Mrs. Guinea pays like Esther’s 
scholarship, Esther has her “own room again” (The Bell Jar 178): 
 
It reminded me of the room in Doctor Gordon’s hospital – a 
bed, a bureau, a closet, a table and a chair. A window with a 
screen, but no bars. My room was on the first floor, and the 
window, a short distance above the pine-needle-padded ground, 
overlooked a wooded yard ringed by a red brick wall. If I jumped I 
wouldn’t even bruise my knees. The inner surface of the tall wall 
seemed smooth as glass. (The Bell Jar 178-179).  
 
Although Esther’s room is not barred, suicide attempts are reduced 
to a minimum because of the composition of the institution. Normalcy 
is simulated, but the simulation is an inconsistent one because of the 
red brick wall, which is the reminder of the exclusion from society. 
Esther first stays at a “gloomy brick building called Caplan”, where all 
sorts of amusements, such as golf or badminton, are offered to Esther 
(The Bell Jar 179). The appearance of a healthy society is held up, 
despite the apparent exclusion of the inhabitants from society.  
Again, Esther is threatened with shock treatments or the transfer to 
Wymark, “a building for worse people” (The Bell Jar 185). However, 
the psychiatric institution also works with awarding good behavior, for 
example the relocation of good patients to Belsize, where no shock 
treatments are conducted: 
 
I felt the nurse had been instructed to show me my alternatives. 
Either I got better, or I fell, down, down, like a burning, then burnt-
out star, from Belsize, to Caplan, to Wymark and finally, after 
Doctor Nolan and Mrs Guinea had given me up, to the state place 
next-door. (The Bell Jar 200)  
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The structure of society is mirrored by the structure of the asylum. 
Both work with reward and punishment, in which reward always means 
an acceptance by society for the right behavior. Living at the edge of 
society reinforces societal norms and values. Especially at the edge, 
values are held high like the red brick wall, which cannot be crossed. 
The mental state of the patients is reflected by the different buildings 
and the different rights they possess, for example to play games or to 
take walks, but in neither place mental space, namely space for 
alternative views, an alternative language or an alternative society, is 
given. As soon as alternatives are being created by the patients, they 
are punished with electroshock therapy or relocation by 
representatives of the normative patriarchal system. 
 
 
3.7. Esther’s return to society: a “happy” ending or 
self-betrayal?  
 
Although The Bell Jar has always been part of the feminist literary 
canon, Esther’s return to patriarchal society does not point at a real 
solution, but at her self-betrayal and her powerlessness to find a new 
way within the existing system. Esther does not find space for her 
thoughts, her language, or a new self. Instead she is forced into 
repeating the patterns of the women surrounding her and into fulfilling 
society’s expectations of a young, intelligent woman.  
While the main character of “The Yellow Wallpaper” might have 
chosen insanity for good, Esther chooses self-betrayal for the moment, 
until she possibly collapses again under the pressures of society. Even 
though suicide is not a typically “good” ending to a novel, it provides a 
symbolic alternative outside of patriarchal society and thus points out 
the disillusionment and hopelessness of a generation of young women.  
In reality, Sylvia Plath accomplished what her heroine Esther could 
not achieve: to free herself from a suppressing society at the cost of a 
brilliant writer.  
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4. Margaret Atwood: Surfacing 
 
The last work to be discussed in this thesis is Margaret Atwood’s 
Surfacing. The novel concludes the development from women as child-
bearers as presented in “The Yellow Wallpaper”, to educated women, 
like Esther in The Bell Jar, who have the option of getting 
contraception, but who are still expected to be the safeguards of their 
families, and finally to more modern women, whose option of abortion 
provides them with a new freedom, but also with new problems. 
Surfacing additionally advocates the return to one’s family and to one’s 
own past instead of the renouncement one’s ancestors.  
Although Surfacing was first published in 1972, only nine years 
after the first publication of The Bell Jar, major changes – however, not 
only positive ones – in the attitude towards women can be perceived. 
This development can already be seen in the main character, who is 
not a typical mad housewife, nor an insecure college girl who feels 
forced into marriage, but a grown, unmarried woman, who has both a 
career and sex. In this respect, the heroine of Surfacing is much more 
modern than either one of the previous two protagonists and mirrors 
more precisely the “madness” of contemporary women.  
 
 
4.1. The story 
 
Unlike “The Yellow Wallpaper” and The Bell Jar, Surfacing is not 
set in the USA, but in Canada. The protagonist is a woman, who is in 
her late twenties or in her thirties. She is unmarried, but has a lover, 
Joe. Joe and two of their mutual friends, the couple Anna and David, 
accompany the narrator into the Canadian wilderness, the 
protagonist’s childhood home. The reason for her return is the 
disappearance of her father, whom she has not seen for a long time. 
Her father is a scientist, who apparently discovered some old cave 
drawings and has vanished. The narrator does not believe in her 
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father’s death and instead tries to find him herself. The search leads 
her from a remote village in the francophone Canada, deeper into the 
wilderness to her family’s little house, and finally onto the circumjacent 
lakes. However, soon the search for her father turns into a search for 
her self and the narrator has to face her past and the guilt connected 
to it: her absence from her mother’s funeral and the abortion she had 
nine years before, the result of an affair with a married man. The 
narrator represses the abortion and instead only remembers it as her 
failed marriage. In fact, the narrator has never been married, but needs 
this lie in order to cope with her past. However, the reality of the 
abortion haunts the narrator in the wilderness. The first part of the 
novel describes the protagonist’s return, the confrontation with her past 
and the split of her self. The second part depicts the narrator’s 
illumination, her healing of the two parts of herself and her moving into 
her psyche, which also includes a conflict with her past, and finally the 
realization of the death of her father, whom she finds dead. In the third 
part, the possibility of the narrator’s return to community and the 
restoration of her self are central. The novel ends at the point when the 
narrator decides whether or not she wants to return to society, 
personified by her boyfriend Joe.  
 
 
4.2. Characters 
 
Surfacing focuses on the protagonist, who is influenced by her 
past. However, her parents, her lover Joe and her friends Anna and 
David influence her and give a more detailed view of the narrator’s 
situation. 
The protagonist is a young, modern woman who has everything 
Sylvia Plath’s main character Esther Greenwood always wanted to 
achieve: she has a career as an artist and is financially independent. 
She has a lover, but does not want to become pregnant and refuses 
marriage, and she has abandoned her parents, who do not interfere 
with her life. Regardless of all these advantages, the narrator is 
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unfulfilled and unhappy: the voluntary loss of both her parents and her 
aborted baby haunt her. Although she is a modern woman, she cannot 
just leave behind her past, the tradition of her family and a child she 
possibly should have had.  
Her friend Anna, by contrast, fulfills a rather traditional role of 
women: she is married to David and acts according to all his wishes 
and demands. For him she tries to become like the centerfold of 
American men’s magazines wearing tons of make-up and trying to be 
the sex object he wants at all times. Anna is caught in the mirror, which 
the narrator seeks to escape. Although Anna oftentimes has 
arguments with David, she never puts her foot down, but always gives 
in because of her fear of losing David’s love.  
David dominates Anna and ignores her wishes and feelings, 
treating her like an object instead of like a human being. It becomes 
clear that David sees all women as mere objects. His selfish attitude 
becomes visible when he wants to have sex with the protagonist, 
disregarding her relationship with Joe or her expectations from their 
friendship. Thus David is the perfect example of a violator, a person 
who victimizes everything and everyone around him. He is a 
representative of patriarchal society, from whom the protagonist wants 
to escape.  
The protagonist’s lover, Joe, although also a man, is not regarded 
as a violator by the narrator. He is a potter and is described as a 
clumsy person full of weaknesses. His weakness makes him more 
feminine and thus more lovable for the protagonist. However, he is 
coined by society aspiring institutionalized love and marriage. 
Consequently, he does not know how to handle the protagonist’s 
refusal to admit her love outspokenly and her reservations against 
marriage. Still, Joe is the reason why the narrator does not give up 
hope and still believes that society is not only made up of people who 
take advantage of nature and women. Hence, Joe’s character presents 
an opposition to both David’s misogynist attitude and the tourists who 
exploit Canadian wilderness.  
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Although the protagonist’s parents are dead, they are her link to 
childhood. Her father, a scientist, represents patriarchal society; he is 
the reasonable part in the narrator’s life and appears to be godlike. 
Although the narrator loves her father, it becomes obvious that she has 
reservations towards his rational approach towards life.  
Her mother stands for nature, she is a “natural woman”, who is 
interested in the weather and birds. She is the only female role model 
the narrator has—other than women like Anna. Ultimately, her mother 
incorporates the kind of woman the narrator wants to be: someone 
who refuses to victimize others, but who has creative potential to 
empower other people. Her mother also presents the lost part of the 
protagonist’s identity: Because of the protagonist’s rejection to attend 
her mother’s funeral and because of her general dismissal of her 
mother’s way of life, the protagonist has lost her roots and the 
connection to her female ancestry. Only by reviving the memory of her 
mother can the narrator come to terms with her past and use her 
mother’s strength to redefine her new self.  
 
 
4.3. Space 
 
4.3.1. The setting: the dichotomy between the USA and 
Canada  
 
Unlike the two other works of literature discussed before, Surfacing 
is set in Canada. Margaret Atwood constructs a binary opposition 
between two countries – a dichotomy that reminds of Plath’s binary 
construction of the USA and the USSR. However, there is a difference: 
in Surfacing the binary pairs are the USA and Canada.  
Whereas the binary opposition between the USA and the USSR in 
Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar can be regarded as an opposition between 
two equally powerful countries, which pose a threat to one another, the 
binary opposition between the USA and Canada provides a parallel 
between another existing binary pair, namely male and female or men 
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and women. The USA is connoted as the prominent and powerful part 
of the pair, like male/men, while Canada has the connotation of 
female/women appearing powerless and weak in comparison with the 
USA. The ignorance of the active/powerful part of the binary pairs 
towards the passive/powerless part leads to a one-sided problem: 
men, or respectively the USA, are ignorant to the issues the 
prominence of their privileged position cause, while women, or 
Canada, are trying to escape from this unfair power system.  
Thus, Atwood involves a twofold dichotomy in her novel which 
provides the reader with plentiful parallels between Canada’s situation 
towards the USA and women’s situation towards men. The protagonist 
is both female and Canadian which makes her passive and powerless 
in more than one dichotomy. Men interfere with her mind and set limits 
when it comes to the narrator’s psyche, while representatives of the 
USA exceed the physical borders of Canada, and thus curtail the 
narrator’s space: her refuge into wilderness is challenged by the 
presence of another dominant power system—male Americans, who 
are privileged in two ways, namely because of their origin and because 
of their gender. Erinç Özdemir comes to the conclusion that 
 
[i]n Surfacing the national and gender dimensions of the issue of 
victimhood converge in the female Canadian identity of the 
protagonist. Both Canada as a geo-political body embodying the 
Canadian nation, and woman as the female body emerge as 
entities to be taken possession of from within by resisting 
colonialization by power structures that threaten them with 
engulfment and amputation. (Özdemir 2003: 62) 
 
Another dichotomy appears within Canada itself between the 
English-speaking and the French-speaking parts of Canada. The 
narrator returns from the English-speaking part of Canada, which could 
be interpreted as the male world, into the French-speaking part of 
Canada, possibly the female world. This dichotomy relies heavily on 
language: the narrator hardly remembers the language surrounding 
her in her childhood—she has forgotten the female language. A total 
understanding between the narrator and her old acquaintances only 
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seems possible through the narrator’s final rejection of English as male 
language.18 
 
 
4.3.2. Wilderness 
 
According to Erinç Özdemir, wilderness has various functions: first 
of all, it is the “setting of the protagonist’s childhood”; secondly, 
wilderness is outside the “urban way of life” and thus functions as a 
contrast to the protagonist’s regular surroundings; thirdly wilderness 
represents victimized nature, which corresponds to the protagonist, 
who has also been victimized (Özdemir 2003: 60). Accordingly, 
wilderness has a function of isolating the protagonist and of providing 
space to her past and her thoughts which transcend patriarchal 
society.  
Arno Heller’s article “Literarischer Öko-Feminismus: Margaret 
Atwoods Surfacing”19 points at an understanding of wilderness as the 
actual victim in the novel. Heller regards the protagonist and women in 
general as a metaphor for (Canadian) wilderness, which is being 
victimized. Thus, he conducts a shift from reading Surfacing as a 
feminist work to reading it as a work that offers ecological criticism.  
Although Heller’s position has some valid points, I prefer an 
interpretation of wilderness as a parallel structure to femininity. Both 
wilderness and women are exploited and pushed towards the border of 
civilization and patriarchal society. While wilderness has to recline 
physically because of mankind, women have to retreat psychically 
because of men. The protagonist’s transformation into a place points 
at the similarities between nature and women.  
                                            
18 The relationship between Canada and the USA is essential to an understanding of 
Surfacing. However, I have opted for a different valuation in this thesis and thus, I only 
wanted to mention the similarities between Canada versus the USA and women versus 
men. The additional dichotomy within Canada itself appears as a much more complex 
opposition in the novel. My attempt at marking French as female language and English as 
male language should only provide a starting point for further reflection—not an 
unchangeable, definite thesis.  
19 Cf. Heller, Arno: “Literarischer Öko-Feminismus: Margaret Atwoods Surfacing.” In: AAA 
– Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik. 9 (1984), 1. Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen.  
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4.4. The quest for her self 
 
Arno Heller sums up the narrator’s quest for her self as her “interior 
journey” in four parts, namely “return, exploration, catharsis, and 
restart” (Heller20 1984: 40).  
 Early in the novel, the reader comes to realize that the narrator 
has not resolved her past and is now overcome by childhood 
memories and consequently is haunted by her past. Heller claims that 
“the rehabilitation of old traumata, the exposure of the suppressed are 
necessary, if the physical return should be accompanied by a psychic 
one (cf. Heller 1984: 40). Unresolved mysteries result in the narrator’s 
lack of distinction between past and present: “’That’s where the rockets 
are,’ I say. Were. I don’t correct it” (Surfacing 3). Similarly, the narrator 
cannot make up her mind, whether the area she is returning to is her 
home or not: “Now we’re on my home ground, foreign territory” 
(Surfacing 5). Hence, the narrator is split between her old, childhood 
self and her new self, which has left behind her past. Returning to her 
past is a painful process for the protagonist, especially when she 
realizes that despite the many similarities, things have changed: 
 
Nothing is the same, I don’t know the way any more. I slide my 
tongue around the ice cream, trying to concentrate on it, they put 
seaweed in it now, but I’m starting to shake, why is the road 
different, he shouldn’t have allowed them to do it, I want to turn 
around and go back to the city and never find out what happened 
to him. I’ll start crying, that would be horrible, none of them would 
 know what to do and neither would I. I bite down into the 
cone and I can’t feel anything for a minute but the knife-hard pain 
up the side of my face. Anaesthesia, that’s one technique: if it hurts 
invent a different pain. I’m all right. (Surfacing 6-7) 
 
The narrator blames her father for the changes which have taken 
place: she thinks that she cannot find her way back home because of 
him, although she was the one who left. The narrator points out the 
technique she uses to get over her pain—anesthesia. She uses 
anesthesia to forget her abortion, her mother’s death and her past. 
                                            
20 Heller’s article “Literarischer Ökofeminismus: Margaret Atwoods Surfacing” is in 
German. Therefore, I will use my own translations in all citations of his article. 
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However, anesthesia does not only make her forget the pain, but also 
who she is. Coming back home triggers a process within the narrator 
to remember her childhood, her home, her parents, herself as a part of 
her family, and later even the traumatic experience of having an 
abortion: “That won’t work, I can’t call them ‘they’ as if they were 
somebody else’s family: I have to keep myself from telling that story” 
(Surfacing 8).  
Although the protagonist accepts being part of her family, she 
thinks returning must be connected with physical pain. The narrator 
wants to be punished for her escape from and her abandonment of 
home and wants to pay for her redemption instead of experiencing a 
painless return, which points at her feelings of guilt: 
 
But they’ve cheated, we’re here too soon and I feel deprived of 
something, as though I can’t really get here unless I’ve suffered; as 
though the first view of the lake, which we can see now, blue and 
cool as redemption, should be through tears and a haze of vomit. 
(Surfacing 9) 
 
Josie P. Campbell draws a comparison between the protagonist of 
Surfacing and Shakespeare’s Hamlet, because both main characters 
have a “fragmented self, which appears as a ghost” (Campbell 
2002:18). In the case of the narrator of Surfacing, the ghost could 
either be her dead father, her aborted baby or her split self. Similarly to 
Hamlet, “the hero[ine] pushes to the outer limits of her existence in 
order to discover the self” (Campbell 2002:18). Thus, the protagonist 
has to come to terms with the abortion.  
 
The narrator had to reject her family and her old identity because 
of the abortion, which ultimately led to the fragmentation of her self. 
The reader finds out that the protagonist was involved with a married 
man, got pregnant and was practically forced into having an abortion. 
Erinç Özdemir explains that “she worshipped him (142), and […] he 
wounded her to the core of her femininity by persuading her to take an 
abortion” and that “[h]e controlled and suppressed her reproductive 
urge and power, thus damaging her self-identity (Özdemir 2003: 64). 
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However, it is important to note that Margaret Atwood’s “heroines are 
never totally innocent or helpless victims in the hands of male 
oppressors”, but that they have the “option to say no to domination” 
and the ability to “maintain a certain mental distance towards men’s 
views of sexual relationships and women” (Özdemir 2003: 63). As a 
consequence, the protagonist feels like an accomplice to her 
overpowering former lover and has put guilt upon herself, which leads 
to her loss of self and her loss of emotions. She became part of the 
victimization of her unborn baby, although she could have resisted her 
former lover’s demand.  
In Surfacing, destructive power, similar to the power her former 
lover had over the protagonist or the power the protagonist had over 
the baby, is symbolized by the presence of Americans in the story. 
However, a person does not have to be an American citizen in order to 
be an American, but is simply a person who holds power over another 
person or thing. In the novel a metaphor for victimization is given in the 
image of the dead heron:  
 
I said “It’s a heron. You can’t eat them.” I couldn’t tell how it 
had been done, bullet, smashed with a stone, hit with a stick. This 
would be a good place for herons, they would come to fish in the 
shallow water, standing on one leg and striking with the long spear 
bill. They must have got it before it had time to rise.  
[…] 
I saw a beetle on it, blueblack and oval; when the camera 
whirred it burrowed in under the feathers. Carrion beetle, death 
beetle. Why had they strung it up like a lynch victim, why didn’t 
they just throw it away like the trash? To prove they could do it, 
they had the power to kill. Otherwise it was valueless: beautiful 
form a distance but it couldn’t be tamed or cooked or trained to 
talk, the only relation they could have to a thing like that was to 
destroy it. Food, slave or corpse, limited choices; horned and 
fanged heads sawed off and mounted on the billiard room wall, 
stuffed fish, trophies. It must have been the Americans; they were 
in there now, we would meet them. (Surfacing 110-111). 
 
The people whom the protagonist believes to be Americans have 
willfully killed the heron for no reason other than to show their power. 
Later, the protagonist finds out that the people are actually Canadians 
as well, who in return mistake her and her friends for Americans. 
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But they’d killed the heron anyway. It doesn’t matter what 
country they’re from, my head said, they’re still Americans, they’re 
what’s in store for us, what we are turning into. They spread 
themselves like a virus, they get into the brain and take over the 
cells and the cells change from inside and the ones that have the 
disease can’t tell the difference. Like the late show sci-fi movies, 
creatures from outer space, body snatchers injecting themselves 
into you dispossessing your brain, their eyes blank eggshells 
behind the dark glasses. If you look like them and talk like them 
and think like them then you are them, I was saying, you speak 
their language, a language is everything you do. (Surfacing 123). 
 
The protagonist realizes that being American has nothing to do 
with citizenship, but with power relations: if one uses power to have 
power over someone or something and thus victimizes instead of 
empowering others, one is an American. The protagonist feels guilty 
looking at the dead heron, while in fact her feelings are aroused 
because of her aborted baby, which could be seen as the heron she 
murdered.  
 
I felt a sickening complicity, sticky as glue, blood on my hands, 
as though I had been there and watched without saying No or 
doing anything to stop it: one of the silent guarded faces in the 
crowd. The trouble some people have being German, I thought, I 
have being human. (Surfacing 124) 
 
Everyone, even the narrator, could be an “American”. Because of 
her abortion, the protagonist turned herself from being innocent into a 
violator, into an “American”, as well. Now she is split between her guilt 
and her lost innocence.  
 
Traveling back home into wilderness symbolizes the narrator’s 
journey to her old self, which is constituted by a fatherly and a motherly 
part of herself which she has both lost: her mother has died in a 
hospital and the protagonist did not even attend her funeral, while her 
father went missing and the protagonist still believes she can find him. 
Thus the protagonist makes the “discovery of her own fragmentation 
and self-estrangement” (Heller 1984: 40). Although the protagonist’s 
father has died, she can still find him as a part of herself. Thus, her 
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father, a scientist, is represented by her head, while her mother is 
symbolized by her body. Thus, the narrator is composed of the 
heritage of her parents: Her father’s traces can be detected in the 
narrator’s dominating logical approach to thinking, while her mother’s 
legacy can be found in the narrator’s (physical) relationship to nature 
and her renewed, powerful femininity.  
Erinç Özdemir explains R.D. Laing’s phenomenological-existential 
perspective of schizophrenia21 by stating that “the wholeness of the 
self depends on the individual’s sense of ‘embodiment’, or unity 
between her/his body and mind” (Özdemir 2003: 67). Thus, the 
protagonist is able to regain her self through merging the paternal and 
maternal parts with the help of nature and its innate gods: 
 
The protagonist finds the alternative to Christianity that she has 
been seeking in the native gods of the region a result of a spiritual 
process involving her search for her father (140). Until then she 
feels that her mind and body are split apart due to the emotional 
paralysis she experiences. The healing power of the nature gods 
helps her to start feeling again, joining her head to her body. 
(Özdemir 2003: 65). 
 
The logic and reason of her father also dominate patriarchal 
society; therefore, the protagonist has to distance herself from the 
logos, but is only able to do so when “she comes across the dead body 
of her father, which triggers her cathartic journey of madness” 
(Özdemir 2003: 68). Josie P. Campbell states that “under the water is 
her drowned father, but it is also her ‘drowned past’, the ‘break’ in the 
self (Campbell 2002: 23). The protagonist’s rebellion against patriarchy 
including her father’s logic and reason leads to a “psychic journey to 
the borderline of the Symbolic” into madness (Özdemir 2003: 66). 
Madness represents a “desire for a wholeness that is impossible within 
the boundaries of the Symbolic” (Özdemir 2003: 69).  
The protagonist sees her father’s body and thus is confronted with 
death when she is diving in the lake, looking for the cave paintings:  
 
                                            
21 For a more detailed presentation of Laing’s work, please check R.D. Laing’s The 
Divided Self. 
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On the next try I thought I saw it, a blotch, a shadow, just as I 
turned to go up. I was dizzy, my vision was beginning to cloud, 
while I rested my ribs panted, I ought to pause, half an hour at 
least; but I was elated, it was down there, I would find it. Reckless I 
balanced and plunged. 
Pale green, then darkness, layer after layer, deeper than 
before, seabottom; the water seemed to have thickened, in it 
pinprick lights flicked and darted, red and blue, yellow and white, 
and I saw they were fish, the chasm-dwellers, fins lined with 
phosphorescent sparks, teeth neon. It was wonderful that I was 
down so far, I watched the fish, they swam like patterns on closed 
eyes, my legs and arms were weightless, free-floating; I almost 
forgot to look for the cliff and the shape. 
It was there but it wasn’t a painting, it wasn’t on the rock. It was 
below me, drifting towards me from the furthest level where there 
was no life, a dark oval trailing limbs. It was blurred but it had eyes, 
they were open, it was something I knew about, a dead thing, it 
was dead. (Surfacing 136) 
 
According to Heller, the plunging into the lake symbolizes a 
“plunging in the dark side of the unconscious” and points at an “end of 
repression and projection “ opening an “emotional part of her 
personality” (Heller 1984: 45). The protagonist consequently makes 
the connection between the dead thing and the abortion she has had: 
 
I lay on the bottom of the canoe and closed my eyes; I wanted 
him not to be there. It formed again in my head: at first I thought it 
was my drowned brother, hair floating around the face, image I’d 
kept from before I was born; but it couldn’t be him, he had not 
drowned after all, he was elsewhere. Then I recognized it: it wasn’t 
my brother I’d been remembering, that had been a disguise. 
I knew when it was, it was in a bottle curled up, staring out at 
me like a cat pickled; it had huge jelly eyes and fins instead of 
hands, fish gills, I couldn’t let it out, it was dead already, it had 
drowned in air. It was there when I woke up, suspended in the air 
above me like a chalice, an evil grail and I thought, Whatever it is, 
part of myself or a separate creature, I killed it. It wasn’t a child but 
it could have been one, I didn’t allow it. (Surfacing 137) 
 
Upon seeing the body of her dead father, the protagonist has an 
epiphany, realizing that together with the aborted baby, she also killed 
part of herself. Thus, the epiphany can be seen in relation to her dead 
father, the aborted baby or herself, as Erinç Özdemir shows: 
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The protagonist’s memory of her mother saving her brother from 
drowning when he was little and her memory of the foetus taken 
out of her womb, triggered by the sight of her father’s drowned 
body in the lake, are signs of her fear of her own self being 
drowned. She has to dive into the lake and confront the reality of 
death – her father’s and by association her foetus’s – before she 
can be saved from ‘drowning’ and ‘surface again. […] Hence she 
can finally discard the false sanity which she has been trying to 
preserve by means of logic, and plunge into madness. (Özdemir 
2003: 69)  
 
Meera T. Clark equates the regaining of the narrator’s “inner, 
feeling self” with Özdemir’s “plunge into madness” (Clark 1983:7, 
Özdemir 2003: 69):  
 
As she dives and dives again into the lake which mirrors her own 
sternly repressed, unconscious self, she at last finds what she has 
come to find: the power of the gods which resides with the dead, 
and the power which resides in the unconscious. As she surfaces 
from the lake, her lost and buried self also surfaces to her 
consciousness, and she finally confronts the image of her aborted 
baby. She finds, or rather, recovers that power when she confronts 
death—both emotional and physical. She faces up to her father’s 
death and her own emotional death. For her inner, feeling self had 
died in the process of repressing her pain over her aborted child. 
(Clark 1983: 7) 
 
The protagonist reenters the realm of “the pre-Oedipal, where 
there are no dualities but only wholeness” (Özdemir 2003:69). As a 
consequence, the protagonist does not only have a connection with 
her father, but also reconnects with her mother’s sphere. Finally she 
finds the “gift from her mother” in a drawing from her own childhood, 
namely the knowledge that “what she must do is to get pregnant and 
give birth to an animal-god (156)”, which would finally mean 
redemption for the aborted baby and would make her whole again, 
because the overcoming of death is only possible through the creation 
of new life” (Heller 1984: 45). Therefore, the protagonist has sex with 
Joe: 
 
Teeth grinding, he’s holding back, he wants it to be like the city, 
baroque scrollwork, intricate as a computer, but I’m impatient, 
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pleasure is redundant, the animals don’t have pleasure. I guide him 
into me, it’s the right season, I hurry. 
He trembles and then I can feel my lost child surfacing within 
me, forgiving me, rising from the lake where it has been prisoned 
for so long, its eyes and teeth phosphorescent; the two halves 
clasp, interlocking like fingers, it buds, its sends out fronds. This 
time I will do it by myself, squatting, on old newspapers in a corner 
alone, or on leaves, dry leaves, a heap of them, that’s cleaner. The 
baby will slip out easily as an egg, a kitten, and I’ll lick it off and bite 
the cord, the blood returning to the ground where it belongs; the 
moon will be full, pulling. In the morning I will be able to see it: it 
will be covered with shining fur, a god, I will never teach it any 
words. (Surfacing 155-156) 
 
The protagonist wants to return fully into the realm of nature in 
order to finish the “cathartic process of individuation” by leaving behind 
the city and all its attributes including language (Heller 1984: 46). She 
wants her god-child to be conceived in a natural way: Instead of having 
cultured, urbane sex with Joe, she wants to procreate like animals. 
Additionally, she wants her child to be spared from the power relations 
inherent in language. Since language distinguishes humans from 
animals, the protagonist chooses to return to being an animal herself, 
thus making “a voyage from the ego to the self”, where “the totality that 
embraces both consciousness and the unconscious” can be found 
(Özdemir 2003: 70).  
Josie P. Campbell discovers that with the act of impregnation 
“stereotypical sexual roles have been reversed; the protagonist uses 
the male for her own purposes” and that a rebirth of both the dead 
baby and the protagonist takes place: “as the ‘lost’ child is to be born 
again, so too is the narrator” (Campbell 2002: 25). To Erinç Özdemir 
“the half-animal, half-god child to which she imagines she will give birth 
at the end of the novel signals the archetypal rebirth of the 
protagonist’s self beyond the boundaries of the ego” (Özdemir 2003: 
70).  
 
The protagonist’s new self rejects everything connected to society 
and thus she does not return to civilization with her friends, but 
disposes of everything that reminds her of civilization: she makes due 
without her brush, without clothes, without food, which cannot be found 
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in nature, and turns around the mirror in the cabin, in order to make 
“complete reintegration possible” (Heller 1984: 46): 
 
But when I pick up the brush there is a surge of fear in my 
hand, the power is there again in a different form, it must have 
seeped up through the ground during the lightning. I know that the 
brush is forbidden, I must stop being in the mirror. I look for the last 
time at my distorted glass face: eyes lightblue in dark red skin, hair 
standing tangled out from my read, reflection intruding between my 
eyes and vision. Not to see myself but to see. I reverse the mirror 
so it’s toward the wall, it no longer traps me, Anna’s soul closed in 
the gold compact, that and not the camera is what I should have 
broken. (Surfacing 169) 
 
The reversing of the mirror shows the break between the narrator 
and her friend Anna: Anna resembles the other tourists, who exploit 
nature; thus, she belongs to the patriarchal system the narrator rejects. 
The narrator wants to overcome her past, the part she plays in the 
patriarchal system and thus does not want to turn into Anna, the only 
role for women in civilization the protagonist knows. Josie P. Campbell 
discovers that 
 
[a]s she steps ‘out of the self’ and her world envisioned in the 
mirror, so she steps out of her own time and into that of her 
parents, running the double risk of madness and death. Atwood 
reveals the protagonist’s passage from one time into another 
through a ritual bathing in the lake. (Campbell 2002: 26) 
 
Bathing includes a process of repurification, similar to the one 
Esther Greenwood in The Bell Jar tries to undergo in New York City; 
additionally, undressing is compared by Atwood to peeling off 
wallpaper, a metaphor used in “The Yellow Wallpaper” for the 
narrator’s attempts to escape the patriarchal system:  
 
I untie my feet from the shoes and walk down to the shore; the 
earth is damp, cold, pockmarked with raindrops. I pile the blanket 
on the rock and step into the water and lie down. When every part 
of me is wet I take off my clothes, peeling them away from my flesh 
like wallpaper. They sway beside me, inflated, the sleeves 
bladders of air. 
My back is on the sand, my head rests against the rock, 
innocent as plankton; my hair spreads out, moving and fluid in the 
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water. The earth rotates, holding my body down to it as it holds the 
moon; the sun pounds in the sky, red flames and rays pulsing from 
it, searing away the wrong form that encases me, dry rain soaking 
through me, warming the blood egg I carry. I dip my head beneath 
the water, washing my eyes.  
Inshore a loon; it lowers its head, then lifts it again and calls. It 
sees me but it ignores me, accepts me as part of the land. 
When I am clean I come up out of the lake, leaving my false 
body floated on the surface, a cloth decoy; it jiggles in the waves I 
make, nudges gently against the dock. (Surfacing 171-172)  
 
 The bathing ritual indicates the protagonist’s release of her former 
self and her becoming part of nature. The protagonist makes space for 
her new self outside of civilization and outside the realm of the logical 
and rational, turning into part of nature, identifying as nature’s 
language and objects, and even leaving behind her own time in order 
to enter her parents’ time and timelessness.  
To Heller “the total cancellation of differentiation in an annulment of 
separate identity within biosphere” represents “the last phase of the 
process of regression” (Heller 1984: 46). Similarly, Özdemir comes to 
the conclusion that “she must isolate herself totally from human society 
in order to go through the ritualistic process of healing necessary for 
her to regain her sanity” (Özdemir 2003: 65). By rejecting patriarchal 
language and civilization, the protagonist has provided space for her 
new self to develop or to relearn a language, which does not exert 
power, but empowers. She is within a space of unity, instead of being 
within a society of dichotomies; hence she leaves behind patriarchal 
society and, instead, is everything surrounding her and becomes “a 
place” (Surfacing 175):  
 
The animals have no need for speech, why talk when you are a 
word 
I lean against a tree, I am a tree leaning 
 
I break out again into the bright sun and crumple, head against 
the ground 
I am not an animal or a tree, I am the thing in which the trees 
and animals move and grow, I am a place (Surfacing 175) 
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The narrator’s identity as “a place” signifies the break with her old, 
exploited and exploiting self. Being “a place” is a state of 
unity/madness, in which the protagonist encounters her ancestors: she 
meets the ghost of her mother and consoles with her: her mother died 
in a hospital instead of dying within nature. Now “her mother can be 
released to death […] in nature itself” (Campbell 2002: 26): 
 
Then I see her. She is standing in front of the cabin, her hand 
stretched out, she is wearing her grey leather jacket; her hair is 
long, down to her shoulders in the style of thirty years ago, before I 
was born; she turned half away from me, I can see only the side of 
her face. She doesn’t move, she is feeding them: one perches on 
her wrist, another one on her shoulder. 
[…] 
I go up to where she was. The jays are there in the trees, 
cawing at me; there are a few scraps on the feeding tray still, 
they’ve knocked some to the ground. I squint up at them, trying to 
see her, trying to see which one she is; they hop, twitch their 
feathers, turn their heads, fixing me first with one eye, then the 
other. (Surfacing 176)  
 
The protagonist’s mother becomes a nurturing goddess of nature, 
while she encounters her father as a “dormant, immortal, indifferent 
spirit of nature” (Heller 1984: 46): 
 
He is standing near the fence with his back to me, looking in at 
the garden. The late afternoon sunlight falls obliquely between the 
treetrunks on the hill, down on him, clouding him in an orange 
haze, he wavers as if through water. 
He has realized he was an intruder; the cabin, the fences, the 
fires and paths were violations; now his own fence excludes him, 
as logic excludes love. He wants it ended, the borders abolished, 
he wants the forest to flow back into the paces his mind cleared: 
reparation. 
I say Father. 
He turns towards me and it’s not my father. It is what my father 
saw, the thing you meet when you’ve stayed here too long alone.  
I’m not frightened, it’s too dangerous for me to be frightened of 
it; it gazes at me for a time with its yellow eyes, wolf’s eyes, 
depthless but lambent as the eyes of animals seen at night in the 
car headlights. Reflectors. It does not approve of me or disapprove 
of me, it tells me it has nothing to tell me, only the fact of itself. 
Then its head swings away with an awkward, almost crippled 
motion: I do not interest it, I am part of the landscape, I could be 
anything, a tree, a deer skeleton, a rock. 
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I see now that although it isn’t my father it is what my father 
has become. I knew he wasn’t dead. (Surfacing 180-181) 
 
The encounter with the ghosts of her mother and her father has a 
healing, therapeutic function on the protagonist: “It causes an 
annulment and merging of the oppositions – father and mother, male 
and female principle, rationality and emotion, mind and body, 
conscious and unconscious” (Heller 1984: 47). The protagonist 
realizes that both her mother and her father have become a part of 
nature and that she can now regain an ego and return to civilization as 
a whole being. Madness does not prescribe her set rules anymore: 
“The rules are over. I can go anywhere now, into the cabin, into the 
garden, I can walk on the paths. I am the only one left alive on the 
island” (Surfacing 182).  
Consolidating with her past, with her aborted baby, and with her 
parents empowers the protagonist to reemerge from her healing 
madness. Although she is scared of the Americans who want to find 
her, she can finally return, because “[s]he knows that the alternative is 
death or the mental hospital” (Özdemir 2003: 71). The protagonist 
even has an optimistic view regarding civilization and believes that she 
is strong enough not to become an oppressing part of patriarchal 
society, but to stay true to her new self: 
 
I could take the canoe that’s roped up in the swamp and paddle 
the ten miles to the village, now, tomorrow, when I’ve eaten and 
I’m strong enough. Then back to the city and the pervasive 
menace, the Americans. They exist, they’re advancing, they must 
be dealt with, but possibly they can be watched and predicted and 
stopped without being copied. (Surfacing 183) 
 
The protagonist has to come to terms with the image she has of 
her mother and father as unfailing and god-like and must realize that 
they are humans who make mistakes—just like her: 
 
No gods to help me now, they’re questionable once more, 
theoretical as Jesus. They’ve receded, back to the past, inside the 
skull, is it the same place. They’ll never appear to me again, I can’t 
afford it; from now on I’ll have to live in the usual way, defining 
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them by their absence; and love by its failures, power by its loss, 
its renunciation. I regret them; but they give only one kind of truth, 
one hand.  
No total salvation, resurrection, Our father, Our mother, I pray, 
Reach down for me, but it won’t work: they dwindle, grow, become 
what they were, human. Something I never gave them credit for; 
but their totalitarian innocence was my own. (Surfacing 183-184)  
 
According to Josie P. Campbell, “[t]o accept their humanness is to 
accept her own with all her frailties and subsequent guilt” (Campbell 
2002: 26). As a consequence, the protagonist understands that she 
has to abandon madness for her new ego, because she owes it to her 
parents to prefer life to death and to psychiatry (cf. Surfacing 182): 
 
That is the real danger now, the hospital or the zoo, where we 
are put, species and individual, when we can no longer cope. They 
would never believe it’s only a natural woman, state of nature, they 
thing of that as a tanned body on a beach with washed hair waving 
like scarves; not this, face dirt-caked and streaked, skin grimed 
and scabby, hair like a frayed bathmat stuck with leaves and twigs. 
A new kind of centrefold. (Surfacing 184) 
 
The protagonist abandons madness for “a new, life-affirming, 
separate and still holistic identity as ‘natural woman’” (Heller 1984: 47). 
Hence, she follows her mother’s path, who has also been a ‘natural 
woman’, strengthening the connection to her female predecessors.  
With her new identity as a ‘natural woman’, the protagonist is 
strong enough “to refuse to be a victim” (Surfacing 185): 
 
Unless I can do that I can do nothing. I have to recant, give up 
the old belief that I am powerless and because of if nothing I can 
do will ever hurt anyone. A lie which was always more disastrous 
than the truth would have been. The word games, the winning and 
losing games are finished; at the moment there are no others but 
they will have to be invented, withdrawing is no longer possible and 
the alternative is death. (Surfacing 185) 
 
The protagonist’s quest for self ends with her refusal to become an 
oppressing part of patriarchal society and to have power over people. 
Instead she chooses a path of empowerment, staying true to her ties 
to her ancestors and nature.  
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A reconciliation with society can be seen in the protagonist’s 
attitude towards Joe, who has come back to find her:  
 
He calls my name, then pauses, “Are you here?” Echo: here, 
here? 
He must have been waiting in the village, the searchers must 
have told him they’d seen me, perhaps he was with them. He 
stayed behind when David and Anna went away in their car, or he 
drove to the city with them and then hitched back, walked back, 
what’s important is that he’s here, a mediator, an ambassador, 
offering me something: captivity in any of its forms, a new 
freedom? 
I watch him, my love for him useless as a third eye or a 
possibility. If I go with him we will have to talk, wooden houses are 
obsolete, we can no longer live in spurious peace by avoiding each 
other, the way it was before, we will have to begin. For us it’s 
necessary, the intercession of words; and we will probably fail, 
sooner or later, more or less painfully. That’s normal, it’s the way it 
happens now and I don’t know whether it’s worth it or even if I can 
depend on him, he may have been sent as a trick. But he isn’t an 
American, I can see that now; he isn’t anything, he is only half-
formed, and for that reason I can trust him. (Surfacing 186) 
 
Because of Joe, the protagonist discovers that not all people 
outside of the innocent wilderness are oppressing representatives of 
patriarchy and that there is still hope. However, her hope is tainted and 
she believes that sooner or later they will fail. The importance is that 
the protagonist is willing to try and to return to society, strengthened by 
her spiritual, mythic encounter with her parents and nature. Özdemir 
states that the reader can discover “signs of empowerment resulting 
from her spiritual journey into inner space and time” within the 
protagonist, which helps her accept human failure (Özdemir 2003: 76). 
Still, the ending of the novel is left open, because the narrator – 
although about to go back – has yet to take the step back to society: 
“To trust is to let go. I tense forward, towards the demands and 
questions, though my feet do not move yet” (Surfacing 186).  
At the end of the novel and the protagonist’s quest for her self, 
“nature is once more a neutral place, indifferent to all human struggle”, 
because “once the protagonist re-enters the Symbolic, the realm of 
nature is no longer a source of power and nurture” (Özdemir 2003: 76): 
“The lake is quiet, the trees surround me, asking and giving nothing” 
 109 
(Surfacing 186). It is significant that the novel ends with reference to 
nature, again pointing at the parallels between women and nature as 
objects of patriarchal victimization.  
 
 
4.5. Language 
 
The narrator’s return to the environment of her childhood coincides 
with the confrontation of English and French. The narrator and her 
friends use English to communicate; in the novel English is connected 
to the narrator’s life in the city and her flight from her family. Although 
she also used English with her parents, English used to be a sign of 
isolation in her childhood, because the people surrounding her spoke 
French. Thus, English only gained a negative meaning throughout the 
narrator’s life, turning this language into a patriarchal tool to hold 
power over others. In her childhood, French represented civilization 
and was a means of excluding the protagonist, whose French was 
deficient. Thus, French has the same connotation as an instrument of 
patriarchal power. Upon her return, the narrator is not able to 
understand much French anymore, which might also prove that she 
does not understand patriarchal civilization anymore. Meera T. Clark 
suggests that 
 
[h]er statement that her throat constrict when she hears words that 
mean nothing can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is possible 
that she refers to the French spoken by the natives of Quebec. She 
is English, and she is uncomfortable with a foreign language. Or 
she could be saying that meaningless words, conventional phrases 
devoid of content, make her acutely uncomfortable. She does not 
trust words and would rather deal with ‘hand alphabets,’ i.e., 
alphabets as written pictures, not spoken sounds. (Clark 1983: 6) 
 
Clark is convinced of Margaret Atwood’s “profound distrust of 
language as a means of communication between people, proposing, 
instead, a non-verbal or meta-language as infinitely superior” (Clark 
1983: 3). This attitude can be seen when the narrator additionally 
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distances herself from English as the language of patriarchal society 
throughout the novel. The (English) language makes less and less 
sense to her and although she understands single words, she cannot 
make meaning of what has been said to her and she cannot use it 
anymore:  
 
It was the language again, I couldn’t use it because it wasn’t 
mine. He must have known what he meant but it was an imprecise 
word; the Eskimoes had fifty-two names for snow because it was 
important to them, there ought to be as many for love. (Surfacing 
100) 
 
According to Arno Heller, “words like ‘love’ are meaningless to her, 
because they have become imprecise” and because “language 
threatens to freeze into a totalitarian system, which reduces the world 
to mere objects” (Heller 1984: 41). As a consequence “language is 
misapplied as a tool of repression and suppression of others” (Heller 
1984: 41). The reader is confronted with patriarchal language as a 
means of suppression in the shape of Anna and David. Özdemir notes 
that 
 
[s]exual power politics emerges in the novel as a matter of power-
over, and is enacted by David and Anna in its most destructive 
form. Their superficial intimacy, consisting mostly of verbal power 
games, is a show they put on for the audience – in this case for the 
protagonist and Joe. What really sustains their relationship is the 
asymmetric balance of power and the maintenance of which Anna 
must constantly strive lest she lose David. (Özdemir 2003:64) 
 
Özdemir shows that language does not consist of more than of 
power-over for David and Anna. Although Joe and the protagonist do 
not participate in verbal power games, the protagonist recognizes 
herself in David, because “like him she has forgot to meaningfully 
communicate with other people – verbally and nonverbally” (Heller 
1984: 42).  
Özdemir states that “[l]anguage as a register of the Law-of-the-
Father excludes any legitimate space for the Mother and the feminine” 
(Özdemir 2003: 68). Özdemir’s statement is supported by Meera T. 
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Clark’s argument that “[w]ords and language based on logic can only 
do the same—confine, fence off, evade and lie” (Clark 1983: 7). 
Therefore it is not surprising that the narrator only regains a connection 
to her mother and to the alternative image of women as “natural 
women” after abandoning patriarchal language, which includes the 
narrator’s loss of her name: 
 
Joe comes up the steps, shouting; Anna shouts too, shrill, like 
a train whistle before departure, my name. It’s too late, I no longer 
have a name. I tried for all those years to be civilized but I’m not 
and I’m through pretending. (Surfacing 162) 
 
Clark recognizes in “her refusal to answer” “the ultimate refusal to 
acknowledge her human identity, an identity which separates her from 
the rest of nature” (Clark 1983: 7). The protagonist conducts a “search 
for another language, one that would allow non-destructive 
relationships with others and nature”, a language which does not 
signify power over others, but which gives power to them and therefore 
is empowering (Özdemir 2003:58).  
The language the narrator seeks is similar to the legacy her 
parents left behind. Neither mother nor father left her words, but 
tokens: “But even though they did not leave her any words as a legacy, 
they did leave her with something which proves much more 
important—images, visual ones” (Clark 1983: 6). 
The retrieval of a new, feminine language is accompanied by a 
change in the style used in Surfacing: although the novel’s style has a 
disrupted character from beginning on, language becomes more and 
more fragmented; words and punctuation signs are left out, grammar is 
not the supreme category anymore. The interior change of the 
protagonist is thus reflected by her narrative voice: 
 
The forest leaps upward, enormous, the way it was before they 
cut it, columns of sunlight frozen; the boulders float, melt, 
everything is made of water, even the rocks. In one of the 
languages there are no nouns, only verbs held for a longer 
moment. 
The animals have no need for speech, why talk when you are a 
word 
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I lean against a tree, I am a tree leaning 
 
I break out again into the bright sun and crumple, head against 
the ground 
I am not an animal or a tree, I am a thing in which the trees and 
animals move and grow, I am a place (Surfacing 175)  
 
From the lake a fish jumps 
An idea of a fish jumps (Surfacing 181)  
 
Her speaking voice has turned into the sounds of animals: “I laugh, 
and a noise comes out like something being killed: a mouse, a bird?” 
(Surfacing 184). Clark believes that  
 
[h]er words no longer ‘sanely’ represent reality. They remake 
reality in the image of her won power like God […]. Her liberated 
imagination is creating the primal scene—forest, boulders evolving 
out of the first element—water, even as her unborn baby is growing 
in her amniotic fluid. In this vision, there are as yet no 
distinguishing nouns—only active verbs, creating. (Clark 1983: 11) 
 
After the reconciliation of the maternal and the paternal parts of her 
split self, 
 
[a]fter having railed against [language], after having destroyed its 
logic, after breaking its rules, she arrives at the possibility of a new 
language. […] It is a language not bound by reason, not enervated 
by logic. It is a visionary language, able to express an unmediated 
vision. It is the old language, cleansed and reinvented, endowed 
with power by herself. (Clark 1983: 12)  
 
At the end of the novel the protagonist regains her name and 
understands human language again: “He calls my name, then pauses, 
‘Are you here?’ Echo: here, here?” (Surfacing 186).  
 
 
4.6. A new woman with new responsibilities   
 
Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing efficiently shows problems connected 
to the new image of women in the 1970s. Being able to pursue a 
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career, to use contraception or have abortions does not mean equality. 
Thus, the perfect image of Doctor Nolan in The Bell Jar is ultimately 
and irrevocably destroyed. Despite some newly gained rights, women 
oftentimes are still the victims of patriarchy and of men, which cannot 
solely be countervailed with a career of one’s own.  
The novel relates the experiences of a young woman who has 
become the ally of her married lover, who forces her into having an 
abortion. However, it also shows that women have the option to say no 
and to refuse to be a victim. Unfortunately this option oftentimes is not 
being exercised – because of internalized patriarchal values and 
concepts of morality or because of fear of losing the person one loves.  
The lesson to be learned from the novel is to stop being a victim, to 
stop victimizing others and to finally take over responsibility, which 
everyone—men and women equally—has: 
 
This above all, to refuse to be a victim. Unless I can do that I 
can do nothing. I have to recant, give up the old believe that I am 
powerless and because of it nothing I can do will ever hurt anyone. 
A lie which was always more disastrous than the truth would have 
been. The word games, the winning and losing games are finished; 
at the moment there are no others but they will have to be 
invented, withdrawing is no longer possible and the alternative is 
death. (Surfacing 185)  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Although the three heroines discussed in this thesis are different 
characters and live in different social situations, their choice to flee 
patriarchal society by means of madness remains the same.  
The narrator in Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” disobeys the rules of her husband and Victorian society 
and chooses madness over an unfulfilled life as a wife and mother. 
The consequences for her are crucial: She is robbed of the possibility 
of writing and expressing herself and is condemned to a house and 
later to a room far away from the center of society. However, the 
narrator manages to subvert her situation and instead of being locked 
in a small space under the control of her husband—a representative of 
patriarchal society—she finds her own space in her mind, where she 
can be herself. Madness becomes her means to defy the role assigned 
to her by Victorian society. Consequently, madness can be regarded 
as a positive tool for finding one’s identity. 
 
Esther Greenwood, the protagonist of Sylvia Plath’s novel The Bell 
Jar, finds herself in a similar position as the narrator of “The Yellow 
Wallpaper:” She feels obliged to play the role patriarchal society 
expects, namely the role of a wife and mother. Although it is possible 
for women in the United States of the 1950s to work and to have a 
career in certain fields, the choices are limited and Esther is robbed of 
one choice after the other. Ultimately, Esther’s disillusionment leads to 
her madness and her suicide attempts. Esther fails at withdrawing 
herself completely from society and consequently, she is treated in 
psychiatric institutions by representatives of patriarchal society. At the 
psychiatric institutions, madness is punished by electroshocks and the 
withdrawal of privileges; consequently, no other way but punished 
madness and suicide presents itself to Esther. By choosing life, Esther 
surrenders and abandons madness as a solution. Instead, she 
becomes part of patriarchal society again. Unlike the narrator of “The 
Yellow Wallpaper,” Esther has not been empowered by her madness 
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and has not learned how to use it to create her own space and her 
own identity. 
 
Margaret Atwood’s Surfacing presents a protagonist who uses 
madness to liberate herself from the ties of patriarchal society, to 
create a new identity and who—possibly—returns with new strength to 
society where she can live an alternative life. For the constitution of 
this new self, the protagonist relies on nature—the Canadian 
wilderness—and her ancestral bonds to her dead parents, especially 
to her mother. The return to her past and to nature is linked to 
abandoning every symbol of patriarchal society, such as clothes or 
language. In the wilderness, the protagonist undergoes a necessary 
change to survive in patriarchal society without becoming a 
representative of this very society: The protagonist learns to value and 
empower other people and nature instead of holding power over them. 
Empowering others leads to an addition of power in the protagonist as 
well.  
 
Gilman’s and Atwood’s heroines follow the same pattern: They 
enter madness, abandon everything connected to patriarchal society—
including language—and constitute a new, stronger self using a new, 
feminine language.  
The narrator of “The Yellow Wallpaper” stays in this state of 
empowerment until the end of the story, whereas the protagonist of 
Surfacing (almost) manages to reappear in patriarchal society without 
giving up her newly found identity.  
Plath’s heroine Esther Greenwood does not undergo this process 
of empowerment, because she is deceived by her female psychiatrist 
Doctor Nolan, whose role she wants to copy. Esther does not 
recognize that Doctor Nolan is only a representative of patriarchal 
society, who cannot offer Esther real freedom in patriarchal society.  
 
Despite all kinds of measures to gender equality, many women in 
the 21st century are still mere objects to patriarchal power and do not 
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have other means to escape this power than the protagonists in the 
literary works discussed in this thesis, namely madness. Hence, 
society’s discourse on madness ought to change: Instead of excluding 
people who are considered “mad”, categories should be abolished, 
providing space for alternatives to the power structures of patriarchal 
society.  
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Appendix 1 – German Summary  
 
Diese Diplomarbeit befasst sich mit drei literarischen Werken, die 
Wahnsinn thematisieren, nämlich „The Yellow Wallpaper“ von Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, The Bell Jar von Sylvia Plath und Surfacing von Margaret 
Atwood. 
Zuerst werden die Begriffe Wahnsinn und Weiblichkeit als Ergebnisse 
eines historischen Diskurses erklärt und in den Zusammenhang mit einer 
feministischen Literaturtheorie gesetzt; zusätzlich wird ein historischer 
Abriss der Psychiatrie gegeben. Daraus geht hervor, dass Wahnsinn und 
Weiblichkeit parallele Konstruktionen sind, die von der patriarchalen 
Gesellschaft gebraucht werden, um festzustellen was „normal“ ist. So 
werden die Termini „wahnsinnig“ und „weiblich“ immer negativ gesehen 
und mit „normal“ und „männlich“ kontrastiert. Diese binäre Opposition ist 
jedoch nur ein Konstrukt von historischen Diskursen, die von den jeweilig 
mächtigen Institutionen dominiert werden. Folglich wird in dieser 
Diplomarbeit versucht, das Konzept des „Wahnsinns“ zu dekonstruieren 
und die negative Konnotation dieses Terminus durch eine mögliche 
positive Deutung zu ersetzen.  
Charlotte Perkins Gilmans Kurzgeschichte „The Yellow Wallpaper“, das 
1892 entstanden ist, wird in dieser Diplomarbeit als Vorläufer für die 
beiden anderen Werke gehandelt wird. Der Prozess des Verrücktwerdens 
wird als Befreiungsprozess einer Frau gesehen, die keinen anderen 
Ausweg aus ihrer Lage als unterdrückte Ehefrau und Mutter hat als den 
Wahnsinn. Besonderer Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Aufteilung von 
Fläche gerichtet: Die Protagonistin hat immer weniger physischen Platz 
zur Verfügung und verflüchtigt sich deshalb in den psychischen Raum, 
den ihr der Wahnsinn bietet. Weiters ist die Verwendung der Sprache 
zentral, da sich das Sprachvermögen der Protagonistin gemeinsam mit 
ihrem psychischen Zustand verändert; die unterdrückende Sprache der 
patriarchalen Gesellschaft wird für eine neue, weibliche Sprache 
aufgegeben.  
Sylvia Plaths The Bell Jar aus dem Jahre 1963 handelt von den 
Selbstmordversuchen der Protagonistin Esther Greenwood, die als 
 125 
Hilferuf, aber auch als Versuch der Flucht aus der patriarchalen 
Gesellschaft der 1950er und dem dort vertretenen Rollenbild der Frau als 
Ehefrau und Mutter gesehen werden. In der Folge spielt neben Raum und 
Sprache auch die Psychiatrie als Abbild der patriarchalen Gesellschaft 
eine entscheidende Rolle. Die Psychiatrie versucht den Wahnsinn so weit 
zu unterdrücken, indem Bestrafung in Form von Elektroschocks oder 
Entzug diverser Privilegien eingesetzt wird, dass die Patienten wieder als 
„normale“ Mitglieder der Gesellschaft „funktionieren“. Esthers Zustand 
„normalisiert“ sich, weil sie sich von dem (trügerischen) Vorbild ihrer Ärztin 
dazu verleiten lässt anzunehmen, dass es für eine Frau im Amerika der 
1950er Jahre andere Rollen gibt als die der Ehefrau und Mutter.  
Als letztes literarisches Zeugnis des Wahnsinns wird Margaret Atwoods 
Surfacing betrachtet. Surfacing spielt in der kanadischen Wildnis der 
1970er Jahre. Die Protagonistin muss eine vorhergegangene Abtreibung 
verarbeiten und flüchtet sich dabei in den Wahnsinn, indem sie Teil der 
Natur wird, die Sprache der Gesellschaft aufgibt und zu ihren Wurzeln als 
„natürliche Frau“ zurückkehrt. Der hier präsentierte Wahnsinn befähigt die 
Protagonistin ihre Vergangenheit zu bewältigen und neue Kraft für das 
Leben in einer unterdrückenden Gesellschaft zu erlangen. Die 
Protagonistin lernt im Wahnsinn, dass sie sich nicht in die Opferrolle 
drängen lassen darf, aber auch keine Macht über andere Menschen und 
über die Natur ausüben soll, sondern ihre Umwelt bemächtigen soll. Somit 
gehen zusätzlich gewonnene Rechte der Frauen mit einer neuen 
Selbstverantwortung überein, die die Protagonistin erkennt.  
Die beschriebenen Werke spannen einen historischen Bogen von der 
Viktorianischen Gesellschaft, mit der eine völlige Unterdrückung der 
Frauen einhergeht, über die 1950er Jahre, in denen Frauen nach wie vor 
als Stütze der Männer gesehen wurden, bis in die 1970er, wo Frauen 
sexuell und wirtschaftlich unabhängiger waren, jedoch auch mit 
herkömmlichen Frauenbildern konfrontiert wurden. Allen drei 
Protagonistinnen bietet der Wahnsinn eine Zuflucht von ihrer „normalen“ 
Rolle als Frau. Wahnsinn kann dafür genutzt werden, traditionelle 
Rollenbilder zu untergraben, wie zum Beispiel in „The Yellow Wallpaper“, 
oder, wie in Surfacing, um neue Kraft zu schöpfen und einen anderen 
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Umgang in der Gesellschaft zu lernen. The Bell Jar zeigt, dass Wahnsinn 
jedoch nicht nur positiv wirken kann, sondern einer Frau auch ihre letzten 
Rechte der Selbstbestimmung nehmen kann. Wahnsinn ist somit 
einerseits ein Instrument der patriarchalen Gesellschaft, mit dem anders 
Handelnde ausgeschlossen werden; andererseits kann Wahnsinn bewusst 
als subversives Werkzeug genutzt werden, um eine neue Identität 
außerhalb der Gesellschaft zu konstituieren. 
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